THE CHANCES OF SPEEDY PEACE. T HE victory at Kinchau is
rapidly awakening the Continent to the realities of the situation. The experts there were much amazed at the victories on the Yalu, but their preconception of Russian strength was so immovable that they finally agreed to regard the result of that series of battles as on the whole accidental, or, it might be, the consequence of vacillation in General Kuropatkin's strategy. The present victory, however, has been accom- plished by one of those long-sustained frontal attacks which are justly regarded by the military experts of the Continent as supreme feats in the art of war. In modern times no greater deed has ever been accomplished. The Japanese General had, it is true, the support of a squadron which, towards the last moments of the struggle, caused by the weight of its fire a gap in the long line of Russian defences. But in spite of this advantage, which must be admitted to have been a great one, the persevering assaults on the Russian position at Nan-shun reveal a heroism in the assailants which, if it has had parallels—as, for example, in the storming of the French position on Spicheren—has never been outdone in the history of modern war. The Russians had fortified their positions with all the skill of trained military engineers. They had ample artillery, the quality of which was not previously known to their assailants, for it is recorded that Japanese officers exposed themselves in advance of their men in order that, by examining the broken shells hurled at them, they might ascertain the calibre of the guns mounted on the batteries which it would be necessary to carry. The Russians had used all modern devices of trenches, barbed wire, and hidden mines ; but notwith- standing terrible losses, the Japanese charged again and again—five times, according to some authorities, nine times, according to others—the reserves marched up unflinch- ingly in spite of repeated repulses ; and at last, when it was known that ammunition was running short—of itself not an encouraging circumstance—they resorted to the bayonet, and in one final charge, made just before night- fall, swept the Russians over the ridges which they had so stubbornly defended. There is not as yet the slightest evidence that General StOssel had made any grave mistake, or that the Russian soldiers in any way derogated from their old repute for readiness to die where they stand. None but soldiers equal in battle to picked European troops could have performed such a feat of "derring-do," nor would any but a first-class European general have continuously and successfully hurled his troops during that long contest of sixteen hours upon a position so very nearly impregnable. These facts are recognised to the full by the best German and French experts, both of whom, for different reasons, are prejudiced against the Japanese ; while our own, who recognised them at once, are somewhat prejudiced in their favour. In- structed Russians, we may be certain, recognise them also, although a traditional horror of publicity, and perhaps some dread, of the "black people" down below, induce their Press to explain away facts in a style indistinguishable from deliberate falsehood. In truth, for the future Japan will be admitted by all soldiers—and it is the soldiers whom on the Continent statesmen consult—to be one of the few Great Powers of the world. That is a wonderful change, as we said last week, in the distribution of power ; but it is not our object to-day to discuss that change, but another and different, though related, question.
Dalny has been occupied, and it is evident even to civilians that unless some event occurs on which it is im- possible to reckon—say, for example, the death of General Oku—Port Arthur must fall, probably within a fortnight, the idea of its relief from the north being obviously imaginary ; and then the whole of the four or five armies at the disposal of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief will be set free for the destruction of General Kuropatkin. He may by possibility retreat, with frightful loss both of men and materiel, on Mukden, or even, with additional loss of prestige, on Kharbin ; but it is much more probable that this movement has been anticipated by the Japanese Staff, and that the moment he puts himself seriously in motion he will find that he has been surrounded by four armies, each of them nearly equal to his own, and able on emergency to move two feet for his one. If that is the real position—and our description can only be wrong so far as the numbers of the men with General Kuropatkin is concerned—the facts point either to a battle like that of Omdurman, where the defending army died as it stood ; or to a wholesale surrender like that of 1:J1m or Sedan, a surrender which would send a shock through the whole Northern world. Should this occur, the belief that Russia will make peace, which is already growing strong, would become universal in the West ; but we are unable as yet to accept that theory of the broad. result. We admit, and have admitted from the first, that if a defeat— which, being a defeat by Asiatics, would be held to be so discreditable—should produce an uprising of the common people in Russia, peace must be made, and would be made on any terms obtainable. It is also just conceivable that the Czar, who does not love war, and who must be almost maddened by the sense that he has been deceived by his great agents, might by a supreme act of volition compel a peace, even though he knew it would be followed by the necessity for his own abdication. But reasoning as one does reason about great States, and leaving the incalculable out of the calculation, we cannot but think that the great group which governs Russia will, even in the disastrous circumstances supposed, decide to continue the war. They will believe, perhaps know, that their authority is not broken within European Russia; that the peasantry will respond to a final appeal to their patriotism and hereditary reverence for the Czars ; and that all they can lose through Japanese action is the command of Northern Asia beyond the Baikal. They will therefore have as an alternative to peace the ability to fall back within their old boundaries, and yet leave the war to continue. The Japanese will cer- tainly not follow them west of the Baikal ; and they them- selves, in full security from invasion, will be able to remodel their armies, collect a new and more tremendous artillery, complete a system of military railways, and at the end of ten years, with new resources and a new mobility, perhaps even new alliances, strike once more for a revival of their dominion in Eastern Asia. Such a policy would presuppose a marvellous patience in their people, and a still more marvellous confidence between the rulers and the ruled ; but except a few Russians, no one thoroughly understands Russia, and the people have in their history borne years of war without a gleam of success. Their statesmen would calculate that a policy of this kind would wear out Japanese fortitude and Japanese resources, while their own would be comparatively little affected, for even in time of peace they keep soldiers by the million, and their new military rail- ways would hardly cost more in wasted treasure than the enormous single line, belief in which has beguiled them to a false confidence in their strength. With a policy like this, if it could be made to succeed, even for a limited term of years, the bureaucracy might be safe, and the great change towards Western Liberalism, which they fear almost more than defeat, might be postponed, or even finally averted. They probably even now dread the general upheaval, which they continuously apprehend more than anything that can happen to Port Arthur or General Kuropatkin, and are secretly considering the means of defending them- selves and the autocracy even more than the means of defending Russia. We do not mean in saying that to accuse them of want of patriotism ; but vast corporations, like great aristocracies and great Churches, can never quite resist the belief that the safety of their own organisations is identical with the safety of the State. The answer of Japan to such a policy would, of course, be to persuade, or if' necessary compel, the Manchu clans to fortify their frontier on a grand scale, and, if possible, make of Manchuria a series of fortified camps such as even the Russian Empire when eager for revenge could not enter without a risk which its dynasty and their agents would hesitate to run. Such an armed truce may be considered by many of our readers impossible ; but we would venture to point out to them that one almost precisely similar, though it is maintained for other objects, exists between France and Germany, and between Russia and Austria on her Eastern side. The Western world is able to bear armed truces of the most exhausting character, and we do not know any final reason why Eastern Asia should be unable to endure them also. It is always useless to prophesy, but in every game of chess stalemate is, by the law of the game, a possibility.
Previous page
