PRINCE BISMARCK'S SPEECHES. T HOSE are cuttle-fish speeches of Prince Bismarck's
on Tuesday,—one in reply to Herr Beningsen's questions, and the other in answer to Herr Windthorst's criticisms. Their first object, as we read them, is to mystify the public of Europe, to conceal the ultimate policy of Germany, and to leave her as free as possible to act, either in Conference or after its dis- persion. Indeed, Prince Bismarck almost avows that this is his first object. He says distinctly that he has a programme, which he will lay before Conference, but which he will not announce now, because it might be accepted by some and re- jected by others, and so imperil peace. He takes pains to repeat that German interests in the war are very indirect, de- clares that the importance of Constantinople is over-rated by his opponents, its possessor, the Sultan, not having been by any means master of the world—though a Russian possession of Constantinople might concern all Europe—and even asserts that the freedom of the Straits to commerce is more important than its freedom to ships-of-war, a statement quite unintelligible, if Germany is ever to become a great maritime Power. In any war with Russia she would, no doubt, strike straight, marching an army upon Warsaw, but she would also desire to be able to act in the Black Sea. The Chancellor's object, however, it is clear, is to minimise the German feeling of direct in- terest in the war, and so leave himself and the Emperor free from popular pressure. Were it not, indeed, that a man in the position of the German Chancellor cannot speak without giving some expression to his true thoughts, even un- intentionally, it would have been useless to discuss his speech, for he intended to say as little as he could manage without creating disquietude by total silence. As it is, it is the drift of his speech which is more important than his words.
That drift is slightly, but we think visibly, favourable to Russia ; and slightly, but visibly, unfavourable to Austria. It is true that he said he could trust Count Andrassy's state- ments—the first report of this passage in his speech was entirely inaccurate—whereas in previous negotiations he had been obliged to act without believing a word the Austrians said, or indeed attending to them " any more than to the wind in the chimney," but he does not repeat his old statement that the security of Austria is of the highest import- ance to the German Empire. He does not promise in any way to guard Austria from the consequences of war. On the contrary, he tells his audience that, supposing the Conference to fail, Russia would sit quiet, saying, " Beati possidentes !" and then any Power which drove her out would have to undertake the government of the Turkish peninsula,—a most difficult task, and one for which Austria is unprepared. That is a warning to Austria that she cannot set up Turkey again, and also, we suspect, a warning that he himself has not abandoned his old idea that the East, and not the West, is the true career for Austria,—by no means a pleasant intimation to the Hapsburgs. Clearly he is not going to help her to turn the Russians out. Indeed he stated most clearly that it was of no particular concern to Germany whether the Turkish Provinces, including Bulgaria, were to bear a different relation to Turkey or not, Germany, in the interests of humanity, being on the whole favour- able to the Christians. He went over each Province, name by name, and while conceding that as regarded many of them European sanction •was necessary, said that none of the arrange. ments proposed involved any threat whatever to German in. terests. The Austrians must remember that the Russians, if forced to recede, would be as unfriendly to the Power which forced them as he himself was to France when she intervened after Sadowa—an intervention, he significantly added, which did France no good—while for himself, recollecting all that Russia had done in times past, he should think twice before he advised his master to renounce so valuable an alliance. The single distinct reservation he made was as to the possession of the Dardanelles,which in his second speech he admitted would. concern all Europe. He took, moreover, great pains to clear. Russia from the charge of deceiving Europe by wilful delay in revealing the conditions of the armistice, or in advancing, towards the Turkish capital under cover of the diplomatic darkness. Indeed, he was so Russian that in the second speech he thought it necessary to pay a compliment to Austria in the form we have mentioned, of an assurance that he did not now, at all events, disbelieve her. His words are :— " Our relations with Austria are those of reciprocity, of full confidence and of mutual trust, which is all the more remarkable considering what was formerly the case when other parties in Austria were more power- ful than they are at present. To my joy and to my honour, I stand personally with regard to Count An. dressy in such friendly relations that render it pos- sible for him frankly to address any questions to me that he may think essential to the interests of Austria, and he is convinced that I tell him the truth, while I am like. wise certain that he candidly informs me as to Austria's intentions. Such an understanding is a very favourable one, especially with regard to a minister on the troth of whose words you are perfectly convinced. Such is the friendly position which I hold towards Austria. In former times, which may have been more agreeable to the former speaker, it was otherwise. Then I had to deal with Austrian colleagues regarding whom I used to say, ' It is a matter of indifference to me whether you speak or. whether the wind blows down the chimney, as I do not believe a word you say.' Count Andrassy believes me, and I believe what he says to me."
We do not wonder that these speeches have slightly elated the Russians and greatly disenchanted the Viennese, Their obvious meaning is that Russia is in possession, and that if Austria threatens her she will be compelled to act without German help, and it follows of necessity that she would lie almost at Germany's mercy. She could not trust France, whose interests are quite different, to save her ; and England is powerless in the forests of - Bohemia. Consequently the Viennese Press, which for a short time was all in favour of war and of an English alliance, has turned round, and now asks if Austria has now the power to drive Russia back, and if it is her business or that of Europe to resist Russian encroach- ment. The Austrians, it must be remembered, though afraid of Slav domination in the South, and although greatly impressed by the strong feeling of their Hungarian copartners for Turkey, are by no means willing to go forward with Germany either hostile or indifferent, and begin to wonder once more whether after all they might not gain more by the addition of two fine provinces to the Empire. They are, at all events, inclined to wait and see whether they cannot gain their ends in Congress instead of by war, and whether Prince Bismarck's programme, only to be revealed if the Conference assembles, may not after all afford a basis for an arrangement with which they can be content.
It will be observed that Prince Bismarck is throughout decidedly of opinion that the Congress should meet, and meet soon—at latest, in the first fortnight of March—and even goes so far as to express a kind of certainty that it will meet. This is entirely in accordance with the short speech of Lord Derby on Thursday night, and is not in dissonance with what is known of French or even of Russian policy in the matter. It follows that unless some unhappy event drives the nations beside themselves,. and as it were forces them involuntarily to war, the Conference will meet, and will at all events make an effort to settle the whole Eastern Question. In that Conference Prince Bismarck, though he may not personally attend it, proposes to be not arbiter —he emphatically renounces that position for Germany—but mediator between Austria and Russia, and even between Eng- land and Russia—Germany and England having no conflicting interests—and trusts in that attitude to preserve peace. We see no reason to doubt that this declaration is genuine, and look upon it on the whole as a guarantee that the Conference, if it meets, will arrive at some kind of arrangement which will ensure the freedom of the Straits, the limitation of Russian demands, and the permanent emancipation of the Christians of Turkey.
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