THE WAR CLOUD IN THE NEAR EAST.
IN spite of the exceedingly dangerous and critical position in South-Eastern Europe, we believe as well as hope that peace will be maintained. At the eame time, we are bound to confess that our belief Is rather instinctive than rational. Argument and logical deduction based on observation of the facts must tend, not in the direction of reassuring the student of the situation, but to the reverse conclusion. The chief cause of war in modern times may be shortly described as the desire to get in the first blow. Military science is the science of attack. The soldier—and from his point of view probably quite rightly—is always telling the statesman : "We don't want war any more than you do ; but if war is to take place, for heaven's sake give us a chance of striking three or four days, or, if you cannot manage that, even twenty-four hours, before our opponents are ready to deliver their blow. The whole difference between success and failure depends upon who strikes first." The logic of this maxim is that as soon as a Power gets into a. position from which her statesmen believe that the outcome must almost certainly be war, the temptation to get in the first blow becomes tremendous. They are for ever saying or thinking to themselves "How great will be our responsibility if war comes in the end, and proves to have been unavoidable, and we find that we have missed our chance of waging it with advantage because we were too optimistic or not far-seeing enough to strike before we were struck ! " This tendency to hurry on the catastrophe is greatly accentuated by the expense and strain of modern preparation for war. The cost of maintaining a mobilised, or partially ' mobilised, army is tremendous, and so is the strain when a considerable part of the rank-and-file of the army have been called from their civil employment and used as the first Reserves to fill up the cadres. Their argument—and it is an argument which is bound to react on the statesmen—is apt to be : "If you must take us from our homes and expose us to the horrors of war, for heaven's sake get the thing over as quickly as you can, and don't let us die from disease or exposure before the first shot is fired." That may be, nay, certainly is, a very foolish attitude for men to take up, but nevertheless it is a natural and a common one. It requires, therefore, a very great and very powerful ruler or statesman to keep a modern army in leash for many months together, determined not to be swayed in his policy by the pressure either of the financiers, who are becoming frightened by the cost of armed peace, or by the grumblings which, if they are not actually uttered in the army, are reflected in the attitude of the civil population generally.
We cannot doubt that the condition of things we have just described is the real cause of the pessimism which is now affecting Austria-Hungary, and inducing almost all observers in that country to believe that war must be the result. "We cannot," say the subjects of the Hapsburg Sovereign, "endure the present strain for ever, and therefore we must force Servia and Montenegro to put an end to the conditions which impose this strain upon us, even if we have not merely to risk, but to incur, war to do so. We are not going to bleed to death to please the rest of Europe, who at their ease, and without themselves enduring any strain, are quite content to preach platitudes about the advantages of gaining time and letting the situation cool. Gaining time and letting the situation cool mean a terrible sacrifice for us, and we are not going to endure it much longer." To tell men in this frame of mind that they are only running from a minor to a major sacrifice is, we fear, of very little use. It is like telling a man who is being stung by a swarm of bees that he runs a greater risk by plunging into a river with a swift current. That being the situation, what can be done by the Powers of Europe who want peace ? These may be said to be all the Powers in Europe except Servia, Montenegro, and Austria, who must be described as, if not wanting war, at any rate as suspicious of peace under the conditions which the other Powers find quite reasonable and endurable. There are two courses of action before these Powers. On the one hand, they can put pressure upon Servia in order to make her take up the attitude of submission to the accomplished fact which is demanded by Austria-Hungary ; or, on the other hand, they can make . representations to Austria-Hungary So strong that she may feel that, powerful as she is, she cannot risk defying all Europe. Either course of action would probably be effective, but unfortunately, for the moment at any rate, both courses seem impossible. One of the objections to putting sharp pressure upon Servia is the weakness of that Power. As Europe has experienced on former occasions, there is nothing more difficult than to bring a weak and desperate Power to reason. After all, outsiders can only exercise pressure upon a nation through its Government, and if that Government . has lost control over its own people, the task, short of that form of coercion which is now being talked of in Austria- Hungary as the only way with Servia, is impossible. A. further complication is to be found in the fact that there is reason to fear that a considerable number of Serbs have come to think that temporary absorption by Austria- Hungary may in the end prove the royal road to the future development of a great Serb Power, If Servia were absorbed into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Serbs, it is suggested, would be able to join hands with the rest of the Slavonic populations within the dominions of the house of Hapsburg, and ultimately a South Slav kingdom of some sort might be formed which would be able to play that part in the European world which is the dream of the nationality in question. In other words, though a temporary