29 APRIL 1882, Page 6

SIR W. HARCOURT ON LONDON OPINION.

THE divergence, possibly temporary, but more probably per-

manent, between the political opinion of London society and that of the country at large, is now an accepted datum in politics. We quoted eighteen months ago the opinion upon the subject of the late Mr. Adams, one of the closest observers, and a man of singularly, almost unaccountably impartial judgment. He believed that " London " almost invariably blundered in its estimate of political forces, and his judgment is now repeated in an even stronger form by Sir William Har- court. No one knows Society better than the Home Secre- tary, or watches opinion more sedulously, or is less under the dominance of preconceived prejudices, or even, we sometimes think, of fixed convictions. Yet he said at Derby, on Tues- day, in a speech intended to be marked throughout the country,—" It is astonishing what ignorance there is in London society respecting the opinions of the English people. I had the opportunity of talking the other day to a friend of mine, a very intelligent diplomatist, who had just come to England, and I said to him,' If you will permit me, I think I could give you some useful advice. Do not pay too much attention to what you hear in London, or you are likely to be greatly deceived. When you have listened to the gossip of the Clubs, to the murmurs of the lobby, to the spite of the drawing-rooms, when you have collected the opinions of influential and well-informed people, and when you have read all the newspapers that are never mis- taken, and collected the calculations of the Stock Exchange, if you find that they all agree, then you may be absolutely cer- tain that that is the thing which is not going to happen.' Gentlemen, that is the result of a political observation of my own, extending, I am sorry to say, over thirty years of London society. I have known no exception to it No one who watched the late election will hesitate to confirm this account, which is accepted, though with indignation, by the most Con- servative writers. They say that as London society is guided- by the cultivated, is a focus of information, and is the only society familiar with all governing personages, it must be usually wiser than the huge aggregate called " the country," must have fewer prejudices, more insight, and greater impar- tiality ; but they admit that as regards both the state of opinion and the progress of events, London is usually wrong. It ought, they allege, to govern, but it does not. Believing, as we do, that Society is too indolent and pleasure-loving to study facts, and too much devoted to a caste to judge the few facts it sees with impartiality, we should deny its superior capability for political thought, even if the whole people had not instincts which, on grave occasions, are more accurate than thoughts. But that is not what we wish to dwell on to-day. Our object is to show that the difference admitted to exist, is one of the many unnoticed or scarcely noticed causes which tend to produce the weakness and want of energy so distinctly visible in Parliament, and, in a less degree, in the Executive..

