29 FEBRUARY 1896, Page 22

ALMIRANTE COCHRANE.*

Tim time calls aloud on the British nation to prepare for defence, and to take thought for the conduct of a war which may come like a thief in the night from the East or from the West. To such a time the lives of our sea-heroes are peculiarly apt, and none of them carries a more needed lesson than that of Dundonald, which has been written with commendable terseness and with a true appreciation of the essence of war by the Hon. J. W. Fortescne. Thomas, Lord Cochrane, eldest son of the ninth Earl of Dundonald, was born in 1775 and joined the Navy in 1793, when he was eighteen. In May, 1800, he was appointed by Lord Keith, then commanding in the Mediterranean, to command the prize-brig 'Speedy,' with 6 officers, 84 men, and 14 four-pounders. In this little craft, during a cruise of thirteen months, he took more than 50 vessels, 120 guns, and 500 prisoners, his principal prize being a Spanish frigate of 32 guns and 319 men, which he attacked and captured in Barcelona harbour in the midst of a swarm of Spanish gunboats. In the end the 'Speedy' herself fell a prey to three French line-of-battle ships. In 1804 Cochrane was a captain in command of the 34-gun frigate ' in which his first cruise yielded a series of rich prizes, and his second gave him the opportunity first to destroy three French corvettes in a single engagement, and later to defeat the frigate Minerva ' and three brigs in a brilliant action in the Aix roads. From 1807 to 1809 he com- manded the frigate Imperiettse,' by the judicious use of which he paralysed the French military operations on the coast of Cats,lonia ; he also conducted with great skill and gallantry the defence of the castle of Rosas, and afterwards captured two French men-of-war and eleven victuallers which lay in Caldagnes Bay, under the protection of shore-batteries and a large body of troops, dispersing the troops and taking the batteries. In April, 1809, he was sent by the Admiralty to superintend the attack on a. French fleet that lay in Aix roads, behind booms and other defences, which the Admiral, Gambier, dared not attack. The result of Cochrane's arrangements was the partial destruction of the French fleet, which, had Gambier supported him, would in all probability have been annihilated. On his return home, however, Cochrane under- took in Parliament an attack upon Gambier, which ended unfortunately for himself ; and shortly afterwards was in- volved in the financial and other intrigues of relatives and acquaintances, with the result that, although innocent, he was tried and condemned to imprisonment, and disgraced.

In 1817 Lord Cochrane was offered and accepted the com- mmd of the navy of Chili, at that time fighting for her independence against Spain. During the three years that followed he performed a series of the most astounding exploits recorded in the history of naval war. Landing 350 men from two small ships, he attacked and took the fortress of Valdivia, the strongest Spanish place on the whole coast, and regarded as impregnable. He then out out and captured the Spanish frigate Esmeralda,' which was lying behind a boom in Callao Harbour, protected by 27 gunboats, and by a series of

• Dundonald. Bp the Hon. J. W. Fortescne. "English Men of Action Harlem." London : Macmillan and Co.

batteries mounting 300 guns. The Chilian Government treated their victorious Admiral with so much insolence and dishonesty, that he left them and took service in 1823 with Brazil, then in revolt against Portugal. The Brazilian fleet was in wretched order, and Cochrane had to put to sea with only two ships, neither of them in first-rate condition. His cruise lasted seven months, and in that time, with his two ships, he chased a fleet of thirteen Portuguese men-of-war from Bahia to Portugal, sent a Portuguese army after them, and captured a vast number of merchantmen transports and stores ; he also expelled the Portuguese for ever from the three northern provinces of Brazil. The Brazilians treated him as badly as the Chilians bad done, and in 1826 he left their service to assist the cause of Greek independence. But with the Greeks he could do nothing, for it was impossible to make them fight. From 1828 to his death in 1860, Cochrane (he became Lord Dundonald in 1831) was engaged in the attempt to obtain reparation for the wrongs which had driven him from the British service; and in this he ultimately succeeded, for he died a British Admiral, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

The details of Cochrane's wonderful battles and campaigns, the force of his character and its concomitant weaknesses, may be fully traced in his own Autobiography of a Seaman, his Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru, and Brazil, and in Marryat's Frank Mildewy. The moral of the story, so far as it concerns both the indiscretions which drove Cochrane from the British service, and the qualities which pro. duced his unparalleled exploits, can be completely gathered from Mr. Fortescue's well-written pages. It is the skilful and daring seaman, not the rancorous hater and keen partisan, that deserves attention.

