LITERARY SPECTATOR,

CONCLUSION OF THE DUKE OF ROVIGO'S MEMOIRS.

THE 7th and 8th parts, which conclude these Memoirs, embrace the first abdication of NAPOLEON, the restoration of the Bourbons, the return from Elba, the Hundred Days, including a criticism on the battle of Waterloo, BONAPARTE'S second abdication, and all the circumstances which attended his flight to Rochefort, his em

barking on board the Bel!erophon, and subsequent transference to the Northumberland, for the purpose of his being conveyed to his last place of exile. This portion of the Memoirs is much more controvessial than any of the preceding parts, and consequently less interesting to those \vim read for amusement only. The main object of the writer, in the first instance, is to convict the two

great political adventurers, TALLEYRAND and FouCHE, of carrying on intrigues hostile to the interests of their master, and which, in

their course, were accompanied by every species of baseness and ingratitude. In proving that these men were dishonest shuffiers, the author proves nothing more than was notorious to all the world: he throws, however, some light on their dark operations ;

but at the same time that M. SAVARY may, we think, be relied upon to a considerable extent for his facts, we must be

cautious in receiving the names he giveslo actions as charac

teristic of them according to other codes of morality than his, which is altogether a Code Napoleon. If the object of a diploma

tist should prove to be anything else than the aggrandisement of Isis master—the good of his country for instance, it meets with no quarter from the military notions of fidelity imprinted in the mind of the Due de Rovioo : he gives it instantly the worst names in his

vocabulary. In the two instances of TALLEYRAND and FouunE, we are well disposed to join him :if such men deserve a reputation

for diplomatic talent, then indeed should diplomatists be sought

for among the hardened liars and unprincipled forgers of our gaols and hulks. We do not, however, think so hardly of the metier.

These men have got a reputation, not for carrying the objects of their mission, but for a slipperiness in negotiation, so excessive, that their adversaries never knew where to meet them : this lu bricity gives an appearance of depth and impenetrability of de sign, whereas it only amounts to utter absence of principle, end, or truth. The sole object of both these men, shuffiers and

egotists, always was to negotiate a position for themselves. The only great talents necessary for this course are mendacity, cowardice, anti impudence. Coolness is not always ne cessary. When TALLEyRAND, divided between the chances for

himself under a regency or in the restoration of the Bourbons, had to make a speech to the Senate which he had assembled, he was in such a state of agitation that he could scarcely read the speech that the Archbishop of Mechlin had made for hint ; and had he found any other in Isis waistcoat-pocket besides the right one, that prelate declares he would never have known the difference.

Fouctm, on the contrary, seems to have had more nerve. When they came to arrest him, after NAPOLEON landed from Elba, he

protested against the authority, and, retiring into a closet as if to write a protest, he slipped out of the window, crossed a garden and wall, and made his way into the saloon of a partisan of the Emperor, in which many of his friends were deliberating how to

assist his progress : FOUCHE, hitherto plotting in another interest, as quickly changed his side as he had changed his house, and, as usual, negotiated his, position. The scenes that took place when

the restoration of the Bourbons was agitated, set the utter selfishness and want of principle of the ministers, diplomatists, and ci vilians of Paris at the time, in a light which will long reflect shame upon the national character. They were consulted, they were referred to by the Allied Powers on the subject,—for the re storation of the Bourbons seems to have been a point that none had at heart : yet none of the French authorities dared to speak out ; no one dared to reject or accept them ; no one looked to what would be best for the country—for France or for Europe :

each Was employed solely in examining whaf would be best and safe,t for himself; until the Emperor 21LEXANDER, worn out by the delay, and urged on by the defection of Marshal MARMONT.S

6th corps, at length proposed after dinner the health of the King of France, Louis the Eighteenth. The Senators who were pre sent all stared at one another, and then drank the toast with enthusiasm ; each thinking that something had been settled by the rest in the morning, and that now the Lest plan would be to sail with the stream. The restoration of the Bourbons was a cast of the die.

