THE GENESIS AND USES OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE.
AS there is still so much want of knowledge in the country as to the nature of the National Reserve, we may be excused for dealing with the genesis of the idea. There is no better way of making people understand a thing than to tell them its history. During and after the war a large number of people throughout the country began puzzling over the problem of making practical use of the very large number of men with military training and in good phy- sical condition who are to be found scattered up and down the country but who belong to no military unit. For example, from the year 1899 and onwards we repeatedly urged con- sideration of the matter in these columns, and insisted that we ought in some way or other to create a National Reservoir of our trained men into which the country could dip at times of need. Others were urging the same idea in different ways in other quarters. But though the idea was un- questionably abroad in the country, nothing was done or seemed able to be done to bring it into the region of practical life. Then came Lord Haldane's epoch-making suggestion—we can call it nothing less—for the formation of Territorial Associations throughout the country. By those Associations he did a great deal morn than merely change the nature and organization of the Volunteers, though that in itself was a great and beneficent revolu- tion. What was even more important, ho created a military machine, or rather a number of military machines, capable of handling the problem of national defence throughout the country.—Incidentally he made a machine which will some day be able to do what the War Office could never do efficiently, that is, organize universal national training and service on the Swiss pattern ; but that is altogether another story.—It happened to occur to an inhabitant of Surrey—though it might just as well have occurred to anybody else, for, as we have said, there was nothing original or patented in the idea—that in the Terri- torial Associations would be found a body which could organize a National Reserve. Accordingly the aforesaid inhabitant of Surrey, in the autumn of 1907, just before the Associations assembled, addressed a letter to all the newspapers circulating in his county to the following effect :- " Sir, May I ask the hospitality of your columns in order to draw attention to a matter which concerns the interests not only of the county, but of the nation ? A county association will very shortly be formed under Mr. Haldane's now Army Act for raising and maintaining that part of the Territorial Army which is within the county of Surrey. May I venture to suggest to those who will be responsible for the association, and for the policy adopted on its initiation, certain considerations in regard to a point which appears to mo of vital importance ?
One of the most glaring defects of our military system hitherto has been our habit of training men to the use of arms for four or five years, and then losing touch with them altogether. The country is literally swarming with men who have learnt their military duties in the Volunteers, the Yeomanry, and the Militia, but who have then left those Forces. Without question, many of these men would be not only willing, but eager in a moment of danger to do their duty to the Motherland. Yet, owing to the total lack of any reserve organization, it would be impossible for the nation to avail itself of their services without an enormous amount of confusion, friction, and delay. In my opinion, it should be ono of the first and immediate duties of the county associations :—
(1) To form a register of all trained men who are not now connected with any definite military bodies, and
(2) To provide them with a skeleton organization which, at a time of national danger, or in the case of a threat of invasion, could be clothed with flesh and blood.
I sincerely trust that the county of Surrey, which is admirably placed for the work, may be able to lead the way in creating such a register of trained men within the county, and in thinking out and establishing a skeleton organization. There is no need why tho organization of a Surrey Reserve or a Surrey National Guard, or whatever other name may be chosen, should be the source of any great expense. The compilation of the register containing the names and addresses of the men, kept well up to date, might want a little trouble, but should not cost more than the salary of a competent clerk in the office of the county association. The skeleton organization by local companies and battalions should again involve no great expenso, as, of course, no pay would to given either to the officers or mon, and no equipment issued. All that would be absolutely necessary would bo for the men to know their point of assembly in case of a signal for enrolment being given. They would also be told who would be their com- manding officer. In order, however, to make the organization more real, each company might be called together once a year by
the person nominated to act as its captain, but this, again, should be a piece of voluntary work and no source of expense.
I have dealt with the Volunteers and Yeomanry, but I do not see why men who have passed out of the Army Reserve should not be added to the register, and also Militiamen in the same position. To these I would add any police pensioners, whether local or Metropolitan, and any Royal Navy sailors resident in the county. Further, members of rifle clubs might bo invited to place their names on tho register. In this way the county authorities would know the names and addresses of all those who, in the language of our forefathers, were `war-worthy.' It would, of course, be explained to the men that they would be a purely Reserve Force, and would only be called out if the whole country had to be raised in case of invasion, and that no legal obligation would be imposed on a man by having his name placed on the register. But, though the immediate object of the register would ho the formation of a skeleton scheme for organizing the levee en masse, the register would have other uses. In case a body of men wore raised for oversee service, as in the South African War, a special appeal and a special bounty might be given to per- sons who were on the county register. By this means, if a now Force of Imperial Yeomanry or the like were required, wo should not witness the horrible higgledy-piggledy which was observable in December 1900.—I am, Sir, &c., J. ST. LOB STRACHEY. Newlands Corner, Merrow Downs, Guildford."
It is interesting to note here that though in many ways the organization of the Reserve has been greatly improved upon, in the main it has kept to the lines suggested in this letter. It must never be forgotten, however, that scattering seed. and making plants grow are very different things. Happily the Surrey Territorial Association, under the chairmanship of that very remarkable military organizer, Sir Edmond. Elles, was not stony but fertile ground. The Surrey Territorial Association, under his guidance, grew the plant, and cuttings from it are now flourishing throughout the country, and one of them—the London cutting—has far o'ertopped in size the original stock. And here we must not refrain from giving the amplest and fullest re- cognition to the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council for the way in which they took up the idea. As soon as they saw that the Surrey plant was beginning to grow they recognized its value, and, taking it under their official patronage, made what they at first called the Veteran Reserve, now the National Reserve, a regular and official part of our scheme of national defence. We are not in the least exaggerating the fullness of the official recognition of the Reserve in this respect. "The National Reserve Regulations " begin with the following statement :— " 1. The National Reserve, which forms n part of the military organization, is primarily a register of trained officers and soldiers who, being under no further obligation for military service, except as specified in para. 6, are organized under the auspices of County Associations and encouraged by the military authorities with a view to increasing the military resources for national defence."
