TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE THREE "BRITISH QUESTIONS" IN CONGRESS. THE British Representative in the Congress at Baden, whoever he may be, and we suspect that point is not as unsettled as it appears, will have one great advantage in the discussion. His policy may, if his Government so please, be at once strong and clear. It may be strong, because upon its essential points the country, though apparently so divided, is really united ; and it may be clear, because there is no reason for any concealment or hesitation about its objects. What England wants and must have is not a secret to be gradually revealed. Apart from the question of Greece, which it is the English interest to strengthen, as the most trustworthy of English allies, and from the demands of Austria, whom it is British interest to aggrandise as far as that may be done without war, there are just three vital points upon which this country neither can nor will make any concession. The first of these is the freedom of Constantinople, the second the freedom of the Straits, and the third the freedom of the people in the Valley of the Nile. Constantinople cannot be Russian. The Black Sea cannot remain shut up. Egypt cannot be left a half-ruined vassal State, in the hands of a powerless Sultan.
Upon the first point there is little need of protracted dis- cussion. Our own belief, stated from the beginning of the struggle, is that the importance of Constantinople is foolishly exaggerated ; that the Russian Government if seated there would be twice as weak as it is now, being at last exposed to invasion of the dangerous kind ; and that if we had but full possession of Egypt and Mitylene, the ownership of Constantinople would make but little difference to English permanent interests. But it is vain to hope that the British people will take that view, vain to ignore the fact that Egypt is not ours yet, and vainest of all to deny that the Russian Government has killed for itself the possibility of this solution. That Government has pledged itself to the lips not to annex Constantinople, and if it broke the pledge, even with the extorted assent of Europe, it would earn a reputation for faithlessness which would make the whole world its enemies, and render any friendly arrangement in the future with it nearly impossible. , No treaty would be possible with such a Power. The contingency will not, we feel assured, occur ; but occurring, the British Representative must resist it with the most emphatic, state- ment that Great Britain holds that concession to be impos- sible. That demand means war at any price. The alternatives to Russian occupation are of course endless, and as yet, we think, unexhausted by discussion ; but the one grand point that Constantinople cannot be Russian we take to be, so far as this country is concerned, practically decided. Upon the second there is even greater unanimity. Any de- mand to close the Straits to all war-ships except those of Russia must be resisted, if necessary by a long war. It would be simple madness to allow it, for the concession, apart from its unfairness, might at certain moments nearly paralyse this country's action. Our own belief is—and we state it frankly, in spite of its utter unpopularity—that as the years pass on, a necessity stronger than prejudices will drive Russia and England into a hearty and enduring Asiatic alliance ; that they cannot retreat from Asia, that they cannot help advancing, that both as they advance will be menaced by China, and that the burden of watching each other, and that huge, unaccount- able, dangerous cesspool of men, will become financially unen- durable. But to ensure that alliance, England must be able to hurt Russia, if Russia infringes on her rights, and with the Black Sea closed, England could scarcely hurt her. The Baltic is inaccessible for five months in the year, and for the remain- ing seven may be so policed by a German navy as to make war there without German consent the most difficult of operations. We must be able in the last resort to appear in the Black Sea, or the alliance will be an alliance between an archer and a man in proof-armour, which is not a position that England intends to hold. We certainly shall not be accused of over-suspiciousness of Russia, but we cannot see any way whatever out of this. The Straits must be free, free as the English Channel, as they ought to have been made in 1856, or at the worst, remain as they are now. There is no need to imagine that therefore they must be held by Turks. On the contrary, the Turk is the very worst owner of the Straits, for if he remains there he must become a vassal ; but they must be placed in hands and under conditions which will admit of our passing through them, in the event of a war with Russia, without an anticipatory war with a State, or City, or Principality to which we have no hostility. This will natur- ally be the crux of our representative's ability, but if he does not win he will never again be ranked among English statesmen, and may run more than a chance of being disavowed..
And finally, there is the question of Egypt, which is clear,. though momentarily confused by the wretched financial squab- bles imported into it. It is mere folly, and a bad kind of folly,. to say that we must annex a country because its ruler repudi- ates his National Debt. The punishment for that offence is the same as the punishment for bankruptcy,—inability to borrow any more, even if the money is wanted to keep the borrower alive. Mexico repudiated, Spain repudiated, Italy taxed her bonds, Austria taxed her bonds, the United States are going to pay in silver, we ourselves paid for years in inconvertible paper, but none of those incidents were held in this country to be justifications for invasion. That under the special cir- cumstances the Viceroy, if he repudiates, will cheat his own. friends, has nothing to do with the matter, except as showing that he is not a ruler whom decent men can trouble themselves to defend. That Egypt, if it is to have a continuous life, will find it expedient to make some reasonable compromise with the public creditor, and ought, if the creditors can manage it, to be compelled to do so, may be admitted, without in the least carrying the corollary that the compulsion should be exercised' by fleets and armies. Distrust, and not death, is not the fitting penalty of repudiation. But after placing the bondholder and his claims as far on one side as common- sense permits, there remain the great facts that the security of our route of passage through Egypt is essential to the welfare of the Empire—that is, probably of a fourth of the human race—that this route will henceforth remain, ultimately in the hands of a Power which may in all great crises be swayed by other powers than England, and immediately in the hands of a ruler whose pledges cannot be trusted, and whose single governing impulse is obviously his own advantage. We do not see how that can go on, or how any settlement of the Eastern Question which- leaves that factor unsettled can be expected to be permanent. There would be a struggle for influence at Cairo, as severe as the- struggle at Constantinople, and equally sure to end at the first opportunity in an application of force. The true remedy, of course, would be the transfer of Egypt to Great Britain, a transfer about which no Liberal need have the least compunc- tion. Egypt is quite as badly governed as any other pro- vince of the Turk, with this additional aggravation, that it has far less to hope from any alliance between its people and any Power competent to effect their liberation. England govern- ing down to the Lakes would civilise all North-Eastern Africa, and offer the Arabs in particular their first grand chance in modern times of displaying their great capacities for war, for literature, and for the sciences. If, however, this solution is impossible, or involves too great a,. chance of permanent hostility from France, or is made too expensive by the hold which bondholders would- have upon a Government so sensitive to its credit as that of Great Britain, there is surely a compromise possible more satisfactory than the retention of the present incurable system of misgovernment. Why should not Egypt be added to the list of the autonomous tributary States into which Turkey is ta be transmuted, and her ruler or Viceroy be a Prince selected and guaranteed by the Powers like the Prince of Roumania, with the special duty imposed on him of keeping open the Cana/ in the interest of mankind ? He would have an army ready- made to his hand, for any fair arrangement of the conscription- would bind soldiers terribly weary of being massacred in Abys- sinia to his flag. He would have a revenue, and the basis of a Civil Service at all events, in the Europeans already employed ; and he might govern, as Charles of Roumania does or the Obrenavich, with a reasonable attention to other interests than those of his own family. Turkey would lose very little if she received her tribute, the industrious people of Egypt, now more than ever ground down by corvees, would benefit indefinitely, and the world would secure its greatest highway, the one indispensable link between Europe and Asia, alike against violence and against the results of anarchy. We do not think this solution the best, for we know how the British Govern- ment, with its regiments of officials trained to administer dark races, would vivify the Valley of the Nile, and utilise that very- industrious person, the Nubian negro ; but it is a better solution than the present arrangement, which is destroying the Egyptian people, which does not secure the transit, and which places England at the mercy of a Sultan who has not a reason for remaining on our side.
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