I T is hardly necessary to deal at length with the
pro- posals of the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Forces in favour of conscription, for they died at birth. Not only has the country shown itself unwilling to consider compulsory military service seriously, but it has made it clear that, in its view, the Commission was expressing an opinion on a matter where its opinion was not asked. The Report as regards conscription is, in truth, entirely un- practical, and leaves the question exactly where it was. As our readers know, though we desire to see a compulsory system of physical education of a semi-military character added to our present compulsory literary education, we are strongly opposed to compulsory military service in any form. We want voluntary, not compulsory, soldiers, believing that there will always be plenty of men willing to answer to the nation's call, and that armies diluted with unwilling combatants are injured, not improved, in their fighting capacity. But though we want no forced recruits, we desire that the men who answer the nation's call at an emergency shall be able to offer her more than willing hands. This they will be able to do if our schoolboys before they pass from out of the ken of the State have had a physical training of a military character, know the essentials of drill, have handled a rifle, and have had their physical and moral health improved by manly exer- cises. When a British Government has the courage to propose a practical scheme for such physical education, we believe that the country will gladly accept it, and that an immense benefit will be conferred on the nation in the shape of an improved national physique.
But though the proposals of the Royal Commission in regard to conscription have been, and were bound to be, rejected as unnecessary and unpractical, the question of the Auxiliary Forces remains to be considered. In our view, it is a vital question. If we adopt the right system, we shall greatly add to our strength and security as a' nation. If we do nothing, or choose the wrong path, we shall miss the opportunity for reform which is now offered us. In the abstract we accept to the full the naval view as to invasion ; but this does not prevent our desiring to maintain the Auxiliary Forces which we now possess, and in larger numbers and greater efficiency. In the first place, we think it wise to effect a secondary insurance of a moderate character, and to have a policy in the military as well as in the naval office. Next—and this is a more important reason—we desire to have an Auxiliary Force which will serve as a reservoir upon which in times i we did in the Boer War. Finally, we desire to have an, Auxiliary Force which shall form a national school-of,1 arms in which the manhood of the nation can be trained.. A man. is not "full a man" unless he feels himself, capable of helping to defend his own home from attack.
While we hold it essential to have a large and sound Auxiliary Force, we feel that the present Force is in many ways imperfect. But that is not a reason for, destroying but for improving it. After the excellent service done by the Auxiliaries in South Africa, it would, it appears to us, be madness to throw the whole Force into the melting-pot. Let us rather reform than destroy. In. setting out the reforms which we consider necessary we shall not deal with the Yeomanry, for we believe the Yeomanry to be, on the whole, at present a very satisfactory body. Improvements may, no doubt, be made in matters of detail—the force should certainly be kept up to thirty-five thousand men, and greater regularity in the supply of horses should be arranged—but as a whole no serious alterations are required. There remain the Militia and the Volunteers to be considered. In the case of the Militia, we would place the establishment at a hundred and fifty thousand men at the least, and we would provide for a bond-fide Militia Reserve of equal numbers.—We would also have a Yeomanry Reserve.—The term of enlistment in the Militia should be for three years. There should be five months' training, plus a month in camp, in the first year, and in the two succeeding years a month's training in camp. each year. After the three years had been completed there should be a period of four years in the Militia Reserve, with each year, say, four days' training in camp. To secure a good class of man we would pay the Militiaman 5s. a, day. For that sum, however, he would be expected to feed himself, and also to lodge himself, except when the regi- ment was under canvas. In fact, the terms would resemble those now offered to the Yeoman. No doubt we shall be told that the pay proposed is excessive, but we hold that it is essential to get a good class of man. The recruits wherever possible should live at home while being trained, —as under the old system. They should, that is, come into the barracks or depot to be drilled just as they now go to work in a factory. No one thinks it necessary for a factory hand to live in the factory ; and yet the work of the factory hand is far more difficult, and is conducted under a discipline which, though different from military discipline, is quite as strict in essentials. In country districts we believe that the recruits might also be allowed to live at home. To effect this a certain amount of organi- sation might be required, but, given a proper supply of ranges and of training-places, we do not believe that any insurmountable difficulties would be encountered. There remains, of course, the provision of officers. This, we admit, is by far the most difficult problem in the whole question ; but we do not think it insoluble. We would, to begin with, create a corps of professional Militia officers, whose whole time should be taken by the State, and who should serve on much the same conditions as the Regular officer. From this corps of officers we would appoint at least half of the officers in the Militia regiments. The re- maining half should be supplied, as now, by civilians who are fond of military life, and who are able and willing to give their spare time to soldiering. This is, of course, a, very hasty and imperfect outline of suggestions for im- proving the Militia. We put them forward rather as indicating the general lines on which reform should proceed than as a finished scheme.
