vince Turkey that no aid could be expected from her
in resist- respects nothing has been altered. After the capture ing it,—Lord Derby never thought it desirable either to pro- of three armies, the crushing defeat of a fourth, and test against these Russian views, or to accept the overtures the surrender of Turkey almost at discretion, the terms made by her, until, after the fall of Plevna, he suddenly of peace demanded by Russia are, to all intents and pur- and, as far as we can judge, abruptly, communicated to Russia poses the same as they were before any one great success the anxiety, not to say displeasure, with which England would had been achieved. We say most emphatically that with this view even a temporary Russian occupation of the Turkish proof of the moderation and good-faith of Russia in their capital. In short, the June correspondence now produced shows, hands—a proof of which the English people knew nothing— first, that Russia has been consistent and frank throughout ; the British Government was most culpable in working up the next, that the British Ambassador was doing all that he nation to the pitch of excitement reached when they made- decently could to convince her Majesty's Government in his their abortive menaces with the Fleet, and when Mr. Cross confidential correspondence that we ought to interfere on endeavoured to thrill the House of Commons with a conviction behalf of Turkey, and ought not to lend ourselves in any case of the shameless treachery of the Russian advance. whatever to the support of the policy of Russia, even though Next, how did Mr. Layard answer all these communications ? we might deem it the least disastrous course for Turkey By despatches in which he virtually scolded Lord Derby for to accept that policy early ; and lastly, that the Govern- even asking his opinion about them, and certainly went as ment could never make up its mind to seize the advantages of a near to expressing contempt for his superior's weakness, clear and decisive policy of any kind ; that it was too much in not at once taking steps to curb Russian aggression, as an influenced by Mr. Layard to establish a friendly understanding ambassador probably ever dared to go. Take such a passage with Russia, and too little influenced by him to give Turkey as this, from his despatch of the 19th June :—" I would the comfort and encouragement of any sort of help, conditional venture to urge most earnestly on her Majesty's Government or actual, beyond the promise to do what England could as a not to be the medium of communicating or of suggesting any mediator, to obtain " the most favourable terms possible under such terms as those proposed by Prince Gortschakoff to the the circumstances" for her, whenever she might be disposed Sultan or to the Porte. The Russian Chancellor's language to treat for peace. All ihese points are important. It is does not admit the possibility of a mediation. It is simply that most important to know that Russia has not been intoxicated of dictation ; the terms offered are to be accepted at once, or by success, that she proposed before her successes precisely or the consequence will be a further dismemberment of the almost precisely what she asks after her successes ; it is most Ottoman Empire. Let some other Power accept this important to know that Mr. Layard, rigidly as he may have task. It is vital to our gravest interests—to interests the kept to his instructions, never for a moment concealed from importance of which no words can adequately describe, the Government his own bias towards sustaining the policy much less exaggerate—that we should be ready to interfere of the past, the policy of the Crimean war, in its integrity ; to save the Turkish Empire from complete dissolution. If we and it is of the first importance to be made aware that Lord have even determined to abandon it to its fate, we have not de- Derby has had the opportunity explicitly offered to him of keep- termined to abandon to the same fate the highest interests of the ing back Russia from the gates of Constantinople ; and that he British Empire. Surely the policy which has hitherto made us deliberately neglected it last summer, only to try what must support Turkey for our own purposes and safety, and for no have looked very like a threat, when Russia had overcome the abstract love of Turks, or their faith, a policy approved and only formidable obstacle in her way, through the capture of adopted by the greatest statesmen England has produced, is not Plevna and the surrender of Osman Pasha with his army. one which the events of the last few months, having no relation Now as to the first point. Speaking on June 8, Count whatever to it, are sujicient to reverse."