We have compared the narrative of the Duke of Itovioo with previously existing documents, and arc somewhat surprised to find that he has been able to communicate little that is new. His accounts are, however, confirmatory of the history of those remarkable transactions as we already had it : it is only in a few, and those not very important particulars, that we find variations.

The conduct of GROUCHY on the day of the battle of Waterloo is again brought into discussion. GROUCHY has already answered the censures of NAPOLEON, as published by General GOURGAUD ; and now the Due de Rome, replies to the pamphlet of Marshal GROUCHY. He throws some novelty into the charge. The point certainly has hitherto been mistaken. GROUCHY has been blamed for not coming up on the 18th, the day of Waterloo : the answer, which is well urged in Captain PRINGLE'S notes on this battle, appended to Sir WALTER SCOTT'S Life of NAPOLEON, is, that he Q0111{,1 not, for he was engaged all day with a strong division of

BLUCHER'S army under THIELBIANN, which prevented him from crossing the Dyle. This is all very well, but M. SAYARY carries the accusation higher: why was he there P—because he had mistaken the route of the Prussians, and had followed even their supposed course with great sluggishness. Now to mistake the route of a great army in a friendly country, is a capital fault ; and to be timid, and hesitating, and inactive, when a great stroke is to be made, is to be altogether unfit for duty. The truth is, that the indefatigable BLUCHER marched completely round the circle, with his great and encumbered army, while GROUCHY was turning himself in the centre of it. The understood object of BLUCHER, after his defeat on the 16th, was to join the Anglo-Belgian army under WELLINGTON. GROUCHY was detached from the grand army to intercept him. Suppose him departing from NAPOLEON at Tyburn Turnpike, and that Hyde Park is FlanderS: let the Duke of WELLINGTON be at Ansley House: BLucrisna having been defeated near Cumberland Gate, is obliged to go round by Kensington Gardens and Knightsbridge to reach the British General : GROUCHY is sent after him; and while the old Prussian is making the circuit of the Park, GROUCHY is airing himself on the New Bridge over the Serpentine, where at length he encounters a division sent to entertain him: with this division he fights all day : in the mean while, old BLUCHER is striding down Rotten Row, passes the Barracks, and just comes in for the tail of the fight at Hyde Park Gate, NAPOLEON having advanced down the Parade and Park Lane from his former position of Tyburn Turnpike to attack the Duke in his post at Apsley House. This is Mark:hal GROUCHY in small. It was not the first time he had deserted his chief: he left HocHE, his commander, on the coast. of Ireland, having wasted his time without effecting a landing, and then sailed away with the forces without waiting for his General. NAPOLEON foolishly enough made him a Marshal for taking the Due d'ANGOULEME prisoner at Lyons, and had reason for repentance. The poor man, however, is now in misfortune and exile ; and his want of the talents of a General is not any greater crime than many commit in filling offices for which they are unfit.

M. SAVARY repeats the hackneyed story that it was the coming up of the Prussians which defeated NAPOLEON at Waterloo. They secured the victory—that was all. Our author maintains his notion on the ground that it was a principle with NAPOLEON to make his grand attack only an hour or two before nightfall ; and in the earlier part of the day to keep up a series of charges, thickening the light as the day advanced, until, towards the close, he gave a blow with all his force, from which darkness alone would prevent the enemy from recovering. M. SAYARY would have it believed that the appearance of the Prussians interfered with this grand coup ; but this was not the case : NAPOLEON on that day had already used all the forces under his command ; and the evening was compelled to make his grand coup, which he did, with his Guard—and it failed—some time before the .Prussians were in the field. The Prussians never even produced a moral effect upon his army ; for it was understood all through the field, when the heads of the columns were descried, that they were fugitives before GROUCHY. NEY led on the Guard to the grand charge while he was under this delusion.

But enough of Waterloo. We prefer to listen to the Due .de Rovido when he speaks of events he himself witnessed. We hope that his example, perhaps too his charges, will bring his contemporaries into the field of history. Before the hist cgy of the last thirty-five years can bewritt en, we must have many works like this of M. SAVARY : we wish they may each be as entertaining and instructive.