TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE LOYALTY OF THE CAPE DUTCH. THE Echo of Thursday contained a letter from Mr. Mackarness in regard to the loyalty of the Cape Dutch,—a letter which is, in effect, an appeal against the assumption that a man is disloyal because he is a Cape Dutchman. With a great deal of that appeal we are in sympathy. As our readers know, we have never ceased to protest against the folly of treason-mongering. By all means let the Imperial authorities be vigilant in dealing with overt acts of treason, but let them beware of the temptation, which affects all rulers in times of strain and stress, to magnify opposition and criticism into treason. We would have no mercy on British subjects who actually gave succour to the enemy, or who threw obstacles in the way of our troops when in the field. It would be grossly unfair to our own men not to punish such acts with the utmost severity. Again, anything like a treasonable correspondence with the enemy should be dealt with sternly and swiftly. But between such vigour and a fussy inquisition into motives and designs, or a pedantic inquiry into whether this or that man is not a rebel because he has made use of this or that foolish expres- sion, there is a world of difference. The treatment we ought to accord to the Cape Dutch is that which Hoche accorded to the people of La Vendee. He sh.ot them when he met them in arms, but he never forced men into rebellion by the dread of an unreasoning severity, and he always did his best to make it easy for men who had just crossed the line to come back. He always acted, that is, on the principle that La Vend& was not an enemy's country, and that France was going to resume her authority and live once more with the Vendeans. That is the kind of spirit in which the Cape Dutch ought to be treated. But before we say in detail what are the actual things that might be done in order to reassure the Cape Dutch, we will add a word more about the other side of the question. Though we hold most strongly that the Cape Dutch should be conciliated and reassured, we are also most strongly of opinion that the Imperial Govern- ment must make the Cape Dutch clearly understand that it will not pay quite as well to be disloyal as to be loyal. To do that would be fatal. If men in the border districts once thought that even if they took the Boer side they would be pardoned, all men of neutral views would be lost to us. They would argue : 'The British forgive ; the Boers do not. Therefore, it is clearly better to take the Boer side, for then whichever way the war ends we shall be safe.' It is also simply impossible to let the loyalists get the impression that their active loyalty will only receive the same reward as Boer disloyalty. Wavering men, face to face with the terrible pressure exercised by the Boers in the border districts, must be supported by the know- ledge that disloyalty is not the same thing as loyalty. Hence we should not hesitate to make examples in clear cases of real and active, and not mere rhetorical, disloyalty among the Cape Dutch in places near the seat of war. Men who help the Boers in the field know what they have to expect, and they should get it.
But apart from these plain cases, we hold that the greatest possible consideration should be shown to the Cape Dutch. In the first place, our authorities, civil and military, at the Cape should let it be clearly understood that they realise, and so far sympathise with, the extremely difficult position in which the Cape Dutch are placed by the present war. We respect, and ought to make it clear that we respect, the sentiment of race,—the senti- ment which always affects us when our own flesh and blood are in arms. The Cape Dutch have nothing to be ashamed of if their hearts are on the side of the Boers even while their heads admit that the Boers are fighting for an im- possible ideal (the ideal of racial ascendency), and for turning the majority of the inhabitants of one part of South Africa into white Kaffirs. The instinct of race cannot be suppressed, though in a case like the present it can be to a great extent neutralised. The Imperial authorities should, that is, make it abundantly clear that this instinctive and sentimental feeling will not be re- garded as a crime, and not even as a source of suspicion. and that, unless it is followed by overt acts, it will the Cape Dutch must be made to know two things be ignored in the present, and entirely forgotten in the future, and that it never at any time needed forgiveness. To put the matter in another way, the Imperial authorities at the Cape should insist with all their might that this is not a struggle for British ascendency, nor a fight to see who is to be master, the Dutchman or the Englishman, but instead a battle for racial equality, as a basis for that amalgamation between the two races from which will spring the South African nation of the future—there is plenty of room for new nations within the Empire—a nation destined, it may be, to play a great part in the history of the world. Again, the Imperial authorities at the Cape should make it clear that we are not fighting to deprive the Dutch race of anything. We do not want to tax them, or to oppress them, to take away their right of self-government, or to proscribe their language. We only want to prevent the Transvaal Dutch applying such treatment to the British. It will be said, no doubt, that there is no need to give such assurances, because the Cape Dutch know this well enough already. We are not so sure. Unless we are greatly mistaken, the Cape Dutch are being con- stantly told by the Boers that as soon as the Republics have been conquered the Cape Dutch will be treated as Outlanders. To stamp upon a lie of this kind is something more than a work of supererogation. Speaking generally, we would have the Imperial Government treat the Cape Dutch, not as potential traitors, or as traitors unless they prove themselves to be disloyal, but rather as loyal men undergoing a great strain and temptation, and therefore needing special fairness and consideration in the attitude of the authorities. Every man not only has a right to be assumed loyal till he is proved disloyal, but it is wisdom to act strictly on this maxim. To assume treason lightly and so unfairly is to encourage its growth. If a man feels he will be suspected of treason whatever he does, he will very soon give good cease for the suspicion from which he has suffered; Before we leave the subject of the loyalty of the Cape Dutch we must notice one special point in Mr. Mackarness's letter. He tells us that the Imperial authorities rejected a plan proposed to them for using the Queen's undoubted influence among the Cape Dutch to quiet and reassure them in their present diffi- culties. We can hardly credit that story in its present form. If responsible persons made such a proposal in a reasonable and proper form, we cannot believe that the High Commissioner -would have refused to forward home the suggestion, and we think it most unlikely that if the suggestion had reached England it would have been re- fused. Of course, if the proposal was in any way mixed up with declarations of future policy we can quite under- stand the High Commissioner rejecting it. If, however, it was a simple in without any arriere pewee, and really conceived the interests of loyalty and peace, we must refuse to accept the story that it was wantonly rejected by the High Commissioner until we have specific evidence in regard to the fact. We must not forget that the High Commissioner is obliged to proceed in all official and semi-official concerns with the greatest caution. After the publication, without his leave, of notes of an alleged conversation to which he had not invited reporters—a breach of honourable conduct which cannot be too strongly condemned—we ought not to be surprised if Sir Alfred Milner were somewhat suspicious and reticent. It would, in other words, be most unfair to condemn him off-hand for rejecting at the Cape a proposal which is capable of being stated in London in a very reasonable and attractive form. As the story reached Mr. Mackarness it may have looked like an extremely unfortunate piece of official hardness. ' Yet if all the facts were known the story might bear a perfectly different construction. We shall certainly not condemn Sir Alfred Milner till we know more about the facts. Meantime, we can only say again what we have said before. It is not only right, but the height of good policy, to let the Cape Dutch understand that they will not be regarded as traitors until they are clearly proved so, and, further, to make them realise that rhetorical language used in the excitement caused by a keenly roused racial sentiment will not be misunderstood or treated as proof of disloyalty. At the same time, it must be driven home to the Cape Dutch that real and serious acts of disloyalty must be sternly treated. Lastly, (1) That we do not want to deprive them of the complete right of self-government ; (2) that we mean to fight this war out to the bitter end, and that we shall go on even if it means making South Africa a cock-pit for three years, and using up armies as they were used up in the American Civil War.
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