* That is Sir Henry Schouvaloff was as explicit about Constantinople as he has Elliot's language over again, put more vigorously and with a been in February,—" Une foie la guerre engagee, nous ne bitterer accent of contempt for the vacillating chiefs whom our pouvons accepter de restriction i nos operations eventuelles. Ambassador was serving. Of course from an envoy who Elles restent subordonnees exclusivement aux necessit4s mili- scolded his superior in this way for even consulting him as to taires, mais les consequences de cette guerre peuvent etre the chance of Turkey's accepting such terms, and to whom renfermees d'avance dans certaines limites convenues." A Lord Derby found it necessary to reply humbly that " her franker declaration that if military motives seemed to require Majesty's Government had no intention of instructing you the occupation of Constantinople, Russia would accept no either to propose those conditions of peace to the Porte, or to restriction on her operations, could not have been support them ; they were communicated to you for your con- made. But there were means, as Count Schouvaloff fidential information only, and in order that you might report was instructed to say, by which all danger of your observations on them to her Majesty's Government,"—of an occupation of Constantinople might be avoided. If course, we say, from an envoy who treated his Government in the Porte could be persuaded to ask for peace before this way, and reduced it to a kind of submissive silence, it the Balkans were passed, the Emperor would agree not was not to be expected that any disposition to make use to pass them ; and in that case his terms of peace (as modified of the Russian proposals for the localising of the war to the a week later by fuller examination of the subject) would have north of the Balkans, would be shown. And no use was made of been these :—The erection of Bulgaria,—north and south of the Balkans,—into an autonomous province, with the Turkish • [The talks are on.] troops withdrawn and the fortresses razed ; an augmentation RUSSIA IN JUNE, 1877, AND IN FEBRUARY, 1878. of territory for Montenegro and Servia (Servia being at that TT is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance which all time at peace); self-government for Bosnia and the Herze- .1. reasonable persons must attach to the correspondence govina ; the independence of Roumania, or at least the (No. 15) printed this week on the subject of the Russian pro- submission of its claim to a European Congress ; the retroces- posals of last June. They show that Russia had defined her sion to Russia of the part of Bessarabia of which she was aim before she had attained any one great success, and that deprived in 1856 ; the cession to Russia of Batoum ; and from that policy she has not been substantially diverted by ju case Austria claimed compensations of any kind, she the series of events which indicate the total collapse of was to be permitted to take them in Bosnia and the Turkey, and the obvious competence of Russia to have Herzegovina. Such were Russia's bases of peace as con- triumphed over a considerably more powerful foe. They ceived in June,—in case Turkey could be persuaded to show, too, the passionate tenacity with which our Ambassador request peace before Russia had passed the Balkans. Count at Constantinople, Mr. Layard, clung to the last to the hope, Schouvaloff added, on the 11th of June, that the object of his if not of defending Turkey as in 1854,—which he obviously Government in the communication thus made was not so much thought the right policy,—at least of securing for Turkey by that the British Government should press upon Turkey the our " mediation " a substantial remnant of independence and conditions of peace referred to, but rather to ensure the European power. And they show that though even before neutrality of England, " by the evidence thus afforded of the the Memorandum of July,—early in June last,—Lord Derby moderation of their intended demands." Now, compare these had received full notice of the views of Russia, and especially terms with those actually demanded now. Of course Servia, of her positive refusal to renounce the right of a mili- which had not then entered the field, and which has since, as tary entry into Constantinople in case of victory; except well as Montenegro, achieved great military successes, is to be for some equivalent earlier advantage, such as that Turkey compensated by independence, which was not demanded for should sue for peace before Russia had crossed the Balkans, and her in June. And of course the indemnity for the war must that England should declare herself disposed to acquiesce in the now be much larger, and the territorial pledge for that in- Russian programme, and would do all in her power to con- demnity will probably be more valuable. But in other vince Turkey that no aid could be expected from her in resist- respects nothing has been altered. After the capture ing it,—Lord Derby never thought it desirable either to pro- of three armies, the crushing defeat of a fourth, and test against these Russian views, or to accept the overtures the surrender of Turkey almost at discretion, the terms made by her, until, after the fall of Plevna, he suddenly of peace demanded by Russia are, to all intents and pur- and, as far as we can judge, abruptly, communicated to Russia poses the same as they were before any one great success the anxiety, not to say displeasure, with which England would had been achieved. We say most emphatically that with this view even a temporary Russian occupation of the Turkish proof of the moderation and good-faith of Russia in their capital. In short, the June correspondence now produced