THE WAR SURVEYED: THE GERMAN COUNTER-BLOCKADE
By STRATEGICUS
AFULL month has now passed since France went out of the war, and it is possible to see how far the gains Germany expected to make from the occupation of the Atlantic coast of the Continent have actually been secured. At the outset it is necessary to recognise that she expected to gain a number of advantages, all somehow tending to our defeat but differing very much in the directness with which they promised to compass it.
An invasion would be an attempt to defeat us directly and so secure victory. Up to the moment of writing that has not been attempted. It is possible that we are witnessing the prelude to it, that some features which will accompany it are now being practised, or that we are undergoing a campaign that will if successful be pressed as a substitute. In any case, it is im- portant that we should recognise and estimate the value of what has been happening.
It is clear that Germany expected to be able to institute a counter-blockade by interfering with shipping before it entered our ports and also by making those ports unusable. She thought to contrive these effects by means of her new motor torpedo-boats and even more by means of air-attacks. Attacks by larger units of the Navy she had apparently abandoned out of a salutary respect for the British Navy. Submarines had not proved particularly successful, though no doubt the smaller sub- marines will now be used increasingly. But, while neglecting nothing which promised to achieve the effect, she apparently hoped much from the motor torpedo-boats. They have great speed and, riding low in the water, offer little for the eye to see or the gun to hit. Moreover, their speed gives them the power to escape easily, particularly with the assistance of a smoke- screen. On paper they have distinct advantages ; and they have posed what is to some extent a new problem. Oi course, we have craft of the same type ; and, on general grounds, one would say that these will prove a more dangerous nuisance. That, in fact seems to be the chief role of these midgets—their nuisance value.
What the Germans most relied on, however, is their aircraft. They are now near enough to our shores to send their aero- planes even to the Irish Sea. They have been frequently in the Bristol Channel, and about the southern entrance to the West Coast ports. The Thames estuary and the Straits of Dover are, of course, merely a few minutes distant from their new bases. They have, accordingly, been able to send their fighters as escorts to the bombers ; and that is an immense advantage, since in the early months of the war it was apparent that the German bombers were no match for our fighters. They have even tried to use their fighters as bombers. We have, in fact, been the object of a resolute and very skilful attack. On three occasions, on July i9th, July 21st, and last Monday, the 29th, there were very heavy attacks by greater numbers than we had seen before, though it is mere common sense to recognise that they are far from being as numerous as Germany could quite easily arrange if it suited her purpose.
As to this, the use of much greater numbers has yet to be learned. So far no greater numbers have been seen than were used during the last war ; and it is obvious that the tactical handling of, say, thousands of aeroplanes presents problems that have not yet been faced. While it is wise, therefore, to keep an open mind about the possibility of vastly increased numbers of German planes attacking Britain, it is permissible to draw some conclusions from our present experience.
On Monday the greatest raid ever yet attempted against a British port took place, and it seems that 21 per cent. of the attacking aeroplanes were destroyed for a loss of only two of our own machines. As the number involved was 8o, this is a signi- ficant result. It is the more reassuring from the fact that the attack was delivered by dive-bombers accompanied by fighters. During the war in France the dive-bomber came to have a dis- concerting fame. Theoretically it should be among the easiest of targets; yet it caused almost as much disturbance as the tank, with which it was frequently associated. But it seems impossible for it to escape if the gunners keep their heads. Even the Bien gun can put it out of action, if the appropriate moment selected. This analysis seems a little inhuman ; but the fact ha been proved in action, and it is well that the terror the dive- bomber inspires should be recognised as having little substance behind it. On Monday the bulk of the casualties were agait due to the British fighters. Two bombers were shot down by the guns as against eleven by the fighters, which also accounted for seven German fighters for a loss of only two. Up to the present, surprising as it may seem, the guns do not appear to have achieved the success which might have been expected from them. They can and do put the bombers off the mark. On Monday the guns compelled one of the waves of bombers to retire without dropping their bombs at all ; and such was the effect of the defence that not a single bomb fell upon land. But it is still true that they do not destroy in the wholesale way that the fighters do. I do not understand why, I merely note it.
The success of the defence is remarkable, since on the same day British bombers delivered a number of raids over enemy territory and only one was lost. It is very easy and tempting to draw a large conclusion from that day's series of attacks ; but at least we are entitled to maintain that, on the present showing, we have a distinct advantage both in the attack and the defence. Our defence is better than the German defence and our attack is also better than theirs. Moreover, we can, perhaps, not unjustly conclude that when we really wish to secure immunity for an objective we can do so ; and that is a heartening reassurance.
But if we are to show prudence in our pride we must admit that, although we can protect a particular target effectively, we may not be equally competent to assure the safety of that large round of targets which, from the nature of our position, we are compelled to expose to risk every day.- We have not only to keep open the ports, we have to be able to shepherd shipping into them safely. The Germans are aiming at both impartially; and, as we have seen, they have been very roughly handled when they attacked a port upon which apparently we set some store. But the shipping is more than the port, and the new conditions have sent up the casualties appreciably. In the week ending June 30th—i.e., a week containing only a few days after the fall of France and the full liberty of Germany to concentrate upon us—we lost six British vessels with a tonnage of 30,377; but in the following week our losses were thirteen vessels with a tonnage of 75,883. That was a significant leap; and we can gather thc full meaning of the situation if we take the total tonnage, British, Allied and neutral. The figures for the week ending June 3oth and July 7th respectively, were 51,339 and 114,187. The second week was double the first. If the sinkings were to continue at that rate we should have to take the new conditions as having caused a significant change.
It is serviceable to take not the ntxt week but the next week but one as a reliable indication of the progress of the counter blockade under the new conditions. The first full week must have all the benefit of unfamiliarity of the new methods of attack. The losses for the week ending July 21st were eleven British ships with a tonnage of 37,577, one Allied of 2,088 tons and six neutral with a tonnage of 10,192 ; the total tonnage was 49,857. This is a very instructive figure. It is less than the total tonnage lost in the week ending June 3oth ; and the rever- sion to the standard of the days preceding the defeat of France is striking. It appears to show that the new conditions only had the success that novelty generally secures, and that as soon as we have had a chance to become familiarised with the new tactics we can reduce their effect to reasonable limits. As a fult approximation to the truth that will serve Clearly, if we wish to make a more mathematically accurate analysis, we require another terms. Unless we can say that the exposure to risk of sinking was the same as before, we are unable to draw the definite conclusion that the new tactics have failed. If we were provided with the number and tonnage of vessels entering and leaving British ports, and with some means of gauging the time they were in any one of the areas which the enemy motor torpedo-boats and aeroplanes cover, it would be possible to measure the success more accurately. But we have evidence that shipping is actually entering the ports which the enemy most affects, and we know that our resources for the convoy of shipping are smaller than before Italy entered the war. The results of the counter-blockade up to the present may, therefore, be taken as reassuring. If we can take the balance- sheet of the Dover raid and the British raids in Germany on the same day as characteristic rather than exceptional—and I can conceive of no reason why we should not—we have good ground for encouragement.
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