Great Britain and Russia r HERE is a good deal
of anxiety in the country at 1 the present time concerning our relations with Russia.
The year 1926 was a year of trials faithfully and heroic- ally borne by the BritiSh people. When thee events of last May were succeeded. by the prolonged coal stoppage and culminated in a determined attempt to drive our merchants out of China, it became clear that powerful anti-British forces of a subversive character were at work. And it is hardly surprising that in the search for the source of these mischievous influences Moscow should have been subjected to sharp scrutiny. The results of that scrutiny were profoundly unsatisfactory.
The Soviet Government deliberately attempted to subsidize the general .strike, which it declared was a revolutionary movement directed against the British Constitution. Such action on the part of any Government against the Government of a foreign Power with which it is in diplomatic relationship has, we believe, no parallel in international history. After the breakdown of the general strike, the trade unions of the U.S.S.R., which form, in fact if not in name, a department of the State, contributed, by means of forced levies, a substantial sum of money to the miners of this country, who were adjured by the official Soviet Press to " fight like hell." Finally, the hand of the Bolsheviks can clearly be detected in the Chinese troubles. The Cantonese movement is doubtless inspired by nationalist rather than Communist aims, but behind the purely anti-British agitation in China stand the shadowy and sinister figure's of Karakan, Borodin, and Radek.
In these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the campaign to " clear out the Reds " should have met with a considerable measure of success. It is to be hoped, however, that the Government will not be misled into a belief that this campaign is the outcome of a deep-seated and widespread national demand for a break with Russia, and that Sir Austen Chamberlain will not allow himself to be stampeded into courses of action which may ultimately prove to have been incautious and mistaken. There are already indications that the Foreign Office has formed an exaggerated idea of the force of public opinion on this subject, and it is difficult to believe that the Note which was despatched to Moscow last week would ever have seen the light but for the alleged pressure from without. Although entirely justified by the facts, it is not a very effective document. Querulous in tone, verbose, and of inordinate length, it provided the Soviet Government with opportunities of scoring back, which they could hardly have been expected to resist. A brief and formal protest against Bolshevik activities in China would have been more useful. Best of all would have been a statement in the House of • ommons by the Foreign Secretary, containing if necessary a clear warning that unless the Soviet Government desisted a note would be sent with a time-limit attached.
A tense situation has now arisen, but, despite the undoubted fact that the itolsheviks have frequently violated. the Trade Agreement of 1921, we remain of the opinion that to denounce that agreement and break diplomatic relatiOnship. with Russia would be an unwise step for us to take at the present juncture. What should we gain by such action ? It would not stop anti-British propaganda, but would increase it. It would not raise our prestige in the Far East—already high owing to the timely despatch of the Shanghai Defence Force, and the skill and patience of our diplomacy at Hankow:-Lbut might well diminish it. There is no reason whatever to sup- pose that it would hasten the process of bringing the Bolshevik leaders to their senses, which is bound to be laborious and slow. Now Kamenev and Zinoviev —the two " irreconcilables "—have already gone, and it may well be that some of the other stiff-necked members of the Politbureau, including Stalin, are nearing the end of their tether. The gulf between the Soviet Government and the Third International has been steadily widening during the past few months. Nothing could be better calculated to close up that gulf, to strengthen the hands 01 the extremists in Moscow by uniting behind them all the latent nationalist elements in Russia, and to extend perhaps by years the period of their authority, than an action by the British Government which could plausibly be represented as hostile to the Russian people.
The effects of a definite breach between Russia and the British Empire upon international relationships generally have also to be considered. What would be its reactions in China, in. Poland, in the Baltic States, and in Germany ? In our view they would in every case be unfavourable to British interests and to that world stability of which, for the first time since 1911, there is some sign. The whole of Europe and Asia would be plunged once more into a political ferment. Uneasiness, suspicion, intrigue would everywhere be aroused, and an atmosphere created which would not only be inimical to any substantial revival of trade, but which might seriously endanger the peace of the world.
There is a final point which is worthy of earnest con- sideration by the Government. The British are a trading people. In the past they built up their prosperity and created and sustained their Empire by trade and trade alone. In the conduct of that trade they have been bold and fearless. They have traded with all sorts and condi- tions of men, frequently in circumstances of great danger, and sometimes, having risked all, they have lost all. More often they have won. To-day they realize instinc- tively that their continued existence is entirely dependent on their overseas trade. In truth, the commercial instinct of the British people is fundamental and cannot be ignored. if the Government were to denounce the Trade Agreement. with Russia they would receive a great deal of applause from a vocal, although not necessarily an influential, section of the eommunity, but the business men of the country would be dead against such a policy. The British people arc not really as afraid of cartoons in foreign newspapers as they are of losing a potential foreign market. They might subse- quently come to the conclusion that, for the sake of obtaining a purely party advantage, the Government had taken a step which sensibly diminished a portion—albeit a small one—of their foreign trade, and jeopardized world peaCe. And if they were to come to such a conclusion, the Government would have short shrift.
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