The Archie Rice Story, cont'nued
As the latest diagnostician of our national neurosis, Mr. Mander plumps, and probably quite rightly, for the Adlerian approach. Refusal to recognise our loss of world power, a process which began with the yielding of our maritime supremacy to the United States after the Battle of Midway in June, 1942, has made us a sick 'society. On the extreme right as well as on the extreme left, and, alas, probably among much moderate opinion as well, there exists a fantasy, surrogate empire in which non-existent legions and resources of 'moral leadership' are deployed on the world stage to the consternation of our allies and the ridicule of our enemies. Hence our yearning to act as a 'mediator' between the two super-powers, although everything in our own imperial history before 1945 shows that such a course is both unreal and dangerous. When the reality behind our posturing is shown up, as at Suez, Berlin, Nassau, Brussels and during Cuba week, then we take refuge in isolationism, xenophobia, neutralism, obsession with 'the Commonwealth.' Increasingly, Mr. Mander in- sists—and who will argue with him?—British attitudes on foreign affairs indicate 'withdrawal symptoms.'
The writer's analysis which leads him to these conclusions is presented in some detail. Most relevant of all, he sees how the Anglo- American political tradition, buttressed by sea power and a puritan climate of ideas, has always been optimistic and utopian; on the other hand, the continentals, ceaselessly involved in the rough-and-tumble of European disputes, have always had an intense feeling of involvement. Hence the endless dialogue between idealism and. Realpalitik in much Anglo-American political writing, and the consequent accusations from outside of hypocrisy and Machiavellianism. I think on this subject Mr. Mander has been in- fluenced by Professor Henry Kissinger, and a better mentor on the divorce between power and diplomacy in the history of both Britain and America hardly exists. But in any case, as Mr. Mander sees, it is the United States, rather than the United Kingdom, which under the stresses of the cold war has managed to fuse these dis- parate elements into a coherent national policy —containment, flexible response, call it what you will.
Inevitably, the writer considers British atti- tudes towards the totalitarian rdgimes of the last thirty years. We realised the truth about the Third Reich only just in time to prevent our extinction. At the same time, the intellectuals of the 1930s, while they saw the nature of National Socialism, fell for the Stalinist myth. As Orwell once put it, the intellectuals wanted to be anti-fascist without being anti-totalitarian. Naivety, utopianism, obsession with power, all contributed towards the British left's favourable view of the USSR during the Yezhovschina and collectivisation. 'There is no more extraordinary case of trahison des clercs in English intellectual history.' Today, these ingredients have fused to produce the neutralist impulse. The utopianism and the naivety of the left, exploited by those who are neither utopian nor naïve, merges with the right's yearnings for a 'strong' neutralism. Both attitudes subscribe, moreover, to the his- toricist delusion that Khrushchev's Russia will 'inevitably' be liberalised, or ally itself with the West against China. Fifteen years ago, even ten years ago, at the time of the Berlin airlift and the Korean war, we accepted the American lead; now the truth is that the British cannot really be relied on in moments of supreme crisis.
This is a sad declension, and particularly de- pressing is Mander's story of our hesitancy over applying to join the Common Market; even more disquieting is his account of the recent panic and hysteria over Berlin and Cuba. But, at least over the reaction to last October's Cuba crisis, we have a narrative with many quotations which may be useful in the future.. What, then, is to be done? Mander suggests that we should keep our deterrent force as a bargaining power against Gaullism, abandon our anti-Germanism, seek 'an equal place for Britain in a directorium of Europe's major powers.' But perhaps events have already moved ahead of these sensible sugges- tions; and in the nuclear field at least it may now be more important for Europe to share in the making of American policy than to organise its own defences on the idea of two Atlantic pillars.
In any case, Mr. Mande'r's survey is one which is better in breadth than in depth. Moreover, he ends on a note of exhortation; yet a pep-talk from the analyst is no substitute for the removal of a neurosis by finding a truly satisfactory ex- planation of the trouble that first gave rise to the disturbance. But perhaps this task of national abreaction is now beyond the resources of any one man, even a latter-day Bagehot or an Arnold. In any case, what I personally felt after finishing this book was trepidation. The national reaction to the Profumo affair has shown beyond doubt that Mr. Mander's 'with- drawal symptoms' have now extended to all aspects of our national life, be they domestic or foreign in origin. Soon, some vast new inter- national crisis will loom into the headlines; and as far as the Communists are concerned, no doubt we can rely once again on Mr. Kennedy to bail us all out. No, what is so frightening is the thought of our own reaction; after reading Mr. Mander's study it is impossible to be sure that it will not be more shameful even than our behaviour during Cuba week.
DAVID REES
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