TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER AND THE POSITION OF THE EXPERT IN OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. ADDRESSING the House of Lords on Friday week, Lord Salibbury used words which imply that his duties and responsibilities in regard to national defence stop at the selection of the best man possible for the office of Secretary of State for War. After repudiating, and rightly enough. the suggestion that he could do the work of experts and go into minute details, he went on as follows :—" I should rather refer, and I hold it to be my duty to refer, in the first instance to the great precaution which I have had a share in taking for protecting this country, and that is by recommending an adequate and thoroughly trustworthy head of the War Office." If Lord Salisbury really meant what these words imply, then we must say, with all due deference to his great intellectual powers and equally great experience, that he has not grasped the true position and does not understand the duties of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's duties do not end in finding out the ideal War Minister and keeping him at his post. Of course the duty of choosing the appropriate man for the post is of vast importance, but when that is done the Prime Minister's duties in regard to the great Depart- ments of Srate have only just begun. It is the Premier's function not only to harness the horse .best suited to the work to the particular cart, but to see that the horse does his work well. It cannot be too often asserted that the special and peculiar work of the Prime Minister, the work which is his raison d'être in the Constitution, is to act as foreman of the gang of workmen who compose the Cabinet. His business is to keep his gang together, to see that each one is doing the work he is best fitted to do, to prevent them from getting in each other's way, to consult with and advise the individual worker if a sudden strain or difficulty arises, and to pass up and down the line, as it were, giving help and support and that outside criticism and stimulus which can only be given by a man who is not working at the special job himself, but is overlooking and superintending the work as a whole. The worker in a gang which has an efficient foreman feels that he has a partner in every part of his work, and that partner is the foreman. So it should be in a Cabinet. Every head of a Department should feel that the Prime Minister is in the final resort and in the great acts of his office a co-worker. The Prime Minister must not, of course, be altravs worrying his colleagues or snatching the spade or pick or bar out of this or that man's hands, but he must feel that he shares the responsibility in every Department.
It cannot be said that this view of the office of Prime Minister is absurd and unpractical, because we have had Prime Ministers who were in the closest sense foremen of their Cabinets. Sir Robert Peel saw every important member of his Cabinet every day, and discussed with him whatever of special significance was moving in the office. Thus be kept in his hands all the threads of the Adminis- tration and was responsible for the whole of the work of government. No doubt Lord Rosebery has assured us that this ideal state of things can never occur again because of the vast complexity of modern affairs, but we do not think he was well advised when he committed himself to this view. If we remember rightly, he once complained in public that a Prime Minister in the House of Lords who had no Department had nothing to do. If that was so, it was only so because the Prime Minister was neglecting his special and proper function of superintendence and over- looking. The work of overlooking is not too great for human powers if the Prime Minister acquires the art of selecting essentials, and does not share the work and respon- sibility or give advice to his colleagues except in cases of real importance. But, of course, in order to be a Prime Minister of this kind, and, as we hold, of the true kind— of the only kind compatible with administrative vigour and efficiency—the Prime Minister must hold a purely nominal office, and not control a hnrdeneome Depart- ment like that of the Foie'gn Office. No man can be both -Foreign Secretary and a Premier of the Peel type. As a proof that it is not physically impossible for one man to inform himself in regard to the big and essential questions, and give a decision in regard to them, we may quote not merely the example of the Indian Viceroy, but of Monarchs like the German and Austrian Em perors. If they can make their influence felt in all the great Departments of State, so can a Prime Minister. A Prime Minister of the Peel type plays the part that an able and active Monarch plays in a Constitu- tion in which real power and authority still centre in the throne. . The danger that we run by accepting Lord Salisbury's theory that when a War Minister is selected the Prime Minister's duty is done is shown in the history of the past nine months. Had Lord Salisbury not been immersed in the details of his own arduous office, but had been able to bring his great and comprehensive intel- lect, for such it is, to deal with the various problems that arise at the War Office, we believe that many of our mistakes might have been avoided. Certain pro. posals could never have stood the test of being explained to the Prime Minister day by day. For example, we can- not but believe that if Lord Salisbury had been daily in touch with the Department a good many of the nomina- tions for high command would not have proved sus- tainable. The Department again might, and probably would, have found it impossible to maintain to a. man of his common-sense their contention that this was going to be an infantry war, and that unmounted Colonial troops were to be preferred to mounted. Again, we do not doubt that under the circumstances we are contemplating it would have occurred to the Department, not this year but four years ago, that it was dangerous to have no reserve of ammunition or other essential stores, and that more guns were badly wanted. We do not, however, want to labour these points of detail. What we are sure of is that the country will not accept the notion of War Office autonomy. Whatever Lord Salisbury may believe is, or ought to be, the custom of the Constitution, the nation still thinks that the Prime Minister is a foreman of the works, and expects him to see that the War Office is up to the mark. In fact, they hold the Prime Minister to be ultimately responsible for all his colleagues as long as he supports them and maintains them in power. That the Prime Minister does not part company with a colleague is taken as a sign that the Prime Minister has satisfied him- self that the Minister in question is doing all that can be done in his Department. The sooner, in our opinion, that we make the practice coincide with popular belief the better. Let us have a Prime Minister who is the foreman of his Cabinet. If possible let that Prime Minister be Lord Salisbury, but Lord Salisbury not overburdened with the vast weight of the Foreign Office. To lose his wise and moderating band in the direct conduct of foreign affairs would no doubt be per se an evil, but not so great an evil as having no real Prime Minister, no Ministerial foreman, which is the present state of affairs.
Before we leave the subject of Ministerial respor&bility we must say a word upon the astonishing proposal that the expert advisers of the War Office or Admiralty should come down to the House of Lords when they happen to be Members and explain and defend, or possibly riticise and condemn, the policy of the Government. Those who make this proposal would seem to have no understanding whatever of our system of government. It could have no end but to place a General on the active list in the Cabinet as Minister of War. If any one thinks such a plan would add to the efficiency of the Army, he is utterly mistaken. The General at the head of the Army would not have the power of the purse. He must, therefore, be dependent upon the Treasury for the means of making his Army. But it may be said that whatever money was allotted by the Treasury he would have the spending of. Very likely, but this is by no means the same thing as say- ing that it would be well spent. It is not the soldiers who have proved the best Army reformers, and at this moment we believe that the best things in our military system are due, not to soldiers, but to civilians. When, for example, the history of the present war comes to be written,we believe it will turn out that the failures were due; not to civilian interference, but to the military bureaucracy of Pall Mall. But be that as it may, we shall not be able to do away with our system of a civilian Secretary of State for War. What we ought to do is to put our most efficient adminis- trator at the War Office,—i.e., a. man who, while taking immense trouble to get the best expert advice, will also use his own common-sense. We ought also to be able to feel that the Prime Minister is concerning himself with all the essentials in the problem of national defence, and that thus the chain of responsibility is complete. If such a system is worked properly and by good men, and if public opinion remains sound and vigilant, we shall not be able to improve on it while we remain the limited Monarchy or crowned Republic that we are.
Previous page
