THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.
WE are sorry that the peace negotiations are at a deadlock, but glad of the reason. The reason is the refusal of England to agree to the proposal that Turkey shall continue to occupy Trikhala, Larissa, and Volo so long as the war indemnity remains unpaid. The Sultan and the rest of the Powers consider that Turkey should, as it were, be bought out of the territory she now occupies step by step. Each evacuation of a town or district is to be purchased by an instalment of the indemnity. This arrangement might not matter if Greece were solvent, but as Lord Salisbury points out to the Powers, it practically means in her case the permanent loss of the places retained. Lord Salisbury's contention is that with or without financial control Greece will find it impossible to obtain the money for the indemnity. Consequently the Turkish occupation will, under the plan favoured by the Powers, become permanent. But, it will be argued, if this is so, it is the fault of the Greeks. They engaged in war and lost, and if they cannot pay an indemnity settled as reasonable by the Powers, they must submit to a loss of territory equiva- lent to the indemnity they owe but cannot pay. That argument has a superficial appearance of soundness, but in reality it does not apply. Lord Salisbury meets it, as we think, with perfect reason and justice, by pointing out that in the present case the questions of indemnity and of a virtual annexation of Christian terri- tory by the Porte cannot and must not be confused. The districts which it is now proposed that Turkey shall retain must not be regarded as the ordinary territorial possessions of an independent State. Those districts were relieved from the curse of Turkish rule in 1881 by international action, and it would not be right or fair to their inhabitants to hand them back to the tender mercies of Abd-ul-Hamid because Greece has waged an unsuccessful, and, if you will, a foolish and inopportune war. The position thus taken up by Lord Salisbury is in reality nothing new. It is only the logical outcome of a principle which we had hoped was admitted by all the Great Powers,—the principle that, whatever happens, no body of Christians must ever be replaced under Turkish rule. But to leave Christian towns in the hands of the Turks until a Power so poor and. embarrassed as Greece has paid the indemnity would be to forego this principle, for, as we have said, occupation till payment has been completed means a permanent occupation. Lord Salisbury, then, is acting on a sound principle—and one which he laid down in specific terms several months ago—when be refuses to agree to the new indemnity proposals. But though we entirely agree with Lord Salisbury's action, and applaud it as just and humane, we confess to seeing great difficulties in the way of enforcing it. It is true that he does not ask that Greece shall be let 0 the indemnity, but has an alternative plan. He proposes that Greece should pay some small annual sum each year, which will, we presume, represent both interest and an instalment of capital. This was the way, if we are not mistaken, finally adopted by Turkey in regard to the war indemnity incurred by her as the result of the Russian War. Greece, then, may well ask to be allowed to do what Turkey did. But even if this proposal is per se reasonable enough, what chance is there of the Powers accepting it ? We fear, very little. If they refuse, and insist upon the Turkish plan of receding from Thessaly inch by inch, and only after payment in gold, what can Lord Salisbury do ? Wait and do nothing,—content with the knowledge that the Concert is a Committee which does not count votes, but must be unanimous, and that if he does not agree they cannot act ? Unfortunately, this would only produce the very evils he in- tends to avoid. If the Concert comes to a deadlock, and the peace negotiations stand still, the Turks will be delighted. They will continue to hold the Thessalian plain and to occupy a great deal more than they would keep even under the proposal of the four Powers. The suspension of the negotiations owing to a disagreement between England and her colleagues in the Concert would give the Turks all, and more than, they ask. Lord Salisbury, then, has a most difficult game to play. If he maintains a rigid attitude of refusal he will defeat his own object. It is true, no doubt, that the Powers are anxious to get the negotiations completed and peace settled. Until a definite settlement has been arrived at, and the Turkish Army is once again put on a peace footing, Europe will not feel happy about the Eastern question. Every week that the Turkish Army remains in the field and that the negotiations drag, the tone of the Sultan becomes more arrogant and more determined. The want of a settled policy and the general uncertainty play into the hands of the arch-intriguer, and make him feel more and more how firmly his power is embedded in the jealousies of his neighbours. But though none of the Powers want at present to see the Turkish Empire dissolved, they also none of them desire to see its power increased. Hence they do not at all wish the negotiations to be unduly protracted. In a word, they want to see the embers of the fire that was lighted so near the powder-magazine finally stamped out. This is Lord Salisbury's hold on the Powers, and so able a diplomatist and negotiator may be trusted to make full use of it. Still, as we have said, Lord Salisbury's position is a very difficult one. If he simply refuses to budge, he may embarrass the Powers, but he will also run the risk of helping the Turks and injuring Greece. If he were to retire from the Concert, and to wash his hands entirely of a policy which he believes to be unjust, he would again do an injury to Greece. England is practically the only Power which has done, or will do, or perhaps we should say, can afford to do, anything for Greece. If, there- fore, England withdraws from the Concert, the position of Greece would become more desperate than ever. Prac- tically, the Sultan would have her completely at his mercy.
