ATTEMPTS AT INVASION.
[To TRH EDIT011 OP THE "SPEcTATos...1 SIR,—In common, I am sure, with the vast majority of your readers, I read the article on "Attempts at Invasion" which appeared in your issue of October 24th with very special interest. And if I do not agree with your conclusion that an attempt to invade England will be made, it is not through any failure on my part to realize how strongly such an objective would appeal to Germany, or what risks she would undertake to secure it. It is because I believe the enterprise to be, humanly speaking, incapable of being successfully achieved, and that those who order the naval and military affairs of Germany are themselves convinced of this.
The attempt might conceivably be made either (1) while the strength of the British and German Fleets respectively remains the same, or practically the same, as at present ; (2) when the naval situation had undergone some profound modification to our disadvantage; or (3) after it had been similarly changed in our favour. I will say nothing of how alterations of power in the hostile Fleets might affect the position, except that if the German Navy were decisively defeated it could hardly be argued that the idea of invasion could continue to be enter- tained, while heavy British losses at sea would not of neces• sity ensure success for an attempt, even so far as the exclu- sively naval part of the undertaking is concerned. I will deal entirely with the present situation, and consider whether, on that basis, Germany is likely to undertake this hazardous enterprise.
Many of the difficulties which would confront her are sufficiently baffling even when taken separately. Considered together, they seem insuperable. It is not possible to deal with them all within the compass of a single letter, but some of the most striking may be referred to, and first of all that of collecting the necessary transports and men in perfect. secrecy. I do not know whether there are in any one German port at the present time sufficient ships to carry the invaders; but if there are I certainly imagine that the fact is well known to our Admiralty, and if there are not the task of collecting them will be one of considerable magnitude, and will not be accomplished without our naval authorities being made aware of it. Yet secrecy in this is of vital importance to Germany, and an almost indispensable factor to her success would be that she should be able to get her ships well started on their journey without attack. This would be quite im- possible if it is known or becomes known where the transports are collected, for then their means of approach to the open sea will be heavily mined and constantly watched by air-craft, destroyers, and submarines, and the ships themselves will become the subject of attack, probably with results disastrous to them, immediately opportunity offers.
But should they reach the high sea in safety they would surely be assailed long before they arrived at their destination. It has been estimated (by Mr. Hector C. Bywater in an article which appeared in the Navy League Annual, 1911-12) that it would take at least two hundred and fifty transports to convey only three army corps over such a short sea journey as that from Hamburg or Bremerhaven to Hull. The speed of the flotilla, of course, would be the speed of its slowest ship, and the numerical superiority of the British Navy over the German is such that even if it were attacked in force it could detach an amply sufficient number of its weaker ships to deal with the transports, while if the German Fleet succeeded in joining its transports the necessity for affording them pro- tection would most seriously interfere with its ability to manceuvre freely in the naval engagement which would ensue, and the position of both transports and convoy would become a desperate one.
Before dealing with the situation which would arise when the flotilla had arrived at its point of disembarkation, may I show by a quotation from the article to which I have already referred how difficult it is to find places suitable for this purpose at all F-
"Not every bay or harbour on the coast lends itself to the operation of landing a vast body of troops. The fairway must be deep and navigable to within a minimum distance of the shore if tedious and perilous boat journeys are to be avoided. The beach, moreover, must be commodious and flat to facilitate the landing of horses, guns, train, and baggage. As a rule, however, such strands are found only on shallow stretches of the coast, and at low tide would be unapproachable to vessels of normal draught. Two essentiaLs are therefore at variance here, one excluding the other."
And does it not follow that in war time these few places where in time of peace a landing might conceivably be effected by surprise will be carefully watched, and sufficient forces to hold the invaders be retained in readiness at points where they can easily be made available ? If they did land, therefore, it would be very difficult for them to secure a firm footing, and the danger to them of being overwhelmed before they did so would be considerable.
But to return for a moment to the operation of disembarka- tion. For this considerable time and great space would be required. It is estimated that a kilometre of coast-line will allow of only eight transports disembarking expeditiously, and that the landing of a battalion with horses and train would occupy under good conditions of sea and weather some two or three hours. It is obvious, therefore, that even under conditions the most propitious for Germany her invading force would for a long period and over a wide area be exposed to the gravest risk of a double attack both from the land and from the sea at a time and under conditions when it would be particularly vulnerable.
Lastly, the invaders would have to depend for their supplies either on what they brought with them, in which case all their difficulties as to collection of transports and time and place of disembarkation would be vastly increased, or upon what they could obtain from the districts which they invaded, which would necessitate their detaching in different directions large bodies of men from their main force constantly to bring them in and replenish them; or they would have to get them from Germany, which would be plainly impossible while command of the sea remained with England. It is extremely improbable, therefore, that they would be able to provide either themselves or their horses with sufficient supplies of food and with ammunition for any length of time.
Such are the chief reasons why, in my opinion, Germany will not in existing or similar circumstances attempt an invasion of England in great strength. The datum of Clausewitz to which you have referred, "that in war you must do the best you can," can hardly have been intended to justify enormous sacrifices of life in an attempt to achieve the impossible. Nor must it be forgotten that in the grim struggle which she is now compelled to wage over enormous areas on two fronts, even though she may not need them now, Germany will shortly require more men than she has got or ever can get. Her rulers are unlikely to throw away the lives
of hundreds of thousands of men in the pursuit of any objec- tive, however attractive or important, which lacks the essential condition of some reasonable prospect of success.—I am, Sir, ARTHUR C. H. BORREE. 21 Tite Street, Chelsea, S. Ff7.
[With our correspondent's arguments as to its failure, if invasion on any adequate scale is attempted, we are in the heartiest agreement. We thought, indeed, that we made this quite clear in our article.—En. Spectator.]
Previous page