No doubt eager and active officers and men of the National Reserve, as, for example, the Commandant of the Folkestone Company, whose letter we publish to-day, are inclined to grumble at the War Office and wish they would. move faster. That is natural and in many ways admirable. Unless the hound strains at the leash and the horse quivers, paws the ground, pricks his ears, and makes it clear that nothing but the restraint of the rein keeps him from springing into action, neither hound nor horse is worth his keep. But with so much work to do and with comparatively speaking so small an amount of money to do it with, we can hardly wonder that the Army Council are alarmed at rushing into new schemes involving new expenditure unless they are perfectly sure that they have public opinion behind them and can make good their first efforts. That is why, though we desire development as strongly as any member of the Reserve, we cannot agree in condemnation of the War Office in this matter. Indeed, it is hardly too much to say that judging by former pre- cedents and by the traditions of the Department the wonder is not that they have done so little but that they have done so much. What is essential now is to got the men registered throughout the country. When we have got the 300,000 mon we can get, and ought to get, if the counties do their duty, we may feel perfectly certain that the Army Council can be set in motion by public opinion. Even if they were hostile to the Reserve, -which we are sure they are not, the country could insist upon so great a national asset as the Reserve not being wasted. If, however, prematurely and before making the National Reserve a success, we begin to haggle and dispute as to the precise way in which the Reserve must be organized and used, it is more than likely that the whole thing may end in smoke and ill-temper. Many good. things before now have been spoilt by aggravated and premature disputes over details—not practical details but hypothetical details of the future. Solmtur amhulando is a very good rule, and we have no doubt that when there are 300,000 men ready to march the Reserve will get what it desires and deserves. Meantime we would. with all interested in force at our command implore those who are nterested in the scheme, and who have already devoted. so much time and energy to it, to be patient, and, till the full force is raised, devote themselves to the work of getting more men and keeping together those who are already registered. They must not •forget that though the force has many friends, it has also a good many secret enemies, and that it would still be comparatively easy to strangle it. When it is six times as strong and vigorous as it is now, and has six times the hold upon public opinion—as it will have when the full numbers are reached—the process of stran- gling will be beyond any one's power. Though we deprecate any attempt at the present moment to rush the War Office or to force them to come to a final decision as to the uses of the Reserve while only one-sixth of the Reserve is in existence, we do not, of course, in any sense deprecate a wise deliberation as to the best ways of using the Reserve, provided such deliberation is not hostile or joined to unfair innuendoes as to the action of the War Office. For ourselves we have always believed that the greatest and most important of the many uses of the Reserve would be to stiffen and augment the Territorial Army should it be called upon to resist invasion. A hundred. thousand well-trained men thrown into the Territorial units, to begin with, and another 100,000 ready if need be to supply the wastage of war would so obviously be of use that we need not dwell upon this fact. Again, a portion of the Reserve might be used on garrison and semi-military duties and so set free troops of a more mobile character. This, it seems to us, is foreshadowed by the War Office Regulations as to the Reserve from which we have already quoted. Here is the passage in question :- " 3. County Associations will frame their own rules for the formation and organization of the National Reserve in their counties, subject to the following provisions. Tho names on the register are to be classified in the following manner :- (1) Officers under 55 years of age, and other ranks under 46 years of age, who are considered to be physically fit to join a combatant unit for service in the field. (ii) Officers between the ages of 55 and 60, and other ranks between 45 and 55, who are considered to be physically fit either for combatant duty in garrisons, or other fixed positions, or for administrative work. (iii) Officers and other ranks, not qualified to be included in (i) and (ii), who will become honorary members of the Reserve and be retained therein for social and influential purposes. In the case of officers and men in classes (i) or (ii), the register should record the rank, arm, or branch in which the reservist last served, and any special qualifications or experience possessed by the reservist should be noted."
This appears to us a fairly clear indication of the way in which the Reserve would be used in case of invasion. It is interesting to note here that an officer of the Surrey National Reserve lately analysed the men in his company and found that if classes (i) and (ii) were combined, i.e., the classes set apart for active work, the average age was under 37 years—a remarkable answer to those people who still grumblingly say : " What would be the use of pitting a crew of old dotards like that against the vigorous youth of Germany ? " Another use of the National Reserve is worth mentioning. We do not doubt that if the register ultimately reaches 300,000 it will form a reservoir out of which the nation can draw a very valu- able contingent for an oversea war. We feel as certain as we can feel of anything that if we were engaged in another oversea war like the Boer War and the Government were, without putting the least pressure upon the Reserve, to ask whether any of them would volunteer for active service outside these islands, at least 10 per cent. would willingly come forward. But that would at once give a contingent Of 30,000 men of the very highest quality. That may sound a small matter, but we venture to say that any one who realizes what the drain of war service is will consider this possi- bility as of the very greatest importance. Such a contin- gent, remember, would not require to be trained or t ht aug the use of the rifle, like so many of the members of the Imperial Yeomanry, but could at once be added. to the fighting units in the field without risk of that dilution by inferior material which is always a very great danger. There is not a regiment in the country, however dis- tinguished, which would not be glad to get a draft of 100 or so men skimmed from the National Reserve in this way. We need hardly say that of course no sort of pressure would, or indeed. could, be put upon the men. It would. lie entirely with them whether they liked to volunteer. For the majority, of course, such volunteering would be impossible, but there certainly would. be a 10 per cent. margin. available.
Previous page