There is yet another reason why England cannot lightly withdraw from the Concert. Such withdrawal would almost certainly be misunderstood by the Powers, and would probably throw them into a violent and most dangerous ferment,—a ferment dangerous not only to ourselves, but to the peace of the world. No Power would believe for a moment that our withdrawal from the Concert was really actuated by good motives, and by the desire to protest against the harsh and unfair treatment of Greece. The notion would be scoffed at as utterly and ridicu- lously incredible. Another motive would, therefore, be busily and anxiously sought. The panic and suspicion which an obviously very important, but quite unintelli- gible, action always causes when taken at a moment of crisis, would be certain to make the Powers believe that our motive was a bad one, that we had some selfish game of our own to play, that we were bent on some piece of treachery to the rest of Europe, and that our ultimate object, "as always," was to seize something for ourselves. It is no good to say, as many Englishmen will be inclined to say, that thew) suspicions do not matter, and that they would soon be dispersed by facts. Unfortunately they do matter very greatly, and are a constant obstacle to our diplomacy. It is difficult to believe, and yet a fact, that in practically all the Foreign Offices of Europe it is sincerely believed that at this very moment we are "on the prowl," and that any day it may be discovered that we have executed a coup de main. For example, the majority of the Foreign Ministers on the Continent believe that we are most anxious to seize Crete and keep it for ourselves, and that our whole policy in re- gard to that distracted and unhappy island has been guided by that sinister motive. The suspicion is ridiculous on the face of it, so ridiculous indeed that one can hardly believe that it is entertained by sane men. Yet entertained it is. No assurances from our Government are of any avail. Even the traine.4 foreign diplomatists who live among qui, and seeing with their own eyes, know the pre- posterous absurdity of the delusion, find it impossible -to combat it at home. They have had in despair to give up contradicting what their chiefs regard a fact like gravitation or the procession of the seasons. Those who argue on the Continent that England has not some sinister design on hand simply waste their breath. The design is only the more sinister because its nature is not apparent and because all our outward acts seem to contradict any idea. of selfish action. But though England is believed to harbour these treacherous designs, it is also believed that as long as she remains in the Concert she cannot carry them out. Her leaving the Concert would, therefore, be regarded as a proof of bad. faith. As has been said, the Powers are six men, roped, and crossing a difficult glacier, yet all quarrelling and all a little doubtful of each -other's loyalty. If the one most suspected suddenly cuts -the rope, what is likely to be the feeling entertained of him by the rest ? The analogy is not, of course, really on all -fours, but the Powers think it is, and this is enough to make it very dangerous for us to leave the Concert. Possibly —we should indeed say certainly—we ought not to have agreed to joint action until it had been acknowledged that the object of the Concert was in every case to protect the .Christian and other subjects of the Sultan, and never to increase his influence and authority. Since, however, we went into the Concert without pledges that would enable and oblige the Concert to coerce the Sultan, we . cannot now draw back, at any rate at this precise moment. To leave the Concert now might very likely produce either a general scramble among the Powers, followed by a free- light, or else a menacing combination directed against our- selves,—based on the notion that we were going somehow -or other to deceive and injure all Europe. But neither of, these contingencies are lightly to be incurred. Lord -Salisbury, then, can hardly leave the Concert. At present all he can do is to remain in it, and do his best for Greece and for the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Our best hopes and wishes for success are with him, and we --cannot resist yet one more expression of satisfaction* that he has refused to agree to a scheme so injurious to the Christians of Thessaly as that suggested by the -other Powers.
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