SIR HENRY COLVILB ON THE WAR.* The Ninth Division did
not come into being till February 10th, 1900, but the author commanded the Guards Brigade from Belmont to Magersfontein. He sketches very clearly and briefly the nature of the movements in each fight. Belmont, he says, was a "soldiers' battle," in the sense that the men did for themselves what no general would have dared to ask of them ; "but unlike most soldiers' battles, it had not the drawback of being due to somebody's mistake." In those days every officer had theories, but all were soon to be rudely shattered by the discovery that novel conditions had arisen which did not come within any instructions. But the men con- tinued to fight the hopeless battle with the old uncompla.ning English persistence. General Colvile thus describes a move- ment of the Grenadiers :—
"I had often thought that at home we did not practise rear- guard actions enough, but if Crabbe and his men had been doing nothing else all their lives they could not have carried it out more neatly. As soon as they began to move, the enemy's guns turned most of their attention to them' and at times Crabbe's lines could hardly be seen through the dust; but when we did see them they were strolling quietly along in slow time, utterly unconcerned, alternate files halting and facing the enemy, while the others retired to a fre,-12 position' in which they halted till the advanced files had passed through them. In Hyde Park the movement would have been called perfect; at Aldershot it would have been said that it was too regular and slow ; at Magersfontein it, at all events, showed the Boars that if the British soldier does not mean to hurry, it is not easy to make him do so. One of them had said of George Nugent at the Modder River fight: 'He rides ab ,ut on his — old white horse, and don't ewe a —, and just says, "Let tho — shoot."' Whether my aide-de- camp was correctly reported or not I do not know—perhaps he looked it more than said it; and every man of the Grenadiers looked it so thoroughly as they sauntered across that mile of shell. swept plain, that, thinking of the story, I could almost hear a murmur from the ranks of, let the — shoot."
Next came the formation of the Ninth Division, composed
of Macdonald's Highland Brigade (Black Watch, Argyll and Sutherland, Seaforths, and Highland -Light Infantry) ód SMith-Dorrien's Nineteenth:Brigade ZSbroishirefi,-GOrIOns, Duke Of Cambridge's -Light Infantry.; and • the C. —1=444)- • This Work of Ma Ninth Division. By Major-Gent:al Sir H. E. Caine, C.B. London; E. Arnold. flea. tid.. net.1 . Wz are glad that Sir Henry Colvile has published this book. In the first place, it sets forth his case temperately and fully without the injudicious appeals of the former discussion. In the second place, it is a record of the deeds of his men, who, he thinks, have suffered unjustly by his condemnation. And, most important reason of all, it is in itself an excellent piece of writing. The author of The Land of the Nile Springs has a • gift of vivid picture-making, and the true art of the ob- server, while the writing throughout is terse and nervous English. The point of view, too, is valuable, for General Colvile commanded a division and saw things on a different scale from the private or the war correspondent. As a military history the book is, of course, a piece of special pleading, an ex parts statement, but as a personal narrative it is comparatively little cumbered with discussions. Up to Sannah's Post, indeed, it is a straightforward tale, chiefly occupied with the gallantry of his men, and though in the later chapters the difficulties of his task are recounted at length and his own reading of instructions dwelt upon, yet the author has kept on the whole loyally to his intention, and told us rather of his soldiers than of himself. For this reason, quite apart from its controversial interest, we welcome General Colvile's contribution to the literature of the war.
The march to Paardeberg followed, and General Colvile's men had a share in the unsuccessful attempt to rush the trenches which Lord Kitchener ordered. In the description of the action a curious fact is noted. "What men are able to do, the Highlanders did ; but there seems to be some law which fixes the exact amount of thinning which a body of civilised men can stand. A battalion will advance without a waver, under a storm of bullets, up to a certain point ; on reaching that point it is possible that the enemy's fire may have slackened, but if the gaps in the ranks are too big it will halt." We suppose that the word " " is the key of the explanation. A body of undisciplined men might go on till the last perished ; a highly disciplined regiment, in which the inst;r ct of corporateness is strongly developed, will stop perforce when their selidatity is reduced to vanishing point. The instinct of the mass will overpower any private intentions. Among other interesting facts, General Colvile tells us that in his opinion the work of the Royal Canadians on the morning of February 27th put Cronje at our mercy, whether he had wished to surrender or not.
