THE PEACE CONFERENCE.*
THE Institute of International Affairs was founded in Paris last year by some members of the British and American dele- gation& These two great corpe-of specialists- hach much friendly intercourse, and some of them at least came to realize more clearly than ever before. that " the passions which embroil nations against each other and wreck civilization all have their roots in the ignorance born of isolation." At a meeting at which General Tacker H. Bliss took the chair, on the motion of Lord Robert Cecil, it was decided to form the Institute, with a branch in Great Britain and a branch in America. The purpose of the Institute was " to keep its members in touch with the international situation and enable them to study the relation between national polidesand the interests.of society as a whole." Its first task was clearly to produce an account of the Peace Conference, which had begun a new chapter in the history of the world. The work was planned in five volumes by the late Mr. G. L. Beer, the great American historian of our old colonial system, and by Lord Enstace Percy, and chapters-were allotted to various experts, under the general editorship of- Major Temperley. Mr. T. W. Lamont, of New York, advanced £2,000 for expenses, so that the book might get under way at once. Thanks to Mr. Lamont and to the zeal and industry of the contributors, the first two volumes have already appeared: The list of writers, whose individual contributions are not identified, includes, besides those already mentioned and others, Sir Frederick Maurice, Professor Hazeltine, Dr. Hogarth, Major Ormsby- Gore, Professor Coolidge, Dr. Seton-Watson, Professor Shotwell of Columbia; Professor C. IC. Webster, and Professor Young of Cornell. The editor points out that the difficulty in writing a history of the Peace Conference lies not so much in lack of information as in lack of perspective. On the other hand; a history written by men who took part in the proceedings at Paris will preserve the spirit and atmosphere- in. which the Conference met and will thus help to explain the methods and decisions of the peace-makers. We may say at once-that these • litislory of the Pass, Confer...NW Parts. Edited by IL W, V. Tenrperlay. L, IL Published under the Ana tom of the Institute of International Affairs. London H. Frowde and. Hodder and Stoughton. 142a. each vol..1 two volumes are extremely interesting and will be of the greatest value to those who seriously desire to understand the peace treaties and the new problems which arise out of them. The first volume treats of the end of the war and the preliminaries of the Conference. The second volume discusses in detail the settlement with Germany. The third volume is to contain cotes and documents relative to the German peace and to the !League of Nations. The fourth volume is to deal with the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian treaties, and the fifth with the Turkish treaty and general peace questions. Thus the whole of the work done at Paris will be described and explained.
The opening chapters of the first volume contain a lucid 'summary of Germany's -military defeat, of the German revo- lution and of the armistice negotiations. It is shown that the German revolution was negative rather than positive. The Hohenzollern system collapsed because it could no longer give Germany victories in the field, and not because the docile people consciously desired a modern democratic government. " It was the entry of America into the war, and not the effect of the Allied propaganda, which really convinced 'the German people that their cause was a wrong one." When the offensive of March, 1918, had apparently succeeded, all parties except the Socialists were ready to forget the vague resolution of July, 1917, in favour of " a peace of understanding " and to demand annexa- tions. As late as July, the Centre and Left tamely acquiesced in the Government's refusal to accord a genuine reform of the Prussian franchise. Not till after Bulgaria's collapse did Ger- many obtain, under Prince Max of Baden, what was, at least in name, a Parliamentary Ministry, and even then the civilians did not dare to break with General Ludendorff till October 20th, when defeat had become inevitable :— " The revolution began with a naval revolt against slaughter after armistice negotiations had been begun ; it spread because almost the whole 'population was conscious of defeat, anxious for peace and food, and convinced that its Government had failed and ought to be replaced. No attempt was made to suppress it because the Government itself bad no principle of existence, having abandoned its old principle and only half adopted the very principle of the revolution itself."
