The next two years were occupied in a duel with
M. Isvolsky, whose Anglophil tendencies he distrusted, and though baffled in his tortuous negotiations over the Novi Bazar ' Railway schemes, Count .Aehrentbal had resolved by the summer of 1908 to defy Russian resistance and British displeasure by annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the writer, though M. Isvolsky was apprised of this intention before the historic meeting at Buchlau, in September 1908, it
was then agreed that Austria-Hungary should take no action until sufficient notice had been given to enable Russia to obtain the assent of her friends. But within a month Count Aehrenthal went back on his word, launched the bombshell, and though the ambassadors sent by him to announce the annexation to the European Courts were aware that the proclamation of Bulgarian independence would accompany it—one of them, Count Khevenhaller, admitted the knowledge to President FalliZtres—he denied all knowledge of the fact to the British Ambassador at Vienna. As regards Germany, he calculated on her support in the annexation crisis, but did not foresee the dexterous revenge she would take for his omitting to consult her by presenting an ultimatum which created an opportunity for Russia to yield to Germany rather than Austria-Hungary. Yet, in spite of defects of temperament and perception and the opportunism of his methods, the writer admits that Count Aehrenthal was resolute, tenacious, and fearless, and that he strove consistently to secure for his country a footing of equality with the other Great Powers, and particularly with Germany. Count Aehrenthal has been succeeded by Count Berchtold, of whom little is known, save that he is regarded as a safe man who is convinced of the need of maintaining the Triple Alliance.
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