LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
SIDELIGHTS ON AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY. Crit THE EDITOR OP THE " SPECTATOR:'_1 Sin,—The already famous speech of Baron Aehrenthal fell like a stone into the sullen pool of international diplomacy, and the waters are still troubled and discoloured. All Europe has been searching for hidden motives, but very few of the search- party have really been anxious to discover the missing key. The true explanation of Baron Aehrenthars action is to be traced almost equally to considerations of external and internal policy. If we pass the former briefly in review, we are at once confronted by the indisputable right possessed by Austria-Hungary, under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, to build the Sandjak Railway. And in effect it is now generally admitted that the final decision in the matter lies exclusively between that Power and Turkey. Obviously, then, the excitement and opposition are not to be explained by any violation of existing Treaties or guarantees. The crux of the whole problem is Abd-ul-Hamid's well-known reputation for giving nothing for nothing. Baron Aehrenthal, before he could, so seemingly without all effort, obtain the Irade for the Serajevo-Mitrovitza, Railway, must have offered some substantial equivalent to the arch-diplomatist at Yildiz. Macedonia was the obvious scene for such a counter-con- cession, and here we at once find unmistakable signs that the delay in the promised reforms is due to Austro-Hungarian influence. While Sir Edward Grey urged the necessity for investing the European gendarmerie with executive powers, Baron Aehrenthal equally pointedly insisted that reforms can only be enforced through the medium of the Turkish soldiery. It is easy to see which of these twp views is the better calculated to win the approval of the Sultan. In these circumstances, the charges of British hostility so freely brought forward by the Viennese Press inevitably suggest a guilty conscience on its part. The difference of opinion revealed in the pronounce- ments of the two Foreign Ministers made it impossible for Britain to throw herself into the arms of Vienna, and forced her to adopt a waiting attitude, until it became manifest how the new situation would affect the attitude of Russia and t129 Western Powers. Hinc illae lacrimae. Tension undoubtedly exists, though it has been exaggerated by alarmists. Put normal conditions can only be restored if Austria-Hungary throws her influence into the scales in favour of the Macedonian reforms. It would he ridiculous to pretend an acquaintance with the secret undercuiTents of European diplomacy ; but the plausible suggestion that another Power manceuvred Baron Aehrenthal into the position of a decoy- duck seems to gain in strength when we consider the influence of internal events within the Dual Monarchy upon its new Balkan policy. The interconnexion between foreign and home policy in Austria-Hungary, most of whose frontier races have kinsmen in a neighbouring country, is still inadequately realised by our public, and this must form the excuse for the present letter.
Thanks to the momentous electoral reform of December, 1906, Austria emerged a year ago from a period of racial strife and political impotence. Shaking off her long despondency, she suddenly realised her neglected and growing strength, and the economic revival which coincided with her Parliamentary regeneration enabled her to bring the Hungarian Party of Independence to reason, and to conclude a commercial Ausgleich on terms which involved a negation Of ultra- Magyar principles. Those classes in Austria which favour an Imperialist policy were elated at these signs of fresh vitality ; and as the Balkans are the only possible field for Austro-Hun- garian Imperialism, it would seem reasonable to credit Baron Aehrenthal with the desire to satisfy the advocates of expansion. For various reasons the bureaucracy, the Army, the Church, and the capitalists are all in favour of economic advance southwards ; but it is probable that military considerations predominate. Italian development in Albania has, if possible, increased the strategic importance of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, which forms a wedge between Montenegrin and Servian territory, hems off Servia's outlet to the sea, and, of ceurse, connects the Dual Monarchy with Salonica and the Aegean. Without attempting to define the aims of the military authorities, we may safely assert that the unforeseen situation created by Baron Aehrenthars pronouncement supplied Hungary with her opportunity, and that she is at present making a skilful attempt to avail herself of it. When the Coalition accepted office in April, 1906, great emphasis was laid on the transitional character of the new Government. Its first aim was to be the removal of the es-lea condition, and the military questions (especially the Magyar language of command), which had caused the crisis of 1905, were post- poned by mutual consent of the Coalition and the Crown until after the introduction of universal suffrage and the election of a new Parliament on that basis. Two years have almost elapsed, and the electoral reform which was to be the main work of the Coalition Government has had to yield precedence to a whole series of reactionary measures (notably the Education Acts, the Agricultural Labourers Act, and the Railway Servants Act). Baron Aehrentbars dilemma, into which he was partly led by the desire to please the Hungarian Delegation, has inspired the Magyars with a design for retrieving their shattered position, and there is a real danger lest the dynasty may in return for Magyar consent to a military compromise (which would mean ten years' peace,—in other words, probably peace for the remainder of the venerable Emperor's reign) agree to regard the Coalition Cabinet as permanent instead of transi- tional, and thus to postpone universal suffrage indefinitely. This reform, if it comes, cannot fail to injure the narrow oligarchy which now rules Hungary, and to let in a healthy stream of democracy into the Parliament of privilege. Above all, it will deal a fatal blow to the Magyar hegemony, in its old oppressive sense, by giving to the non-Magyar races and the working classes something approaching their due repre- sentation. Hence the numerous politicians whose future is threatened by the reform are straining every nerve in a last despairing effort to avert the catastrophe. 4 Government which already has so many volte-faces to its credit need not fear loss of prestige, and the verdicts of the foreign Press, being ascribed to bribery and corruption, might safely be disregarded.
Another important factor in the internal situation is the Croatian question, and a great deal more depends on the coining elections to the Diet of Agrara than appears on the
enema. The forward movement in the Sandjak is intimately connected with the scheme of railway development in Dalmatia, with the inevitable Constitutional concessions to Bosnia, and with the aspirations of Agram to form the capital of a South Slav kingdom within the Hapsburg Monarchy. The future of Dualism in its present form is by no means assured, and now that the commercial agreement is concluded, the weakest point in the system is undoubtedly the Hungaro-Croatian Ausgleich of 1868. The Croatian claims against Hungary are following on the exact lines of the Magyar claims against Austria, and a stage has now been reached when Budapest cannot find a friendly majority in the Diet of Agram. And, indeed, unless the elections are conducted in a more than usually corrupt manner, relations between the sister-nations are likely to continue strained. Clearly, however, the course of events in Agram is bound to assume fresh importance in the next few years, since the Croatian capital lies on the direct line from Western Europe to Salonica.
It would be equally unwise and futile to attempt to prophesy the future of the Eastern Adriatic. It is sufficient to emphasise the fact that its political boundaries are still by no means assured, and that the consequent uncertainty influences the whole policy of Austria-Hungary in the Near East. —1 am,
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