IfiE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. O N November 1, 1875, the political position
of the United States, described in the terminology of English parties, was this :—There was a Liberal President, irremovable for six- teen months, and able and resolved to veto any strongly Con- servative measure, but unable to initiate any Liberal measure be- cause the Lower House would decline to follow him. There was a Parliament in which the Upper House was Liberal and the Lower Conservative, and in neither of which, consequently, could any- thing effective be done, because even if the Lower House per- suaded or frightened the Upper—a most improbable contingency —the President remained beyond the influence of either or both. There was, in fact, a legislative dead-lock, but there was also a probability that the huge electoral body, which, if it can but remain firm for four years, is under the Constitution ultimately master of everything not settled in that document, would prevent the dead-lock from continuing, for it had pro- claimed itself in a series of elections strongly on the Conserva- tive side. Very slowly the cumbrous machine would be rolled into the new groove, but still it would be rolled, and then it would be in marching-order again. Not a bit of it. On November 2 a series of local elections were held in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and other States, all ruled by Democrats, and it was found, to the bewilderment of both parties, that the popular mind had swung back once more, and that, on the whole, the electoral body might be taken to be Liberal again. There were no elections held for Congress, but the majorities for State Officials and State Legislatures, though not enormous, were decided, the only exception being New York, where the Liberals, though they at first thought they were triumphant, only succeeded in throwing a heavier vote. There is no proof that the pendulum will remain on the Liberal side, and no proof that it will not, but in either case the action of the Legislature must be paralysed for more than a year. If the people turn Conservative again, and elect a Conservative President, he can do nothing till the Senate has ceased to be Liberal; while if they remain fixed in their present apparent mood, and elect a Liberal President, he can do nothing until a Lower Housb is returned of his own opinions. In the same way, the Parliament can do nothing because the Senate will not be changed. Now we ask gravely if that is a working Constitution? That it can exist is true, partly because the people ,--leske nothing strongly, and partly because the daily business of governing is transacted within the separate States, but that it works in any way except by prohibiting impulsive action we emphatically deny. It does not work at all, but—except in a few extreme cases—prevents working. The people have not under it the means, at this moment, of securing any great policy on which they have set their hearts. If the majority of them are desirous of returning to specie currency, and willing to make the needful sacrifices to attain it, they cannot have it for twelve months, because the House of Representatives is not of their way of thinking ; and if the majority would prefer paper, they cannot have it for sixteen months, because the Pre- sident and the Senate would refuse their demand. War effaces party lines, and it is not altogether fair to put such a dilemma, but still supposing parties to hold together even on that sub- ject, the President might to-morrow advise a war with Spain, and the electors might heartily accept his advice, and the war might be declared by President and Senate, and the House of Representatives might refuse supplies for carrying it on, and there would be no appeal. No one has any power to dissolve the Representatives. How people who believe that "Govern- ment is a necessary evil" can approve the Constitution of the Union we can with an effort understand, but how people who hold, as all Englishmen hold, that every instrument which exists ought to be efficient can approve it passes our compre- hension. It is like a vast machine which consumes coal, and employs labour, and is matter of interest to a district, but which seldom turns out anything, and never anything at the time it is wanted. France, and even England—for we, too, have had our rebellions—would go to pieces before such a machine could be put in efficient movement.
The immediate result of these Elections on the internal politics of the Union can hardly fail to be considerable. They show the party managers conclusively that the people in the West as well as in New York, in Pennsylvania as well as New Jersey, are indisposed to trust men who propose to pay all debts in limitless issues of inconvertible paper. They show the Democrats that their policy on finance has been a grand mistake, and that their men have not as yet obtained the serious confidence of the people. And they show the Repub- licans that they have grown timid too soon ; that they have not yet lost the hold cemented by the war ; and that if they have the nerve to adhere to their principles, to decide for honesty, and decency, and reasonableness in politics, they may retain possession of power. They have still twelve months in which to find men, to draw up an intelligible platform, and to weed out a few of their failures, and then they may go to the people with very
little apprehension. Whether they will propose General Grant again, is a matter of minor importance. We do not see the dangers to freedom in a Third Term which alarm our Tory contemporaries, nor do we believe in a Caesarism which is to hold down forty millions of people and a million of veteran soldiers by a few thousand officials holding office at will, and some thirty-five thousand overworked and unpopular soldiers. If the "man on the white horse" ever rules the Union, it will be as dictator for the nonce, to put down corruption grown too strong for ordinary machinery, and not as the mouth-piece of an Administration. The entire Union may possibly one day call a Vigilance Committee to power to restore the respect for law, but its authority will be short-lived, and its President will most certainly not be General Grant. We very much question if the majority of Americans see these dangers either, or doubt their own power to decide in any event on the course of their own destinies ; and the Republicans, in their lack of a man, may renominate General Grant. He has lost much of his early popularity, but, as these elections show, he has not lost so much as to ruin or seriously impede the party which supports him. The worst of him is very well known, and the Republicans, who have scarcely a man to propose ex- cept Governor Hartranft, may not like to risk everything on a name which would excite so very little enthusiasm. They see that they can " carry " General Grant, and they may be in- clined to seat him. If they do, the Union will still have a President who is, in some respects, an inferior man ; but the
election will not be a Revolution, or the precursor of one, and substantive power will remain with those who have possessed it for fifteen years and, on the whole, have used it well. The Republicans, after all, saved the Union, gave personal freedom to the only class which lacked it, and so taxed the country that, with all its expenses, the huge Debt is honestly provided for, and is silently melting away. They have held the South successfully, if not by very wise means, and they have treated their enemies so leniently, that Jefferson Davis may, if he
pleases, take his place again in the Senate of the Union. They might have done, and ought to have done, a great deal more ; to have founded an honest Civil Service, to have settled the
Indian question—which is chiefly dangerous because every- body cheats the Indians—and to have placed the Navy, if
not the Army, on a creditable footing ; but still, amidst all these failures, what have their rivals done ? They have proposed to cheat the national creditor, to make every private
creditor take less than his due, and to revive in another form White ascendancy in the South,—that is, to sow again the seed of Civil War. In fifteen years of opposition they have not produced a policy, a measure, or a man. Why should the Republicans be expected to be willing to commit suicide in order to let them in ? They are very discontented, no doubt, but they are discontented with themselves, and discontent with oneself does not necessarily lead to high appreciation of one's foes. These new elections look as if the Republican majority, though worried and disappointed, and even bitter, had con- cluded, on the whole, before dismissing itself, to give itself one more trial.
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