Cochrane was one of the greatest dare-devils that ever sailed a ship. Few careers on sea or on land appear on the surface to tell so strongly as his in favour of the not uncommon belief that a generous endowment of pluck and coolness will suffice to bring forth great and splendid actions on the part of a leader in war. But upon close examination, hardly any career better illustrates the inadequacy of this theory, which perverts the truth by dwelling exclusively upon half of it. Cochrane had the exuberant courage that revels in danger and finds warfare the most delightful of sports. Without this quality, his exploits would have been impossible. But his judgment is as brilliant as his bravery. Every one of his actions is marked by a peculiarly subtle and perfect calcu- lation of probabilities, in which every element of the situation has been estimated at its proper worth. To begin with, he perfectly understood and could handle all his weapons. Mr. Fortescue writes :—" He could design a ship on improved lines, plan her engines on improved principles, fit her with an improved propeller, and light her with improved lamps. On taking her to sea he could instruct every man on board in every detail of seamanship, artificer's work, and gunnery." That is to say, he was a past master of all the details of his profession. He knew what could and what could not be done with the several implements of his trade. Beyond that he had a firm grip on the nature of war. He understood that a fight is above all things a trial of spirit ; and that an enemy frightened is ready to be beaten. He knew that disorder is the mother of appre- hension and the daughter of surprise. Accordingly, his ingenuity is for ever employed in preparing surprises, and in making the most of the disorder which they occasion. When he has thus disconcerted his enemy, his blows are delivered with the restless energy that leaves no time for recovery, and directed with clear discernment of the weak and strong points of both sides. His daring appears boundless, but the more closely each of the actions is examined the more striking becomes the care with which his preparations were thought out. This thoroughgoing forethought is the true mark of the great commander, and the basis of all successful boldness on a large scale in war. The all-important ques- tion concerns the method by which commanders become qualified to act in this way. Two opposite answers are current, neither of which is satisfactory. The theory that first-rate commanders originate, like Topsy, in a spontaneous process of growth, is true only if the word "growth" is used to imply the arduous effort of self-education. The theory that profound book-lore is indispensable, must equally be received with caution. A great captain makes himself by a.

persistent uninterrupted effort. A man who, entering the military or naval profession, feels within himself the im- pulse to lead, devotes himself without reserve to his own training. Bent upon knowledge, he absorbs it from every source,—from his comrades, from all the incidents of life, and from books. His mind is possessed with a pur- pose and a subject, and never lets it go. After a few years the effects are seen. He has thought out to the limits of his faculties all the questions that his profession offers; and when his opportunity comes to act he is occupied, not with his plane, for they take shape in his mind spontaneously, but with securing the perfection of his instruments and the intelligent co-operation of his assistants. To a great man assuredly the gifts of talent and of opportunity are indis- pensable; but not less necessary is that complete absorption of the man in his work, without which no one can rise above mediocrity. The failure of Cochrane's career was that his sense of injustice, or his appreciation of himself, led him at the critical moment to abandon his proper work in order to enforce recognition. This is a temptation especially dangerous to noble minds.

Cochrane's battles are remarkable specimens of what is called the "moral factor" in war, by which is meant the influence exerted upon both sides by considerations outside the material world. It is not too much to say that these considerations are usually decisive. Superior numbers and better arms are a great material advantage; but once their possessors have been confronted with impunity by the enemy, the advantage turns the other way, for both sides perceive that the smaller numbers have some source of strength—courage, or discipline, or skill—which is the more potent because unseen. Moreover, numbers or material weapons are destroyed in use, but the unseen element of superiority grows in exercise. It is of course an old story, and need not here be expanded. Yet in these days of mechanical invention, the average man is apt to think too much of ships and guns, and too little of hearts and heads. Especially is this danger to be guarded against by the Englishman of to-day, who is anxious about the naval supremacy of his country. The fate of the Empire in the next war will depend upon the spirit which during the ten years preceding its outbreak, has animated the officers of the Navy. Courage may confidently be expected ; scientific know- ledge and technical skill will hardly be lacking ; but the vital matter is that absolute mastery both of details and principles, of theory and of practice, which comes only from prolonged and thoroughgoing devotion to a profession. The man whose whole heart is in his business never fails to make the most of his faculties. The contribution which the nation can make towards infusing this spirit into the naval service, or rather towards preserving it, consists mainly in encouragement, of which the great secret in every profession is, ia carriers ouverte aux talents.