TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CASE OF THE MALACCA.'
THE seizure of the P. and 0. steamer ' Malacca' by a Russian cruiser of doubtful status on the ground that she contained contraband of war, the placing of a prize crew on board under the Russian flag, the arrest of the crew, and the sailing of the Malacca' from Port Said with the apparent intention of making some Russian port constitute a very grave crisis. On Friday morning the papers were full of rumours that the Russian Government had ordered the release of the ' Malacca,' but, unfortunately, the news was not officially confirmed. Thus, though we greatly hope that a solution of the problem will have been reached before these pages are in our readers' hands, we are still obliged to regard the matter as undecided, and so calling for the most serious consideration. While our Government are dealing with the situation by diplomatic action at St. Petersburg—they have also given orders to a portion of the Mediterranean Squadron to protect our interests on the spot—it is most important that nothing should be said which can in any way aggravate national feeling, and so make a peaceful solution of the problem more difficult. We must, how- ever, point out that though the case is one for very careful and patient handling, and for a due consideration of Russian feelings, it is also one for firm and clear action on our part. Nothing will be gained for the cause of peace by our weakness or indecision. Things will be made easier, not more difficult, if we show ourselves as deter- mined as we are cool and reasonable. Every allowance must be made for the possibility that the commander of the Russian vessel acted without orders, or under a misapprehension of his orders, and every opportunity must in that ease be given to the Russian Government to get without loss of dignity out of the false position created by the over-zeal of a naval officer But this can be, and must be, done without any sacrifice of our own rights.
Though it is so greatly to be hoped the Russian Govern- ment will admit that a blunder has been committed, and assurances will be given us that the blunder will not be re- peated in the future, we shall do no harm by pointing out how seriously Russia would be injuring her own interests if she insisted on taking up an attitude which would force us into a position of hostility. Russia must surely know that though we, as the chief sea-Power, are by no means anxious to insist on a view of international law which will prejudice the action of our cruisers in future wars, we cannot admit that any Power has the right to bring vessels through two neutral highways—in this case the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal—as merchant vessels, and then suddenly transform them into ships of war, with all the rights and privileges that belong to ships of war. Next, Russia will surely realise that we cannot admit that a vessel of such doubtful status, or indeed any vessel, can treat British ships and their crews as the P. and 0. steamer Malacca' and her crew were treated at her seizure and during her passage through the Canal to Port Said. To give no redress for such action, but rather to persist in it, could only mean that Russia intended to assert a novel extension of the rights of marine belligerents in order to bring about a state of war between herself and the British Empire. Is it likely that Russia can have any such intention ? We trust not, though we realise that, from certain points of view, a section of Russian society might like to force on another war, and a war with limited liability, to distract attention from the war in the Far East, and to bring her ally France to her side. She might, no doubt, feel that she would be no worse off if engaged in a war with Britain, but rather better off, because France would be constrained to come to her aid and to lend her the assistance of her China Squadron. The obligations incurred by France in the Mediterranean and the Channel would not be Russia's affair. France must look to herself in those regions. She, at any rate, would be able to help Russia in the Far East ; and very possibly Germany, seeing France and Britain engaged, would also join in on the French side, and so protect the French from damage. But though this view may very well have at one time passed across the minds of certain Russian statesmen, as we suggested some four months ago, recent events, including our agreement with France, must surely have banished it as untenable. Unless the Franco-Russian Alliance, and the subsequent secret agreement in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, are drawn in a very different way from what is usual in such cases, it is most unlikely that France is bound to assist Russia if Russia declares war 072 a second Power.—That we shall not declare war on Russia, even if we take steps to protect our merchant vessels, is certain.—It is far more likely that France would only feel herself bound to help Russia if another Power actively joined Japan in prosecuting hostilities. We should cer- tainly not join Japan if Japan attacked Germany owing to a quarrel over contraband of war, and we can hardly doubt that France would maintain a similar attitude. But it may be said Though this is true in theory, and though France would no doubt be most unwilling to go to war with us because Russia had attacked us, yet she might be forced to do so by the following considerations. Suppose Russia, having become involved with us, were, in effect, to say to France : " You must now either act on our side or else abandon your Alliance with us. We cannot afford an ally who does not help us. If, therefore, you refuse to fight by our side now, we must dissolve the Affiance and substitute for it at a later date, or even now, an alliance with Germany." In such a case, and if such an appeal were made to France by Russia, it is assumed by many persons that France, though very reluctantly, would be obliged to admit it.' But though the argument looks plausible at first, we cannot believe that Russian statesmen have been misled by it. Those statesmen must surely realise that, if the circumstances described above arose, the British Government could and would address France in some such terms as these We fully realise that you need an ally, and that though you do not want to fight us, you cannot risk being left alone face to face with a hostile Germany, and possibly a hostile Triple Alliance. That being so, we offer you our alliance as a substitute for that of Russia. We are willing to pledge ourselves to do for you as against Germany whatever Russia promised, and we can in effect do quite as much, though we are not on paper so strong a military Power as Russia. Russia could have done nothing in case of war to prevent your great African Empire being cut off by the action of a naval force in the Mediterranean. Our alliance in the case of German enmity will not only guarantee the safety of that African Empire, but will, should war take place, consolidate it by the addition of those German possessions which are now dovetailed into the French West African Empire. Further, we can, if allied with you, invite Italy to join our alliance, and so secure your south-eastern frontier. In a word, for an alliance which events have shown is not likely to prove of any very great advantage, we offer you an alliance which gives a far better security.' That Russian statesmen realise that they could not frighten France into an interpretation of the Alliance which would hurry her against her will into a war with Britain, because it would always be possible for us to offer her a more advantageous alternative, may then, we think, be taken for granted. That being so, we cannot believe that Russia will now be so mad as to provoke a war with Britain. Remember, also, that the Russians do not love the Germans, and know that if war took place with Britain the Germans would be sure to seize the opportunity for making bargains with Russia of a. very onerous kind. The price demanded for German aid, or exacted for German neutrality, would not be light. In view of this fact, she is not likely to put herself at the mercy of Germany.
But though there are so many considerations urging the Russians not to involve themselves in a struggle with Britain, it must also be fully admitted that nations often blunder into wars against their own interests, and even desires. This being the case, it behoves us to •act with the greatest caution, as well as courtesy, even when claiming our just rights. We must be firm, but we must also be very patient. Above all, we must refuse to take up an attitude at the beginning which will render it difficult for Russia to retire with honour from the false position which we hold that she has taken up. It is not a case for bullying, brow-beating, and " calling names," but for a quiet, firm, and dignified assertion of a sound principle. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the British Press here will refrain from angry comment, and that the matter will be left in the hands of the Government. They know the facts, and they must be relied on to act with a just sense of our rights and interests.
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