We now reach the question of the Volunteers. In the case of the Volunteers we believe that very little organic reform is required. What is wanted is rather to make the best of what we have got than to institute structural alterations. In the first place, we should avoid everything that depletes the numbers of the Volunteers. We want to withdraw from the Volunteer Regulations anything ana everything which makes it difficult for a man who desires to be a Volunteer becoming one. We want, in a word, to remove as many obstacles as we can from the path of the would-be Volunteer. We would therefore abandon all compulsory camps, and, indeed, except in one particular, all hard-and-fast Regulations. The exception is skill with the rifle. We would give no grant to a Volunteer who could not reach a reasonable standard of marksman-, ship. That reached, we would make the other Regulations, as elastic as possible. Efficiency we should judge by the numbers of certified riflemen who appeared, not at ceremonial parades, but on working field-days, and by their performance in the field. Attendance in camp we should encourage by making it easy, attractive, and without expense to the men ; but we would not attempt to enforce it. In a word; we would do nothing to make the Volunteers imitation Regulars, but everything to give them an ap- propriate organisation. We would, that is, while helping the Volunteers as much as we help theta now, in spirit revert to the older view of the Force. That view is well set -forth in the original circular which was addressed by Colonel Peel, the Secretary for War, to the Lords- Lieutenants of Counties, and which is to be found in a very interesting article on " Home Rule for the Volunteers" in the June number of the Monthly Review. The circular runs as follows (we have italicised the provisions which we deem as of prime importance to-day) :— "With reference to the circular of May' 12, sanctioning under certain conditions the enrolment of Volunteers, it seems essential . . . that they should not be left in ignorance of the nature and character of the service to which they are thus binding them- selves, but that the object which such bodies of Volunteers should have in view should be clearly explained to them, as well as the peculiar duties expected from them, together with the best means of qualifying themselves for their effectual discharge. Premising that these Volunteers may be of two classes, one comprising those who may be instructed to act as riflemen or sharpshooters in the field ; and the other those whose services may be rendered most valuable in our seaports and other coast towns in manning the batteries constructed for their defence, it must be borne in mind that :
(1) The first essential, without which no body of Volunteers, however composed or organised, can hope to render avail- able or really useful service is that it should be amenable. when called upon to act either in garrison or in the field, to military discipline. . . .
(2) In the second place the condition of service should be such as, while securing and enforcing the above necessary discipline, to induce those classes to come forward for service as Volunteers who do not under our present system enter either into the regular army or the militia.
In the above view the system of drill and instruction for bodies of Volunteers should not be such as to render the service unnecessarily irksome, or as to make demands upon the time of the members that would interfere injuriously with their ordinary avocations. . . .
(4) It should not be attempted, therefore, as regards Rifle Volunteers, to drill or organise them as soldiers expected to take their place in the line, . . but it should be rather sought to give each individual Volunteer a thorough knowledge of the use of his weapon, and so to qualify the force to act efficiently as an auxiliary to the regular army and the militia, the only character to which it should aspire.
It is evident that this object will be best attained by the enrolment of Volunteers in small bodies, in companies con- sisting of an establishment of one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, and 100 men of all ranks as a maximum.; or in sub-divisions, or even sections of companies with the duo proportion of officers, and composed of individuals having a knowledge of and thorough dependence upon each other personally, and it should rarely, if ever, be sought to form them into larger corps, entailing the necessity of a lengthened training and complicated system of drill instruction.
The nature of our country, with its numerous enclosures and other impediments to the operation of troops in line, gives peculiar importance to the services of volunteer rifle- men; in which bodies each man, deriving confidence from his own skill in the use of his arm, and from his reliance on the support of his comrades, . . . intimately acquainted with the country in which he would be called on to act, would hang with telling effect upon the flanks and com- munications of a hostile enemy (sic).
The instruction, therefore, that is most requisite in practice is the use and handling of the rifle, . . . how to extend and avail themselves of cover, to fire advancing or re- tiring, to protect themselves from cavalry, or other simple movements which, while leaving every man his indepen- dent action, would enable them to act together with more effect."
If the War Office had kept these ideals before it, and had not instead fussed over compulsory camps and obligatory drills, what a potent force the Volunteers would now be! They might number half-a-million of skilled riflemen, and possess a training thoroughly appropriate to the work they would hi called on to perform in the event of war in these islands. It must not be supposed, however, that in advocating this return to the original type we desire that less consideration should be shown to, or less money spent on, the Volunteers. On the contrary, we want to see more consideration Shown them, and- the money voted by' Parliament better spent. It is, in our opinion, essential that the Volunteers, even though organised more as Irregulars than as imitation Regulars, should be given regimental transport, and should be made mobile in the strictest sense of the word. We would in every possible way encourage coml. raanding officers to achieve mobility, and would give special grants for that purpose. We cannot, however, enter upon these matters of detail on the present occasion. All we want to do now is to insist (1) that conscription is quite unnecessary to secure the national safety, and must be banished from the thoughts of our Army reformers, lest it should turn out a will-o'-the-wisp which will prevent a scheme of real and practical reform ; (2) that the Militia must be increased and radically reformed ; (3) that the Volunteers must in essentials be let alone, but must be given a more appropriate organisation, be treated seriously by the military authorities, and be endowed with the power of movement. The Auxiliaries have served us too well in the past to be abolished or half abolished. We must reform them, or, rather, give them just and reasonable treatment ; not wantonly cast them aside in order to play with the soldiers' new toy of conscription.
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