W E note that a good deal of uneasiness is being
felt in many quarters in regard to the approach- ing visit of the King to Kiel. It is suggested that the German Emperor will take the opportunity of his Royal uncle's visit to entangle us in some form of agree- ment with Germany, or that even if things do not go so far as that, the Kaiser will manage somehow or other to compromise us in the region of foreign politics. •When we remember what happened during the last visit of the German Emperor to England, and how the British Govern- ment, against their will and their interests, and apparently without their knowledge, were drawn into the "Venezuelan mess" and the Baghdad Railway imbroglio, we can hardly wonder at this feeling of anxiety. We say "without their knowledge" advisedly, for our readers will remember Mr. Balfour's vehement repudiation of the Spectator's declara- tion that the German Emperor desired to get our assent to the making of the Baghdad Railway, though it turned out a very few months afterwards that in fact co-operation in regard to that railway was one of the things which the German Government had set their mind on obtaining, and would have obtained had the Press and the public not been a great deal more vigilant than the Prime Minister and his colleagues. Again, in the case of Venezuela, if the Press and the public had not insisted that we should not be made the cat's-paw of Germany, we might, owing to the entangle- ment prepared by the Kaiser, have drifted into a very serious misunderstanding with the United States. As we have said, it is, therefore, little wonder that the portion of the nation which makes a study of foreign affairs is anxious and uneasy at the approaching visit. In the present case, however, we do not think that there ought to be any very great cause for alarm. The visit is primarily one of private friendship, and the King, whose ability and good sense in the region of foreign policy are undoubted, may, we feel sure, be relied on to frustrate any effort on the part of the German Foreign Office to stir up mischief for this country as well as its friends and neighbours on the other side of the Straits of Dover. The King, too, had so great a share in bringing about the entente cordiale with France, and realises so well its importance, that personally his influence will surely be used to prevent Germany nullifying the good results of that agreement. But though we cannot believe even in the Government being so foolish as to listen to a new German proposal for joint action, anti to forget the many anxieties, diffi- culties, and humiliations which they experienced in regard to the Venezuelan and Baghdad incidents, we feel pretty sure that a determined attempt will be made by the Germans to compromise us. The German Emperor is, indeed, almost bound to make the attempt, so sore are his people at their present isolation, and at their repeated failures in the region of international policy. A fortnight ago a leading German newspaper stated with brutal frankness that Germany's isolation was now complete, and pointed its remark by declaring that, if the truth must be spoken, Germany had only two friends left in the world,'—the Sultan and the Pope. When the Germans feel like this, and when they note that the Emperor's aggres- sive speeches directed against France were received in Paris, not with dread, or even anger, but with complete indifference, it is evident that the Kaiser must do some- thing to attract attention, and to show that he is still a potent force in the diplomatic world. But in such a case what could be more natural than to turn to the old resource of endeavouring to get the British Govern- ment to do something foolish ? It is a device which has often succeeded before, and it is therefore almost certain to be tried again. We may, then, confidently expect that Germany is preparing to act on the maxim, 'When in doubt and difficulty pull England's leg. She is too stupid to understand what we are doing ; but if we can drag her into the morass, we may be able to get out ourselves, and, at the worst, we shall be able to point to the fact that if we are in difficulties, so is she.'
