BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW
THE declaration of the King of the Belgians on the principles and purposes of his country's foreign policy calls for fuller explanation than has yet been forthcoming, in spite of the activity of diplomats in London, Paris and• Brussels. The occasion was unusual. Constitutional kings are not in the habit of addressing their Cabinets on foreign policy, nor are their speeches published when they do. The raison d'être of the declaration has in part to be surmised still, for it is by no means clear which of the various reasons adduced by King Leopold was an effective motive force and which was not. And as to what Belgium's foreign policy is now foreign commentators have been quite unable to agree. But on certain points the royal declaration was specific. Belgium can have no allies ; her foreign policy must aim at putting her outside the conflicts of her neigh- bours; her military. policy must aim not at pre- paring for a more or less victorious war as the result of an alliance, but at keeping war away from her territory. There is, it may be conceded, a good deal there that is definite—considerably too definite for the liking of Paris, and even of London. For what it seems to amount to, put into plain language, is that Belgium has no intention of being dragged into war at the heels of France.
If that were all it would be little to Belgium's credit; and it would mean that a generation had grown up to which the memories of 1914—and of 1918—meant nothing. For Belgium to announce through the mouth of King Leopold that a France attacked without provocation by Germany could hope for nothing from her would make it incredible that King Leopold should be King Albert's son. There must be more in the royal pronouncement than that. And there obviously is. Interpreted as a warning that Belgium will not he dragged into war at the heels of a France dragged into war at the heels of Russia, the declaration can be both understood and defended. If that is what Belgium feels she will have the sympathy of a great part of this country with her. If the peril of war in Europe springs primarily from the antagonism between Bolshevism and Nazism, countries like Britain and Belgium, which have as little sympathy for the one creed (not that Nazism has any right to be called a creed) as for the other, are fully entitled to give warning that they cannot be counted on to involve their populations in the carnage. M. Litvinotf's doctrine that peace is indivisible cannot be invoked to sweep all Europe into a war wantonly provoked from Berlin or Moscow. And with King Leopold's doctrine that, except where compelling moral issues are in question, it is far better to keep out of war than to win a war, there will be no quarrel either. But it is best of all that there should be no war to keep out of. The effort to achieve that deserves more atten- tion than the Belgian King's speech gave it.
For there is all too much reason for believing that if peace is indivisible war in Europe is indivisible equally. If Great Britain can cherish little hope of being able to keep out of a European war in which Germany is .a participant,. what hope can Belgium have of keeping out of it ? If there is a war in which Germany is fighting it is inevitable that France should be fighting in it too. Holland, Belgium argues, kept out of war in 1914. She did. But the geographical position of Holland in relation to Germany and France is very _ different from Belgium's. And 1870 can hardly be cited as a precedent in 1936. Actually the peril of war overshadows every country equally and the supreme task of European statesmanship is to avert it. That duty presents itself most immediately in regard to Spain, and provides justification for the policy of non- intervention which the Governments of Europe have adopted, and which the British Labour Party has apparently resolved to challenge. Viewed in relation to Spain alone the policy is indefensible. There is every reason why the Spanish Government, faced with an armed revolt, should be able to buy arms where it chooses. Because France and Britain refuse to sell, and in the early stages of the, campaign the insurgents were drawing supplies from Germany and Italy, the victory has gone everywhere to the rebels and the fate of Madrid is to all appearance sealed. The- Spanish Government has complained bitterly and with good reason of the refusal to supply it in the ordinary way of trade. There is only one answer to make—that an overriding con- sideration is the necessity of preserving peace in Europe—but that answer is decisive.
There can be no irrefutable proof that a policy of free trade in arms for both sides in Spain would precipitate a European war, but the risk of it is far too great to run. War, if it comes, will almost certainly be in the first instance a war between Germany and Russia. They are the two countries which perpetually denounce each other as the enemy. Each justifies its own military expansion by the military preparations of the other. Herr Hitler, whose views on the subject approach monomania, points to the insidious penetration of Bolshevism. M. Stalin quotes the passage from Mein Kampf which advocates physical German penetration into Russia. Is it conceivable that each could make itself the champion of one of the opposing sides in Spain, and support its protege with munitions, food, clothing and possibly men, sending its warships to protect its merchant vessels against interference, without being drawn sooner or later into active conflict ? That is the case, and the only case, for the policy of so-called non-intervention- in Spain.
The policy has not justified itself in the sense that all supplies to either side from external sources have been checked. That there have been breaches of the agreement cannot be doubted. But that the non-intervention policy has kept " intervention " (since the date when the non-intervention agreements were accepted) within relatively narrow limits can hardly be doubted either. There, have been allega- tions of breaches of the agreement, the nations incriminated have been called on for explanations, and they have been indefensibly long in answering. But no case has been made out for abandoning the non-intervention policy. Certainly the British Labour
Party, with the hesitations, vacillations and emenda- tions of its Edinburgh Conference to live down, has made none out. And if Russia broke away now, as she is legally perfectly free to do if she chooses, she would be responsible for whatever consequences her action, and rejoinders to it, led to. She Would have no claim on France, still less on countries like Great Britain or Belgium. That fact, it is clear, is what Belgium is seeking to establish through the utterance of her king. So far she lies open to no criticism. But a country of Belgium's size and situation can find no salvation in conscript armies and frontier forts. Collective security on even a continental scale may for the moment be an empty aspiration, but the need for some peace-system in Western Europe is too great for the attempt to achieve it to be lightly abandoned. If the Loearno conversations materialise, Belgium will have an important part to play in them. If they do not, she will be wise to reflect a little further on the perils of isolation.
Previous page