shows, hands—a proof of which the English people knew nothing— first, that Russia has been consistent and frank throughout ; the British Government was most culpable in working up the next, that the British Ambassador was doing all that he nation to the pitch of excitement reached when they made- decently could to convince her Majesty's Government in his their abortive menaces with the Fleet, and when Mr. Cross confidential correspondence that we ought to interfere on endeavoured to thrill the House of Commons with a conviction behalf of Turkey, and ought not to lend ourselves in any case of the shameless treachery of the Russian advance. whatever to the support of the policy of Russia, even though Next, how did Mr. Layard answer all these communications ? we might deem it the least disastrous course for Turkey By despatches in which he virtually scolded Lord Derby for to accept that policy early ; and lastly, that the Govern- even asking his opinion about them, and certainly went as ment could never make up its mind to seize the advantages of a near to expressing contempt for his superior's weakness, clear and decisive policy of any kind ; that it was too much in not at once taking steps to curb Russian aggression, as an influenced by Mr. Layard to establish a friendly understanding ambassador probably ever dared to go. Take such a passage with Russia, and too little influenced by him to give Turkey as this, from his despatch of the 19th June :—" I would the comfort and encouragement of any sort of help, conditional venture to urge most earnestly on her Majesty's Government or actual, beyond the promise to do what England could as a not to be the medium of communicating or of suggesting any mediator, to obtain " the most favourable terms possible under such terms as those proposed by Prince Gortschakoff to the the circumstances" for her, whenever she might be disposed Sultan or to the Porte. The Russian Chancellor's language to treat for peace. All ihese points are important. It is does not admit the possibility of a mediation. It is simply that most important to know that Russia has not been intoxicated of dictation ; the terms offered are to be accepted at once, or by success, that she proposed before her successes precisely or the consequence will be a further dismemberment of the almost precisely what she asks after her successes ; it is most Ottoman Empire. Let some other Power accept this important to know that Mr. Layard, rigidly as he may have task. It is vital to our gravest interests—to interests the kept to his instructions, never for a moment concealed from importance of which no words can adequately describe, the Government his own bias towards sustaining the policy much less exaggerate—that we should be ready to interfere of the past, the policy of the Crimean war, in its integrity ; to save the Turkish Empire from complete dissolution. If we and it is of the first importance to be made aware that Lord have even determined to abandon it to its fate, we have not de- Derby has had the opportunity explicitly offered to him of keep- termined to abandon to the same fate the highest interests of the ing back Russia from the gates of Constantinople ; and that he British Empire. Surely the policy which has hitherto made us deliberately neglected it last summer, only to try what must support Turkey for our own purposes and safety, and for no have looked very like a threat, when Russia had overcome the abstract love of Turks, or their faith, a policy approved and only formidable obstacle in her way, through the capture of adopted by the greatest statesmen England has produced, is not Plevna and the surrender of Osman Pasha with his army. one which the events of the last few months, having no relation Now as to the first point. Speaking on June 8, Count whatever to it, are sujicient to reverse."* That is Sir Henry those overtures. Apparently we listened to proposals which the Government—or its more sensible portion—thought sufficient to secure British interests in those regions, in depressed silence, in deference to Mr. Layard's angry protest, and never stirred to prevent Russia from going to Constantinople, till the time indicated by Russia was already passed.
Finally, nothing can show more curiously than this corre- spondence how destitute of a policy our Government was. Lord Derby—if he had been alone—would probably have en- deavoured to close with the Russian suggestion. But Mr. Layard and those members of the Government who agreed with, if they did not prompt, Mr. Layard, prevented this, while Lord Derby and his more pacific colleagues in their turn defeated any attempt to act on the advice of Mr. Layard ; and so we went on like a Power without counsel and resource, first wasting the opportunities offered to us ; and when they had passed away, attempting to recover by an unmeaning com- promise between friendly negotiation and menace, the advan- tages which, at the right time, either friendly negotiation or honest menace might possibly have secured, but which it is quite certain that the feeble compromise between the two actually adopted, while human nature remains what it is, never could have secured.
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