We are not prophets, and we are not in the secrets of the German Emperor, and so we cannot expect to be able to divine what will be the exact nature of the mess into which the Kaiser will attempt to lead us. That in the case of the Baghdad Railway we were able to point out the course which would be taken was due to a variety of circumstances which are, not likely to recur. But though we cannot forecast the exact character of the proposals which will be made at Kiel, a consideration of the state of the diplomatic world and of the essentials of German policy will enable us, or any other person who cares to think the matter out, to realise the general nature of the overtures, or rather suggestions, which will be made by the Germans. In the first place, we must remember that the guiding principle of German foreign policy is not merely not to quarrel with Russia, but to seek the favour of Russia. Next, it must not be supposed that the German desire to stand well with the Power on their eastern frontier has been in the least modified by the Russian reverses in Manchuria. Germany is still most anxious to serve Russia, and obtain the reward of Russian friendship, and so relief from the dread of the war with two fronts. Germany is therefore always trying to produce evidence to prove that she is in reality Russia's best friend, and that though she is not bound by any alliance, as is France, her goodwill is, in truth, much more active and efficient than that of the Radical Republic. which professes to be the friend of the Czar. With that principle as her guide, and with the secret, but, of course, never avowed, desire to put Britain and France "in the cart," what is Germany likely to do ? Does not the present situation afford an oppor- tunity for her to make proposals which will eventually `enable her to contrast the British and French attitude towards Russia with that of Germany ? Suppose Ger- many were in the most friendly and disinterested way to talk to us, not about intervention-4 that, naturally, is not to be thought of, considering the special relations between Britain and Japan '—but about helping Russia to make a. peace honourable to her and favourable to the best interests of all the Powers concerned in the Far East, including, of course, Japan. Suppose, next, that, with .a sincere desire to promote peace, and to prove to Russia that we are not her enemy, have no wish to see her injured, but instead wish her well, we were to be foolish enough to agree to enter upon such a discussion with Germany. In that event the Kaiser would have just the opportunity he desires. Ho would be able little by little, and by proposals small at first but getting gradually bigger, to bring us to a point at which we should be forced to say that we could go no further, as the proposals would not be fair to our Japanese ally. As soon as that point was reached Germany would have scored. She would, in the first place, be able to point out to the Russians bow far she had gone in her earnest endeavours to help Russia, but bow she had been frustrated by the selfishness and hostility of Britain. But that would not be all. Next, she could place France in a very awkward position by asking her whether she meant to go with her new friend, Britain, or whether she would still co-operate with Germany in a friendly endeavour to help Russia. If France agreed, a wedge would be driven between her and Britain. If she refused, the fact could be rubbed in at St. Petersburg, and the difference of attitude between Germany and France strongly contrasted. It is hardly necessary to add that the first overtures to us would be coupled with a categorical denial that Germany had any intention whatever of making mischief between us and Russia, us and France, or Russia and France. We should be told in express terms that of course we could not be ex- pected to do anything having even the slightest appearance of hostility to Japan, and also that the greatest care must be taken not to compromise the improved relations between France and Britain, which, whatever foolish newspaper writers might say, was a condition of things viewed with the utmost satisfaction by Germany. Probably we should also be told that perhaps nothing practical would be able to be done, but that still the interests involved were so vast that it might be worth while to discuss them, and so prepare for moving if an opportunity for tendering good offices should occur later. The King at any rate, might use his personal and family influence and kindly sympathies in the direction of peace.
If the Kaiser's suggestions for joint British and German action are of this kind, rather than for the settlement of the Chinese question after the war is over, or for antici, pating the course of events in MaCedonia, Asia Minor, and. Syria, we trust that they will be met at the very outset with a simple non possumus, and that we shall refuse even to test with the toe the surface of the bog, which we shall be assured! is "quite firm." The occasion, indeed, would, in our view, be one for a little very plain speaking under diplomatic forms. We should remind the Kaiser of how Mr. Chamberlain was "let in" in regard to his German alliance speech—the whole story of this curious diplomatic, or rather, " praeter-diplomatic,' intrigue is told in the June number of the Contemporary by Dr. Dillon in an article entitled "The Obstacles to an Anglo-Russian Conven- tion "—of how Germany acted during the Fashoda crisis, and of what were the results of listening to German overtures as regards Venezuela and the Baghdad Railway. In addition, we should state that if an occasion should arise in which, happily, it might be possible to help Russia without injury to Japan, we proposed to take action with France, as the ally of Russia, and that we did not consider that joint action with Germany would be at all likely to conduce to the cause of peace. But, of course, it cannot be supposed for a moment that the present Government would take any such line as this, Or would read the German Foreign Office any such lesson, even in private. The most we can hope is that they will refuse to walk into the spider's parlour, be the excuses for the invitation never so ingenious. If they will do that the very moment the first overtures are made, no great harm will come of the Kiel visit. If, instead, they enter upon negotiations which look harmless, or even promising, it is certain that they will be landed in just such a mess as they were landed in when they agreed to talk about joint action with Germany in Venezuela and over the Baghdad Railway.
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