The Government of Great Britain is not entirely a " go- vernment of opinion," as that of the United States, and, for the moment, that of France, is, because our leaders still retain such an ascendancy that they can often not only change or modify opinion, but actually make it ; but it is a Government which derives from opinion most of its force. It is nearly impossible to do any great act for which general opinion is unprepared,—quite impossible to do it, if general 'opinion is distinctly hostile. The Government, whether Liberal or Conservative, unless driven by stress of events, or fired by some moral conviction, shrinks from proposing measures which require the previous conversion of a whole people ; or if forced to entertain them, denudes its proposals of their most " alarm- ing," which may also be, in many cases, their most vital, characteristics. The Ministers are, in fact, daunted by any general dislike, see obstacles whenever " opinion " appears hostile, and even when convinced, hesitate to urge their sup- porters to run the great risk of alienating constituents. The Mem- bers are even more afraid. They remonstrate, argue, beseech, and at last bolt ; or, if they abstain from that unpopular course, they yield a half-hearted support, which deprives Government alike of courage and of hopefulness. It may go on with its plan, being, as we said, convinced ; but it goes on in despondency, without the rush and swing which in demo- cratic countries mark an Administration when aware, in the last resort, that it has determined millions behind it. Concession is made wherever possible, and every concession is either an injury to the scheme, or to the reputation of the Government for decision and clear-sightedness ; that is, in the long run, to its claim to lead. So long as the opposition of opinion is genuine, this evil is unavoidable, being an essential characteristic of democracy, and has even compensating advantages. It compels, in all cases where delay is possible, careful ex- planation by superior men, a careful study of compro- mises, and that carefulness of decision which, under the pressure of Obstruction, and of the anger it produces, English- men have begun, perhaps unduly, to underrate. But, unfortunately, owing to the circumstances condensed into epigram by Sir W. Harcourt, a false opinion, a mere appear- ance of opinion, frequently' exercises over a Government all the effect of the true article. For six months of the year, the active six months, the opinion of London is, so long as the aggregate democracy remain silent—and they have, as we recently showed, a habit of silence—the apparent opinion of the country. The Ministers are aware as an abstract fact of the illusion, but they live in London, they talk with London men, they read London papers, they breathe an atmosphere impregnated with London ideas. They are them- selves, in a way, Londoners, like the rest, and the influences which so affect them in London are not only subtle, but plea- sant. It is pleasant to be at one with London opinion, with the men who think and talk quickly, who "know everything," and whom you meet every day,—with the newspapers that arrive at breakfast, with the supporting Members, who are twice as much affected by the prevailing tone as the Ministry are. A statesman must be very sure of himself, his own convictions, or his own judgment, who, after reading three papers, talking in the Lobby to twenty Members, dining at a City banquet, and attending two West-End drawing-rooms, finds everybody of one mind, substantially disagreeing with him, or filled with doubt, and yet remains equally sure that the nation is on his side. He may be equally sure he is right—there is plenty of healthy obstinacy in any group of Ministers—bat it is hardly in human nature to be equally sure that the nation thinks so, and it is that certainty which is necessary to give energy. After all, London is a microcosm, and why should it be wrong?—that is the inevitable doubt. We question, for example, whether any Minister, unless it were Mr. Gladstone himself, with his power of comprehending the average people by sympathy, after the six weeks' roar of London against the Closure, could feel as certain as before that the country wanted it. It did, as the sudden subsidence of rebellion showed, but it was not till the " caucuses " acted that any Minister can have clearly seen how entirely of London the opposition was. Had Mr. Gladstone been less resolved, or had the actual vote been given before the cities woke up to the situation, the false opinion might have prevailed over the true one, and a dan- gerous compromise have been accepted. In this case, proof of the facts was not only indisputable, but of the exact kind which politicians acknowledge to be final ; but in other cases, it is not obtainable, and we are convinced thet Ministers often shrink before an opinion which seems to them "very pre- valent," and is prevalent only among the less than ten thousand persons who for the purposes we are discussing make up "London, and who catch opinion from one another like measles. There was an odd illustration of this a fortnight since. London, Liberal as well as Conservative, got into a fit of despondency about Mr. Forster which might have had import- ant results. The country did not respond ; on the contrary. it received the delusive idea that the Cabinet might abandon Mr. Forster with a sort of shame, as something for which apologies might be made, but were very necessary. We venture to say no one who gathered opinion in London alone would have expected that ; and when it is necessary to act quickly, it is only. in

London that opinion can be gathered. We believe, but have no means of proving, as yet, that the same difference exists about the broad Irish policy, that " conciliation " is far more out of favour in London than in the country, and that things might be done of which even Ministers, with the roar of London eternally in their ears, have no conception. That is, of course, an individual judgment, and may be utterly wrong ; but no one who has watched politics will deny the possibility that it is right, or the serious consequence of a delusion. being BO produced among the governing men. There are a hundred questions about which the same difficulty might occur, and as we are convinced very often does occur ; and on each the Administration must for a time, and in very varying degrees, be partially deceived.

We wonder what will be the ultimate result of this diffi- culty in arriving at opinion, and separating the impression of London from the decision of the country. It may be con- tinua weakness, as Lord Salisbury would probably prophesy, the reluctance to act alone becoming more and mere acute, till nobody will do anything until the people have spoken. That would be in great measure government by journalists, and would be as deplorable as government by Peers or other non-representative and irresponsible persons, but the result may be a very different one. Opinion may become such an insoluble puzzle that, in their despair of outside help, leaders may fall back on precedent, on principle, and on themselves. The tendency to rely on precedent as a justification certainly grows no weaker, even Sir Stafford Northcote feels his " financial conscience" a support—fancy standing on rinfiniment petit, instead of dis- cussing it—and we note in America and France, where opinion is distinctly less ascertainable than in England, that democracy developes, instead of crushing, self-will. " I shall go my own way about that Chinese Bill," says President Arthur, with the Representatives four to one against him. "I will have scrutin de liste," says M. Gambetta, just after the most sudden fall, incurred on that very account, that any modern statesman has received. If the conflict between London and the country helps to make our leaders of Sir Robert Peel's opinion,—that they mean to lead, to think their own thoughts, and propose their own proposals, the nation may be repaid, in the new energy of its chiefs, for the weakness the same phenomena have ,temporarily produced.