extinction of their nation might be unpleasant, in the end. it might prove a case of drawing hack in order to leap the farther. No doubt a great deal may be said in controversion of such a notion as this, for it is obviously a gambler's throw. That, however, is not our business now. We merely note the fact that these views are entertained, and that the result is to make it extremely difficult to put pressure upon Servia. A still greeter difficulty, however, is to be found in another face Nothing can be done in the way of putting effective pressure upon Servia unless Russia will join in applying it. But under present conditions it is very doubtful whether the Russian Government, even though they might like to do so, could join in coercing Servia, in order, as it must appear to the world at large, to play the game of Austria- Hungary. Public opinion has always counted for some- thing in Russia when great and fundamental questions are at stake, and at present it counts for a good deal. Russia is divided upon many questions, but there is one question which unites the whole people, and that is the Slavonic question. To appear to oppress the champion of the Slav nationality, even though there were no real intention to oppress, would seem odious beyond endurance to a very large portion of the Russian people. And such a popular view of the situation would be enforced on public grounds by the more far-seeing and statesmanlike Pau-Slavists. They would argue that Russian coercion of Servia would in the end drive the Servians into the arms of Austria- Hungary, and would for ever deprive Russia of the claim to be the protector of the South Slays. In a word, the South Slays, deserted by Russia, would make terms with their present antagonists, and a sudden shift in the European kaleidoscope might easily give to Austria- Hungary a position which belongs of right to Russia. We do not say that these reasons will absolutely forbid Russia from putting any pressure upon Servia, but it is very much to be feared that they will. Lot us turn to the alternative of putting pressure upon Austria-Hungary-, not to move, but to maintain the status guo, bowever unendurable it may seem to her. Here, again, pressure would possibly be successful if the Powers could be unanimous. But they cannot be unanimous. Germany, though no doubt sincerely anxious for peace if the price is what she would call reasonable, has made it quite clear that she cannot be expected to do, and will not do, anything which her Austrian ally tells her would be unfriendly ; and her Austrian ally will, we know, tell her, nay, has already told her, that to join in the attempt to dictate the manner in which Austria-Hungary shall deal with Servia and Montenegro must be regarded as unfriendly. Therefore the hope of putting unanimous pressure upon Austria-Hungary must be abandoned. Germany will have none of it. But without unanimity effective pressure is impossible. Austria-Hungary, though she might be unable to say " No " to Russia, France, Britain, Italy, and Turkey acting in unison, is almost certain to run the risk of doing so when Germany is on her side.
Is the position we have just described hopeless, and if not, where is the remedy to be found We believe with the Times that the best hope is in reviving the idea of a Conference. It is to the assembling of a Conference, in our opinion, that the efforts of lovers of peace should now be directed. No doubt there are many dangers and difficulties connected with a Conference, where, by the nature of things, the reference will have to be vague ; but at any rate it will gain time, and, if only the Austro- Hungarian Government will consent to it, will give them an excuse for telling their people that they must endure for a little longer the strain of preparation for 'war. The object of the Conference would be to find some way of providing compensation for Servia and Montenegro which, while not proving unacceptable to Austria-Hungary, would "save the face" of the two smaller Powers, and prevent them taking up that attitude of desperation which is so dangerous to the peace of the world. The task before the Conference would be an exceedingly difficult one, and there would, of course, be considerable risk of it breaking up without rata, and thus making it almost certain that Austria. Hungary would have recourse to what she describes as the punishment of Servia. But even if this were unhappily the result of the Conference, it can hardly be said that the situation would be worse than it is now. On the other hand, it is just conceivable that during the three or four month* which must elapiie before the Conference could meet, and reach the danger-point, some solution would have been found. One advantage of a Conference in which all the Great Powers are represented is that it is far easier for a proud Power to yield a point in the interests of peace and civilisation, or to show unselfishness and sacrifice, at a great International Conference, than in the higgling, and often exasperated negotiations, between a Great Power and a small one. During the Conference, too, the opportunities for common friends to step in and suggest compromises, or to explain away and smooth over incidental causes of annoyance, are much greater. The whole world, as it were, becomes a party to the negotia- tions, and for very shame statesmen are often unable to take the provocative line which their bad tempers, their nerves, or their personal idiosyncrasies may incline them to take in more private negotiations. After all, the Algeciras Conference was in a way a very considerable success. The Powers, at any rate, emerged from it in a much better temper than that in which they entered it. No doubt calling a Conference on the Near Eastern question is rather a desperate step, but for the moment it seems the only line of action which holds out a prospect of peace.
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