TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ADMIRALTY STATEMENT.
ON Wednesday the Admiralty issued an official state- ment which is no doubt intended to meet the strictures of the Standard in regard to the alleged inten- tion to reduce the fighting efficiency of the Fleet. We expected some announcement of the kind, and hoped and believed that it would when it came give a complete denial to the suggestion that our force at sea is to be weakened. Unfortunately, it is impossible to view the statement in this light. Though it cannot be said to confirm absolutely the allegations of the Standard, it certainly does not give them a complete denial, but rather leaves the question of reduction in our fighting efficiency vague and undetermined. The communication begins by the declaration that the Admiralty have decided on certain alterations in the distri- bution of naval strength. In the first place, a distinct fleet will be constituted from the ships in Commission in Reserve, to be called the " Home Fleet," under the supreme command of a Flag Officer with the status of Commander-in-Chief, and with headquarters at Sheerness. This fleet, we are told, will be in every respect organised " with a view to enhancing its value as a fighting force." The primary object aimed at will be sea-going efficiency, " and for this purpose the cruises of the Home Fleet will be made as frequent as practicable." We are then informed that a sliding-scale will be adopted in the strength of nucleus crews, so that the vessels first required in war will have the largest complement, while vessels in Special Reserve, instead of having no crews as at present, will have adequate complements of officers and men to keep the propelling machinery and the armament efficient. Vessels now in Special Reserve are to be gradually replaced by other ships as they cease to be effective units in the Home Fleet. The Admiralty com- munication next goes on to declare that the distribution of ships between the present Channel, Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Reserve Fleets will be altered in order to permit of the strengthening of nucleus crews, and the organisation of a Home Fleet as above described. " No ships will be paid off, no men will be sent to the barracks or to the instructional schools, and no alteration will be made in the proportion of officers and men serving afloat." The Board of Admiralty have decided, we are also informed, that where it will conduce to fighting efficiency there will be an interchange of vessels between the Home Fleet and the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean Fleets. Any vessels in these fleets requiring an extensive refit will be replaced temporarily by ships of the Home Fleet. Cruisers of the Home Fleet will from time to time be combined for instructional and tactical exercises with the cruiser squadons of the other fleets. The communication ends with a general expression of approval of the scheme as set forth :- " The Board of Admiralty are satisfied that the constitution of a Home Fleet will increase the immediate striking strength of the Navy, and that the more active training which the nucleus crews will receive under the new system will add to the sea experience of the Fleet as a whole. The changes will be gradually carried out in such a way as to obviate any dislocation of the various fleets and squadrons."
That there may be many good points in this scheme if it is regarded in the abstract we do not doubt. What we have to consider, however, is what will be its effect when translated into action ? Of this we have at the present moment no means of judging, for the Admiralty do not tell us what will be the exact and specific effect of their proposals. Till such information is afforded us we can only suspend judgment ; but while suspending judgment, it is necessary to remind the public in the clearest and most emphatic way possible of the standard by which the scheme will have to be judged as soon as the details of the contemplated changes are forthcoming. The real measure and rule by which the nation must try the pro- posed changes is this : " Will the numbers of ships, officers, and men in full and permanent sea commission be reduced ? " If they are reduced, then unquestionably we have sacrificed the fighting efficiency of our Fleet and endangered our naval supremacy. We have no objection whatever to keeping a certain number of ships in Com- mission in Reserve with nucleus crews, and we do not doubt that by increasing the numbers of those nucleus crews the efficiency of the ships in Commission in Reserve may be increased. But this must not fora moment be allowed to blind us to the fact that ships with nucleus crews are not ships in full commission, and therefore not ships upon which the whole safety of the nation and the Empire can be staked. We must have afloat, fully mobilised and ready for instant action—ready, that is, to go anywhere and do anything—a force sufficient to secure us the command of the sea in the first shock of war. Behind these ever-ready ships we must also have ships that may be rapidly prepared for action in order to maintain and take advantage of the victory achieved by the first fighting-line. There is' no reason to believe that the ships at present in full com- mission are at all too numerous for the essential task which is laid upon them of ensuring our immediate supremacy at sea. On the contrary, the fact that other Powers have increased their fully commissioned naval' forces in the last year, and are still further increasin" the number of their ships in full commission, renders it incumbent on us to consider, not whether our first line can be reduced, but whether it ought not to be increased. Since the changes in the relative strength of our own and foreign Navies have during the past year been to our disadvantage, not to our advantage, it cannot be said that the moment is one for reducing our first-line fighting force.
Mr. Fred. T. Jane, the well-known critic of naval affairs, who writes to the Daily Chronicle on Wednesday in regard to the Admiralty scheme, is evidently inclined to be sympathetic. Yet this by no meams hostile witness points out that the crux of the whole matter " is the question of sea-time, which is more important than anything else." " If," he goes on, " ships are withdrawn from active service to become nucleuoids,' it is well to say plainly that there will not be an increase of efficiency thereby, whatever economy may be secured." He then proceeds to give a very excellent tabular statement by which to gauge the real war efficiency of our Fleet. It is as follows :- "Ships in full commission at once ;
New system nucleus ships after fourteen days ; Old system nucleus after twenty-eight days ; Old reserve system after fifty days.
Nucleus ships can, of course, go to sea at once ; but with a pro-
portion of raw crews on board they could only meet the enemy at
a disadvantage."
We accept Mr. Jane's categories, but must point out yet once more that the public must remember that what their safety rests upon are " ships in full commission at once." The other categories are no doubt exceedingly important for securing and maintaining sea supremacy, but the first category is essential. Therefore we say again that the Admiralty scheme must be tried and tested by its answer to the question : " Are you reducing the ships in full commission?" If there is no reduction in this category, then the present Government will have a perfect right to say that they are not sanctioning any reduction in the essentials of our naval strength, and it may well be that the other proposed alterations will increase our naval, strength as Mr. Jane holds that they will. We sincerely hope that an early opportunity will be taken by Members of Parliament who realise the tremendous nature of the issues at stake to obtain from the Government a clear and- definite statement as to whether the number and power of " ships in full commission at once " will or will not be reduced under the new scheme. That is a question upon which the country has a right to obtain an immediate and a definitive answer.
Previous page
