SIR EDWARD GREY ON THE RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.
SIR EDWARD GREY made on Monday a great speech on a great subject. For more than half-a-century, iu fact ever since the last war with Russia, there has been a silent struggle between St. Petersburg and London for influence in Persia, in Afghanistan, and in Tibet which has produced some distinctly evil results. The whole policy of India, to begin with, has been deflected by the necessity, real or imaginary, of providing against a future invasion of India from the Russian side. Millions have been spent in strengthening or creating an impregnable northern frontier, and in preventing so far as possible any extension of Russian influence in any quarter, how- ever distant, which seemed to facilitate a march from the centres of Russian power to the northern and north-western frontiers of India. Russia was suspected of perpetual intrigue within India itself, and by degrees opinion both in India and in England was so poisoned that it became almost impossible to judge Russian policy fairly, or to doubt that every action of the Romanoffs was dictated by a secret hope of ultimately conquering India. "When Great Britain, settling herself in Egypt, rendered the mute between Europe and India permanently safe for herself, the struggle became less bitter ; but it still endured, and in spite of a change of opinion on the part of many statesmen of both parties, an entente between Great Britain and Russia still remained rather a dream or a hope than a vision of practical politics. When the present Government obtained power, the Foreign Office found that the risk had become acute. The dreadful misgovernment of Persia, which has almost destroyed the resources of that Empire, had at last produced a popular revolt, which, though hidden in the Western disguise of a demand for a Parliament, was really a plan for terminating the frightful despotism of the Kajars. It was certain that Persia would demand help either from St. Petersburg or London, and probable, therefore, that Great Britain and Russia, after a short delay, would be involved in war for supremacy in the Persian Empire.
Fortunately, at the most dangerous moment Russia was occupied with internal questions, and Great Britain very peaceful owing to the heavy cost of the South African War. The statesmen of the two countries were ready, therefore, for the kind of compromise now known as an entente,—a compromise which, by the favour of Providence, was at last carried through and registered in a signed Agreement. Under this document the relations of the two Powers in Persia, in Afghanistan, and in Tibet— the three buffer States previously existing—were defined with such clearness that no future hostilities were possible without a formal breach of Treaty. The Agreement was accepted in this country, and we believe in Russia, as the basis of a new arrangement under which the two Powers might by degrees establish as much mutual confidence as usually exists between European Powers who mutually wish for peace, and therefore can negotiate, and even make concessions in detail, without veiled threatenings or secret intrigues. There still remained, however, a kind of bitterness, the anti-Russian party in England doubting whether the Agreement, however beneficial, had not been purchased by too great concessions from the British side. On Monday this view was frankly expressed in the House of Commons, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was compelled to make an exhaustive reply. It is, as we conceive, a most convincing one. To begin with the point of least importance, England has surrendered nothing of any value in Tibet, except, indeed, the right of invading that huge useless plateau should its rulers ever give any trouble, instead of asking Peking to exercise her suzerain rights, and so compelling them to remain, as of old, quiet to invisibility. Then as regards Persia, two separate " spheres of interest," the Russian one and the British one, have been demarcated according to an arrange- ment devised by experts, so that Russia obtains certain not very great commercial advantages, but this country obtains the immense strategical advantage that Russia cannot advance into or through Seistan and Baluchistan,—in other words, cannot attack India through the smoothest route. The North-Western Frontier is, in fact, as long as the Agreement lasts, secure, while the dread felt so keenly in many quarters lest the Russian and British frontiers might some day be conterminous over a long line ceases to operate. It is true that by the delimitation now agreed upon the influence of Russia in Northern Persia has been very clearly acknowledged ; but then that influence is not new. As Sir Edward Grey put it with his usual frank lucidity, Russia had gained that influence before the discussions on the Agreement began :- "Now, in the last twenty years, the Trans-Caspian Railway has been developed; three Russian roads have been made to Teheran and Meshed; Russian trade goes to the south and competes; Russian subsidised steamers run to the Persian Gulf ; Russia has Consuls-General at Ispahan and Bushire, Consuls at Bandar- Abbas, Sherman, Hamadan, and Seistan, and she has pushed the telegraph into Seistan. And behind all that there is the military shadow of the Russian forces. Anybody who looks at the map and sees how Russian and Persian territory lies, who takes into account not only what Russia has got in Persia in the way of con- cessions, and political influence acquired at Teheran, who takes into account the great military forces which she can at any time bring to bear on the Northern Persian frontier, must see how the shadow of Russian influence has been in the last twenty years thrown over the whole of the North of Persia. And more than that, in the last twenty years Russian loans have been made to the Persian Government, secured on the Customs receipts of the whole of Persia except the Gulf ports ; and the Persian Govern- ment have come to an agreement to seek no other loan except from the Russian Government, to grant no other railway con- cessions for a term of years ; and the Persian Customs had come under a foreign control which was not favourable to ourselves. When I consider how the position has changed in the last twenty years, and when I am told that by this Agreement we have thrown away great prospects and great commercial advantages, I say you must take into account the situation with which we had to deal and the starting-point from which the Agreement had to be made."
Then, thirdly, there is Afghanistan. Nothing is changed in the position of the Amir. He remains an independent Sovereign, guaranteed, as he has practically been for fifty years, against any Russian invasion, and unable to make any cessions of territory which would in any way bring Russia nearer to our frontier. There remains only the question of British ascendency in the Persian Gulf. This is not provided for in the Agreement. But then the only danger to that ascendency would arise from the growth of a Power on the Mesopotamian side of the Gulf, which Sir Edward Grey believes to be impossible, as a fortified position on that side could not be established in the face of a British fleet ; and in any case Mesopotamia is Turkish, and its future is not within the purview of this Agree- ment. The Foreign Office by giving up to Russia influence over one or two trade routes, not, Sir Edward intimates, of very great value, has completely protected India from Russian aggression, at least as far as clear Agreements can protect one State against the ambitions of another. If Russia breaks them, we must appeal to the sword ; but there is every probability under the Agreement that Russia and Great Britain, who are equally protected from each other, may, from the gradual softening of public opinion in both countries, acquire a mutual confidence in each other which will destroy the temptation to breach of Agreements, and even conceivably enable both countries to seek objects of European policy in harmony. No one, we think, can read Sir Edward Grey's speech and question these conclusions ; and if they are correct, it is certain that the Agreement must relieve India of one of the heaviest of her burdens, and prepare the way for arrangements which of all others may render the peace of Europe continuous and stable. The entente with Russia is, in fact, as valuable as that with France.
One word in conclusion. The public must remember that international friendships, like private friendships, require to be kept in repair. It is not possible in either case to say : " We have come to a friendly understanding, and need not give the matter another thought." .We must give our Agreement with Russia many thoughts, and must accept its logical consequence. This is to act with friendliness and a proper consideration of legitimate Russian claims and aspirations in other parts of the world than Asia. We do not, of course, mean that we are to endorse Russia's policy everywhere and in all cases, but we must at any rate not be inconsiderate and indifferent in regard to it,—for example, in the Balkans and at Con- stantinople.
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