PORTUGUESE OBSTRUCTION. T HE Portuguese must remember that there are limits
even to the tyranny of impotence. We may be made to endure a great deal because Portugal is weak and we are strong, and because it would be odious to send the Fleet to the Tagus, or even to occupy GOrt, or Madeira ; but nevertheless there is a point where even Great Britain must insist upon being treated by her old ally with some show of fairness and consideration. Against the right of the Portuguese to keep as much of Africa as they can, and to do their best by diplomatic action or by serious occupa- tion to enlarge their Colonial Empire, we say nothing. They have doubtless a strong case in many particulars, and if it were put forward in a spirit of moderation and good faith, it would be certain not to go unheeded. Englishmen are perhaps over-ready to think their own countrymen in the wrong, and a genuine Portuguese grievance would be sure to find advocates here. When, however, the Portuguese make agreements in Lisbon which they will not enforce in Africa, and resort to the most high-handed and aggressive acts whenever they have a claim to put forward, it becomes absolutely necessary to consider whether we can any longer tolerate their arbitrariness and want of all friendly feeling. We have already endured from Portugal treatment which we should never have endured from a Power holding a position equal to our own. A little more, and it will be necessary to make Portugal understand that our patience is exhaustible. The latest difficulties in regard to South Africa have arisen from the fact that Portugal and England are engaged in a race for the northern angle of the Mashonaland High- lands. Practically both Powers know that the dispute as to Minim and the adjoining districts will be decided according as the one or the other obtains effective possession. This being the case, we cannot complain that the Portuguese are endeavouring to push on into Manica as fast as possible. We have, however, a right to require that the race shall be run under fair conditions. If we are content not to exercise the right of might to settle the whole business just as we choose, they must refrain from taking unfair advantages, such as they have lately taken at Port Beira, The Portuguese openly confess that their object in stopping Colonel Willoughby and his ex- pedition was to give their own people a good start. Contrary to their undertaking, they have forbidden our vessels to navigate the Pungvv6, and 'in violation of all friendly feeling, they have fired on British subjects and arrested their persons. In a word, while we are withheld by the desire not to humiliate or coerce a weak Power, the Portuguese act as if we might be treated as virtual enemies, Under the circumstances, it is clear that the time has come to settle the Portuguese question once and for all, by gentle means if possible, if not, by superior force. Let us consider for a moment exactly how matters stand at present. It will be remembered that last August Lord Salisbury proposed a treaty with Portugal which would have given the latter Power unqualified possession of the Manica territory now in dispute. Fortunately for us, however, though unfortunately for the Portuguese, they refused to accept Lord Salisbury's proposal for delimita- tion. On this refusal, a modus vivendi was arranged on November 14th to the following effect. Portugal engaged to give free transit over the waterways of the Zambesi, ShirC1, and Pungwd, and to facilitate generally communication between .the Portuguese settlements on the coast and the English possessions in the interior, " especially as regards the establishment of postal and telegraphic communications, and as regards the transport service." Both Powers also agreed "to recognise the territorial limits indicated in the Convention of August 20th, 1890, in so far that from the date of the present agreement to the termination thereof, neither Power will make treaties, accept Protectorates, or exercise any act of sovereignty within the spheres of influence assigned to the other party by the said Convention." It is added, however, that "neither Power will thereby be held to prejudge any question whatever which may arise as to the said terri- torial limits in the course of the altered negotiations." The agreement is to come to an end six months after date, on May 14th or May 4th,—that is, according as calendar or lunar months are the months of diplomacy. This being the agreement, let us see how the two parties have observed it. In the first place, it is alleged, and we fancy with truth, that the emissaries of the South Africa Company did exercise acts of sovereignty within the regions declared by the Convention of August 20th to be within the sphere of influence of Portugal. If, then, Portugal had herself refrained from wrongful acts, she would probably have had a good case against us for in- fringing the modus vivendi. In obtaining redress under these circumstances, the better portion of the English public would have been on her side. If, however, the South Africa Company did not abide by the modus vivendi, no more has Portugal. The attack made upon Sir John Willoughby and his party is absolutely without excuse. He and his companions were not armed, and they were carrying mails. In a word, they were doing the very thing which the modus vivendi specially gave them a right to do, It is clear, therefore, that Portugal has broken her agreement, and cannot any longer claim to treat it as binding. If she has a grievance against England, we have as great, if not a greater, one against her.
In view of these circumstances, it is evident that, when May 4th comes, there will be a clean slate in regard to the delimitation of Portuguese and English spheres of in- fluence in South Africa. The agreement of August 20th, 1890, was refused by Portugal, and so has ceased to exist ; and the modus vivendi which kept a portion of it alive, but which has been observed by neither Power, will have ceased in another ten days to have even a nominal force. If the Portuguese had abided by the modus vivendi, it might have been difficult, in face of the South Africa Company's infringement, for us to have altered the position we took up last August. As it is, we are free to review the whole position. That this is so is a matter for no small congratulation, for the explorations of Mr. Rhodes's emissaries have shown that our Foreign Office made a great mistake in proposing to yield Manica to the Portu- guese. We say this not merely because Manica is full of gold. The real reason why we must possess Manica our- selves, and not allow a nominal annexation by Portugal, is to be found in the fact that if we do not occupy that terri- tory, it will be raided by Boer filibusters, who will set up a paper Republic, and so add another element of disturbance to the South African problem. The Portuguese would be quite unable to dislodge the Boers if they once took possession, and we should thus have a sort of diggers' Alsatia,--that is what a so-called Boer Republic would become when it had been " rushed " by a cosmopolitan mob of gold-seekers--thrown across our road from Northern Mashonaland to the sea. This is what Sir John Willoughby. writing in the Fortnightly of this month, says on the subject :—" The Manica question at present is of imme- diate interest, as a point of dispute between the Chartered Company and Portugal, but the real interest involved is more far-reaching. Had Portugal accepted the boundary offered by Lord Salisbury in his agreement of August 20th, a new Transvaal would have rapidly absorbed Manicaland under the auspices of a filibustering Boer expedition which would have made short work of pushing the Portuguese representatives into the sea. Could Portugal, even with the assistance of Gouveia [a leader, "of Goanese and native extraction," who commands a band of "armed slaves," and is a terror to the tribes south of the Zambesi], have dared to venture upon the enormous expense entailed by a serious struggle with the Boers in so distant a country ? I am convinced that our withdrawal from Manica, would ensure the establishment of a Boer Republic between the sphere of British control and the coast within twelve months, and I believe every one who is sufficiently well acquainted with South African affairs will endorse my conviction." Sir John Willoughby is quite right to warn our statesmen of this danger, and we trust his view will not be ignored at the Foreign Office. Mean- time we can only say again that Portugal will be wise to adopt a different attitude towards this country. We know the temptation to which her King and statesmen are exposed is not a light one. They think it safer to irritate the British people than the mob of Lisbon. They will find in the end, however, that their calculations are fallacious. If they persist in their present line of action, they will awaken a real feeling of indignation in England, and they will then find that they have only encouraged hopes at home which they are unable to fulfil. Both on domestic and on foreign grounds, Portugal will be wise if she brings the delimitation negotiations to as speedy a termination as possible.
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