Sin,—The Spectator is widely read and its leading articles carry
weight. Mr. Arnold-Forster's speech was made on Thursday night, and your paper came out on Saturday morning. I venture to hope, therefore, that your criticism of the 16th inst. on the above subject may be modified on further con- sideration of the complicated question of the defence of the Empire. I would urge that it should be kept clear of party politics, and that a broad view should be taken of the question, for it concerns not only the United Kingdom, but the whole of the British dominions. It should therefore, I submit, be looked at from this point of view, and not from that of any one department, be it Navy, Army, or Auxiliary Forces.
To provide a Navy to prevent invasion, and then to provide an Army to repel it in case the Navy fails, is to divide our forces.
If the Navy is not strong enough to prevent invasion, it should be strengthened. If the Navy is so incompetent as to allow of invasion when strong enough to prevent it, then its administra- tion should be improved. To provide for the absence or defeat of the Navy is either to spend money unnecessarily, or to divert money to Army purposes which should be spent on the Navy, and the effect must be to assist in bringing about the very evils against which it is sought to prepare.
Thus the first axiom should be that the Navy must be strong enough to guarantee us against invasion, as well as to do a like duty for the Colonies, and to protect the trade routes and com- munications. If this cannot be done, then it is no use keeping up the Navy ; but granted this axiom, the function of the Army becomes plain.
You agree with Mr. Arnold-Forster's proposals as regards the Regular Army, and it therefore only remains to consider the function of the Auxiliary Forces—Militia and Volunteers—in the event of war. Mr. Arnold-Forster proposes that the short-service Army, with its Reserves and the Militia, should be available for reinforcing the long-service Army in the event of a big war.
Surely this is where the Militia have been most useful in the past, and will be most useful in the future. The number required is, of course, another matter ; one would like to have a million or more, but it is really a question of expense. There is only a certain sium to go round, and it should be spent on essentials. Hence the Navy should first have what it requires ; secondly, the
long-service Army ; thirdly, the short-service Army ; fourthly, the Militia and Volunteers. The duty assigned to the Volunteers is to repel raids, and the strength of the raid which may be attempted fixes the number of Volunteers required. Whatever sum this takes must come off the amount available for the Auxiliary Forces after the Regular Services have been pro- vided for.
This is the scheme as I understand it, and it seems to me we should rather consider it from this broader point of view than
question whether it is good for any one of the existing armed forces of the country, or call in party politics to defeat it on such a ground. The whole is greater than its parts.
—I am, Sir, &c., L. H. HORDERN.
Weybridge.
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