From Paardeberg begins the record of disaster and the contentious part of the book. At Poplar Grove the Ninth Division, in spite of great bravery, proved unable to prevent the escape of a large force of the enemy. Then came Bloem- fontein, and then the disaster at Sannalis Post, which is the central point of the charge against General Colvile. He re- counts the facts of that day in extreme detail, accounting for every half-hour, but the main features are very simple., He was instructed to march in the early morning to Waterval's Drift. When he arrived at Boesman's Kop he heard that Broadwood had been cut up, had lost his guns, and was now forming up about two miles off. Instead of going to him, he merely sent a message demanding his presence. Broadwood replied that he was too tired to move, and General Colvile thereupon gave up hope of retaking the guns and marched off north to the Hodder Drift. His defence is that it was Broadwood's business to come to him, that to have pushed on with his infantry would have done no good, and that it was really the wisest policy to attempt to cut the enemy's line of retreat. The real blame, be makes it clear, in his opinion, lies with the superior authorities for not sending him to Waterval's Drift the night before, and not sending French with his cavalry sooner. We omit many of the lesser points, but we are bound to confess that on the simple question of saldierly or unsoldierly conduct General Colvile makes out a strong case for himself. At the worst he says his action was a small mistake, arising from an extreme care for his men and a perhaps undue sense of the difficulties of the enterprise. Clearly Lord Roberts thought otherwise, for after Satinah's Post General Colvile found that his force slowly dwindled away, and that Ian Hamilton, who accompanied him, his junior in every way, commanded a much larger body. It was a difficult position, and he pays a generous compliment to General Hamilton's tact and consideration. Supplies became a painful question, orders from headquarters mystified him, and his Yeomanry escort did not turn up in time. Then came Lindley and the disastrous resolution which sacrificed Colonel Spragge. On this point we think that General Colvile can scarcely be blamed in view of the explanation which le offers. He did not know that Colonel Spragge believed that he had sent for him, and he was unaware that his arrival at Heilbron on the date fixed, which was the purpose of his forced march, was unimportant ; and the telegram sent from Lindley on May 23rd can only be explained as a Boer ruse. At Heilbron the division was broken up, and, in General Colvile's words, Lord Roberts showed "thorough disapproval of his work "
It is a melancholy book, great as is its non-contentious interest, for it is still, in effect, the apology of a general of approved skill and courage for certain acts whereon his judgment differs from. that of his superior officers. "The worst of war," said the Staff officer whom he quotes, "is that one cannot try things both ways " ; and the consequence of taking the wrong way in was is serious, and rightly serious, for any commander. It is not our province to criticise General Colvile's defence, though wm welcome glidly his generous vindication of his men. We cannot believe that it was merely an error df judgment mythic' h he was condemned, considering Lard Roberts's well-known fairness and toleration. We do
not know the facts beyond the ordinary reports, but as these stand they show him confronted by great difficulties, with insufficient supplies, defective information, and inadequate forces. He did not choose to attempt the impossible, and on this, he says, he was condemned. There is, of course, another side to all this, and in time we may hope to hear it. But from this volume we have received the impression that the author, for all his cleverness and courage, must have been a somewhat distressing subordinate. He seems to us inclined to fuss over the inevitable accidents of a great war, to expect arrangements to be flawless, and in case of a breakdown to show a lack of enterprise in meeting it. It would seem, too, from the pedantically minute examination of Colonel Spragge's message on p. 183, that he was inclined to forget sometimes the common duty between different parts of the army. In this particular case the hesitation may have been justified, but it seems to indicate a too literal and self- centred spirit.
On the whole, we adhere, and should advise our readers to adhere, to the view we have expressed above,—namely, that we cannot enter into the details of the controversy, but must be content with the fact that Lord Roberts, who is fair- minded and tolerant to a fault, and who had all the facts not only before him but within his own field of vision, came to the conclusion that General Colvile had not the qualities which fit him for high command,--for that is what the decision comes to. Of course that is not a decision which General Colvile can be expected to accept with satisfaction, but it is absurd tc talk as if it were cruel or vindictive, and so forth. If Lord Roberts, having formed the opinion that General Colvile was not fit for high command, had continued to employ General Colvile, he, indeed, would have been worthy of condemnation of the severest kind. Command in the field is a mattei too terribly serious to be trifled about, nor can war be treated as a game where kindliness and consideration for other people's feelings are the chief objects to be aimed at.
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