The next chapters describe the eta to of the world at the end of the war and analyse the various belligerent -statements of war- alma, the Socialist peace-programmes and the Bolshevik display of rhetoric at Brest-Litovsk. This subject is taken up again in a later chapter discussing how far the Armistice Conventions accorded with the " pre-Armistice agreements" which are conceived to be implied in President Wilson's speeches as well as in his Notes to Germany and Austria immediately befoie the Armistice. It is admitted that the Austro-Hungarian command surrendered unconditionally on November 3rd, 1918, and that Turkey also placed herself at the mercy of the Allies four days earlier. Yet it is contended by one author at least (p. '418), though another differs from him (pp. I35z6), that the Allies had somehow contracted a " moral obligation " to apply to Austria- Hungary and Turkey President Wilson's principles, so far as they can be deduced from a series of vaguely worded declara- tions. "Moral obligation" may mean much or little. But it is surely hypercritical to suggest that when the Austro-Hun- garian and Turkish armies, being utterly defeated, laid down their arms, the Allies had contracted any sort of obligation to those States, apart from what humanity-and the public interest would dictate. In the ease of Germany, the Armistice and the Peace Treaty -were unquestionably based on the " pre- Armistice agreements." The authors, in discussing the question whether the Allies required in the Armistice more " reparation for damage done" than the " restoration " mentioned -in the President's "fourteen points," admit -that the Armistice -must govern the ease. It allay 'be added that President Wilson, who should 'know best what'he meant in January, 1918,'by "restor- ation," agreed to the Allies' demand of November Sth, '1918, for " compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, -by sea and 'from the air." He also agreed to the express reservation of "any-subsequent concessions and claimi" in the Armistice. The 'Peace Conference had to translate these generalities into -plain matter-of-fact -terms.
The account given of the working of the Conference is lucid and 'informing. The vast machine, as 'originally designed, worked far too slowly. The " Council of Ten," comprising the Heads of 'Government and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, America, France, and Italy, with two Japanese delegates, 'formed the real Conference of Paris until the middle of
March, when the ' Council of Four' was substituted for it." The " Council of Ten " proved too large. The " Council of Four "—which the authors call a " Council of the Heade of the four European Great Powers," though they refer to America, with Great Britain, France, and Italy—had far greater speed and driving-power. In a month it completed the draft German treaty and the Covenant. When Italy left the Conference on April 23rd, 1919, the " Council of Three "—President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemeneeau—continned without interruption. To these three men, as the authors say, the main credit for the accomplishment of the immense task is due. We can only refer here to the elaborate exposition of the German treaty in the second volume—a most valuable and instructive commentary, which disposes of much ignorant and hostile criticism, though it does not represent the treaty as 'free from blemishes. The authors are careful to show in detail how the Conference was hampered by much political, military and eco- nomic business. The Allies, while drafting the peace treaties, had to repress revolts against their authority and to concert measures for the relief of diatressed Europe. Few people realize the extent of the relief operations in Central Europe which were initiated and supervised by the Conference. If Germany went short of food in the spring sand early summer of last year, the fault was largely her own, as the merchant ships which Germany agreed in January, 1919, to hand over immediately were not transferred to the Allies for six or eight months. The Allies had not enough ships to meet their own requirements, so that Germany's reluctance to fulfil the agreement prevented her own people from receiving full rations. Nevertheless, vast quantities of food were sent into Germany, and British supplies were sold to her at cost price—which was usually far below the market price. History records no instance of such generosity on the part of the victors to the vanquished as the Allies displayed to the Germans last year. We may draw attention also to the accurate account of the Hungarian Bolshevik insurrection and of the part played by Rumania. The authora point out with justice that Bela Kun attacked both the Czeoho-Slovaks and the Rumanians, in defiance of the Allies, and that the Rumanians had an account to Bettie with the Magyars who had pillaged Rumania mercilessly. The book is illustrated with some good maps, and deserves to be widely read. The Institute-of Inter- national Affairs has.oertandy justified its existence by producing this most valuable work.
Previous page
