TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE TRUE BASIS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.
E trust that the moral of recent events in regard to Germany has not been lost either on our statesmen or on the country as a whole. The well-defined tone of German public opinion, and the fact that the German Foreign Minister, though an able and adroit states- man, felt obliged to adopt the kind of language used by him in the Reichstag—and this though his Imperial master is most anxious not to offend England and English feeling—are sure signs that it would be most unwise for us to base a permanent policy on any agree- ment or understanding with Germany. The Emperor and his leading statesmen may be friendly enough, and may nominally have the pOwer to make binding agree- ments with England, but the force of circumstances will in the end be too much for them, and their agreements will not stand. That is what we desire that the British people should realise. It is no good for them to pretend that things as regards Germany are as they would like them to be. .They must face the facts as they are. We . are not a sensitive people, and, rightly enough, are very little moved by foreign insult, and have no objection to working with people who have covered us with abuse, holding such abuse to be mere froth. But in the case of Germany it is not mere froth. The abuse is based on realities, and marks a deep and instinctive feeling and not a passing phase. The Germans hate and abuse us because they are serious rivals, -.--because they want what we have got, and mean to have it if possible. But it is the nature of nations when in rivalry to express that rivalry in terms of hatred and moral indignation. The Germans when they abuse us are, in fact, lashing themselves into the proper frame of mind for challenging our command of the sea and our Imperial and commercial hegemony. We cannot make a permanent understanding with them because, as they themselves say, they want our place in the Run. That is the long and short of the matter. The trerman Emperor, partly from personal reasons of a friendly character and partly because he sees that Germany must not be in a hurry, and our statesmen, because they hold the belief that any views, however essentially antagonistic, can be compromised—English- men are constitutionally prone to believe that oil and water will mix if only the process is conducted with sufficient care and good feeling—have tried for the last two years to pretend that we and Germany are natural allies instead of natural rivals, but unless we are greatly mistaken our statesmen, at any rate, are beginning to realise that the attempt is a failure.
That being so, it surely should be their concern to reconsider our foreign policy as a whole, and to ash-. whether we cannot find a better basis for it than that of an agreement with Germany. We do not, of course, desire that they should assume a policy of hostility towards Germany. There is no sort of need for that. We merely wish that our rulers should cut Great Britain adrift from the German entanglement, and should adopt towards the Great Powers which stand opposed to Germany a more reasonable and sympa•hetic attitude than that which has obtained of recent years. There can be little doubt that our movement away from Germany would have an excellent effect on our relations with the rest of Europe. It is worth notice the friction with Germany caused by the German wale, tatien over Mr. Chamberlain's speech, and Count von Billow's unfriendly, though doubtless, from his own point of view, necessary, yielding to that agitation. had at once the effect of improving our relations with France. As we diverged from Germany the tone of French public opinion at once improved, and we cannot doubt that if we formally abandoned all idea of a working agreement with Germany we should at once find France most ready to welcome a good understanding with this country. Now that the Egyi. tiara question has settled itself by the efflux of time, Franco is not in serious rivalry with us. She is not struggling for the command of the sea commercially and politically, and does not dream of a world-policy to be carried out at the expense of the British Empire. But it is not merely France that would be favourably affected by our moving away from Germany. If 'we choose to act with reasonable prescience we can, by separating ourselves from Germany, come to a settlement with Russia which may give us a position in Europe and in the world at large such as we have not had since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. If we were to come—as we hold that we could come—to an understanding with Russia, we should be absolutely free to watch the developments of the German world-policy, and whenever that policy trenched upon our legitimate rights and interests—we have no desire to keep Germany from any position of wealth and power that is gained in a fair field and without favour, and not achieved by hostile action—we should be in a position to hold our own with crushing effect.
