TOPICS OF THE DAY.
GERMANY AND ENGLAND. NvE are glad of the German Emperor's message to this country conveyed through the columns of the Daily Express—the enterprising new halfpenny paper, the first number of which appeared on Tuesday—because it seems to us to put the relations between Germany and England on just the right footing. There is no mention of alliance, or of anything that could be twisted into an appearance of aggression against, or unfriendliness to, other Powers, but merely the perfectly legitimate expres- sion of a desire for good relations between the two nations, —a desire in which we all can and do share. If the Emperor had talked about marching to a common goal or standing together to maintain common objects, we, and we believe also the mass of Englishmen, would have felt that it would be impossible to go so far. But, wisely, the Emperor not only says nothing of such things, but uses language which excludes the idea—the dangerous and impracticable idea—of Britain and Germany contra mundum. "Tell the British people," says the Emperor, " that my first hope now and always is the preservation of international peace ; my second, the consolidation and maintenance of good relations between Germany and Great Britain. Between those two nations no essential cause of difference exists, nor should one arise ; between them there should be no rivalry other than friendly com- petition in furthering the economic and social progress of their peoples.
If this is to be the tone and temper of our relations with Germany, no wise man will say a word against their development. To speak with perfect frankness, we have no desire for a political partnership, or even a, close working agreement, with Germany, for many reasons. For example, we do not want to see an alliance or an understanding arrived at with Germany for the purpose of checking Russia in the Far East. As we have repeatedly said in these columns, we do not fear a Russian advance in those regions. In all prob- ability Russia will not get that position of domination and control in Pekin which it is alleged she is trying to obtain; but even if she were to be on the eve of obtaining it, our best policy would not be to fight her, but rather to take measures for strengthening our own position in those portions of the Chinese Empire which are within our "sphere of interest." In a word, the notion of an alliance with Germany to check Russia is one fraught with the utmost danger. Either Germany would in the end refuse the obligation and leave us to face the music alone, or else we should have to pay a price for her co-operation out of all proportion to the value of the object aimed at. Again, we do not wish to see any understanding made with Germany which would in any way involve, we will not say hostility with France, but an endorsement of the attitude which Germany has taken up in regard to French aspirations in Alsace-Lorraine. Germany may be right in saying that under no circumstances will she even consider the retrocession of Lorraine, but we, at any rate, must not be held to have endorsed her view, or, as it were, to have guaranteed her refusal. We must not try to use Germany as an instrument for keeping down Russia's Far- Eastern aspirations, and we must not be drawn into any position which looks like guaranteeing the perpetual loss of the Provinces. Equally .must we avoid the blind endorsement in ad vai.ce, or the encouragement, of Germany's aims and objects as a world-Power, for we do not know what those aims and objects really are. We only know that they exist, and that Germany, with the deliberation, the scientific foresight, and the perfection of organisation which mark the march of the new Empire, is preparing a Fleet of the most splendid proportions to carry out those aims and objects. All we can be sure of is that when that mighty in- strument of war is forged, it will not remain idle, but will be used, just as the German Army was em- ployed, ad majorenz imperii gloriam. It may be, of course, that the naval battle-axe will be used in ways which will not concern us. On the other hand, it is conceivable that it may be directed against the most dearly cherished aspirations of our own kith and kin in America. There is obviously a strong possibility of the German naval power being used in the future in a way which America will consider so contrary to her interests that she will at all risks forbid that use. In such a quarrel, however anxious to maintain good relations with Germany, our sympathies, and more than our sympathies, must be with America. We cannot, in fact, possibly pledge ourselves to a support of Germany which might involve the approval of an attempt to break down a policy—the Monroe doctrine— which we originally suggested in our own interests, and which we should now favour in the wider interests of the Anglo-Saxon race. But though we feel obliged to say this plainly, we experience no sort of jealousy in regard to the rise of Germany as a naval Power. As long as the German Navy is not used aggressively, its increase will inflict no injury upon us. We must be no more jealous of that increase ,than we are of the growth of the German mercantile marine.
There is yet another aspect of our relations with Germany to be considered. As we have said above, we are anxious to remain at peace with all the world, and most anxious also to infringe in no way the rights of other Powers. Again, we desire to show no jealousy and no suspicion of our neighbours. But while we ought to welcome the advances of any and every Power which offers us friendship, we ought to remember also the maxim of " a fair field and no favour." We want to be friendly with all Powers who will be friendly with us, and should be most careful not to be led into supporting any one State to the injury or depression of others. At the present moment, Germany is undoubtedly the European Power most in the ascendant. That is per se right enough, and should in no way be regarded as a ground for trying to pull Germany down. At the same time, that ascendency need not and should not be stimu- lated by artificial support from us. If Germany is the best boat, let her win, but we must not, in order to help her win, do anything which will take the wind out of the sails of her competitors. The historians are never tired of telling us that Cromwell made a great mistake in his foreign policy, because he stimulated and artificially hastened the rising power of France by depressing that of Spain. Spain was still strong, but nevertheless a Power on the wane. France was rising. Cromwell got impatient with Spain, which certainly took little trouble to attract him, and threw his weight on the side of the great State then in the making under Mazarin and the young Louis XIV. This greatly accelerated the fall of Spain and the rise of France. The result was not favourable to England. If the power of France had not been artificially stimulated, who knows but that we might have avoided the wars of William III. and of Marlborough ? Of course the analogy suggested is by no means perfect, but it is worth remem- bering by those who are sometimes tempted to act as if it were to England's interest to speed the rise of Germany and the declension of France. We would do nothing to injure Germany or to hold her back, and we would show no sort of jealousy of her progress, but at the same time we must remember that it is not our business to smooth the road of her triumphal progress and to make her enemies ours. To be concrete, we ought, while keeping on friendly terms with Germany, to take great pains to assure France that we have no intention of doing anything to injure her, and that we will share in no designs against her unless she is unwise enough to attack us. That being our view, we are, as we said at the beginning of this article, delighted with the spirit of the German Emperor's telegram. It puts our relations with Germany, as we have said, on just the footing on which they ought to be,—those of genuine goodwill, but of goodwill untouched by any arriere pensee. We are, then, sincerely grateful to the German Emperor, and cannot refrain from expressing our admiration of the statesmanship he has shown in the matter. He evidently realises that the English people are willing to take up a certain relation towards Germany, but that beyond that they will not move. Possibly this relation is not so close as he desires, but like a wise man he recognises what is possible and accepts it. But having accepted it, that touch of genius and of political inspira- tion which belongs so rarely to Sovereigns, but which does belong to the German Emperor, comes into play, and enables him to define the situation with perfect accuracy. It is, indeed, not too much to say that the German. Emperor's telegram represents the common con- sent of the nation in regard to our relations with Germany. To have performed such a piece of moral diagnosis, and to have expressed it in words, is surely a most remarkable feat, and one worthy of a great statesman.
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