But we cannot come to a real understanding with Russia, unless we are content to meet her reasonable aspirations. In the past British statesmen have ofta talked about an understanding with Russia, but unfortu- nately they have always as the first condition of an understanding demanded the abandonment of the very thing which Russia most desired. When Russia wanted to go to Constantinople we told Russia that we should be delighted to come to an under- standing with her, but only if she promised never to violate the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. When Russia's attention was turned from Turkey to China, and her eyes were directed towards the Pacific, and when the linking of her great Empire by the Siberian Railway became the special desire of the Czar and his people, we told her that we could only be friends with her if she would render those aspirations impossible by promising never to interfere with any portion of China. Now that Russia has no longer any fear of us in the Near East, and has virtually got what she wants in Manchuria in spite of us, and is turning her eyes to the Persian Gulf, where sbe most naturally, and indeed inevitably, desires an open-water outlet, we tell her that we shall be delighted to come to an understanding with her if only she will promise never to touch Southern Persia. Such proceedings are absolutely futile. If we are to come to an understanding with Russia, we must allow her frankly and freely to have access to the Persian Gulf, and what is more, accept all the consequences of that access. The Novoe Vremyct, most significantly unmuzzled by the Censor, tells us plainly in an article telegraphed to London by Reuter last Sunday that it is only by allowing Russia a free hand in Southern Persia that we can come to an understanding. Writing on the recent article on an understanding with Russia in the National Review—an article which has excited more interest and had more effect in the diplomatic world than any magazine article of recent times—the Novoe Vremya declares that "the crucial point of the question is rather in Persia, as Southern Persia and the shores of the Persian Gulf are of vital import. ance to Russia, on account of her aspiration to obtain an opening into the Indian Ocean on the flank of the inter- national highway, which is the Suez Canal. The acqui- sition of that outlet would have for Russia such vast importance that she cannot be able to make any concession in the Persian question, and it is only on the ground of an agreement regarding that question that it would be possible to establish an understanding between herself and England." That is, we believe, the absolute truth. If we want to have an understanding with Russia we must give up the notion of excluding her from the Persian Gulf. What, then, we have got to consider is this,—Is the presence of Russia in the Persian Gulf so dangerous to us that we cannot allow it, even though we should gain thereby an understanding with Russia which would set us free throughout the rest of the world ? Remember for a moment that this is what we should gain. We should at once be free from any need of conciliating Germany, and from paying the very heavy blackmail which that astute Power constantly demands,—witness Samoa and China ; and possibly, when the war is over, certain African concessions. Again, an understanding with Russia brings in its train an under- standing with Franca. France could not separate herself from Russia even if she wanted to, and certainly she would not want to do so when by not separating herself, but by sharing in the understanding, she would produce the diplomatic isolation of Germany. If we come to an understanding with Russia, Germany becomes, in fact, incapable of any movement injurious to us. The Triple Alliance is already tottering. If we moved away from Germany towards Russia, we should certainly draw Italy in 'our train, for we, acting as the honest broker with France, could give Italy a great deal more than she gets from the Triple Alliance. Even Austria might not greatly care to carry on the alliance with Germany, but might prefer to insure herself by a separate agreement with Russia on lines such as those which already exist as to the future of the Balkans. Diplo- matically, an agreement with Russia wou:d give us the complete mastery of the situation in our rivalry with Germany. Alsace and Lorraine make it impossible that Germany could go behind our back and make terms with France. Commercially, the understanding should also bear fruit. Russia cannot, of course, relax her tariff very much, as she wants the revenue. But in Russia an inclination of the State is all-powerful, and if the Russian Govetnment made it known that the help of English capital and English direction would be welcome in the development of Siberia—the America of the new century—this country would have as great a share in bringing Russia's great estate in Asia into cultivation as it had in developing the West of America.
But can it be said that it is worth while to forego advantages of the kind we have named in order to keep Russia out of the Persian Gulf ? Must we, in order to achieve that result, still be the diplomatic drudge of the German Emperor all over the world, and while we do his hard service bear the kicks and insults of the German people? After .all, what can the Russians do in the Persian Gulf when they get there except carry on a trade, which we are, we hope, not such petty hucksters as to envy them. They will threaten India ? Surely not. In the first place, the Russians do not Want India, and if they did the difficulties of the land route remain as great as ever, while if it is a question of the sea, we can always insure against that danger by additions to the Fleet,—additions much less serious than will be demanded of us if we foster and encourage Germany and her naval aspirations. Unquestionably, in our opinion, our foreign policy should be based, not on an understanding with Germany, but with Russia. In either case a certain price has to be paid for the understanding, but no one who is not blinded by anti-Russian prejudice can doubt that the German Government exacts by far the greater price. And further, in the case of Germany the essential hostility of the German people is so great that it is practically certain that, however honourable and right its intentions, the German Government will not in fact be able to keep engagements favourable to England. In one way or another German public opinion will in the end be sure to bring about the repudiation of all diplomatic contracts favourable to England.
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