WAR AND NATIONAL }TNANCE.
MR. R. H. BRAND, who is at once a trained economist and a practical banker, has reprinted from the Round Table twelve of the excellent articles which he has contributed to that quarterly since 1912 on War and National Finance (Arnold : 15s. net). The first article, of March, 1912, on " Lombard Street and War," discussed with admirable prescience the probable effect of war on the delicate mechanism of world-finance which has its nerve-
centre in London. The next article, of September, 1914, described the actual results of the catastrophe, which affected every trade in every country, and the measures taken to avert a general destruction of credit and a cessation of commerce. In the following articles we see how the financial problem developed and changed during the War and since the Armistice. Few people realized at the time the highly critical position of our finances in August, 1916, when Mr. Brand and Mr. Perry, as members of the Imperial Munitions Board of Canada, felt it their duty to warn the Government that they were undertaking heavier obligations to America than they could meet :-
" Wo predicted, as will be seen, that a crisis would occur some time between June and December, 1917. It did actually ripen earlier. At the very moment that the United States came into the War the British Government, with commitments in the United States running into hundreds of millions of pounds, was at the end of its tether. It had no means whatever of meeting them. Between that date and the Armistice it borrowed from the American Government to pay for absolute necessities of life and warfare' not far short of £1,000,000,000, while the other Allies borrowed roughly another £1,000,000,000. If we could picture to our imaginations what these figures meant, when translated into munitions of war, food, ships and so on, we should begin to realize what would have been the effect on our operations of going without them—as well as without American naval and military co-operation itself. Regarded from this aspect alone, tho unlimited submarine warfare of the Germans was one of the most colossal mistakes in history. The financial blockade, which circumstances would have imposed on us, would have been more effective, by itself, than was the submarine blockade after the United States had come in."
The main causes of this crisis were the reckless expenditure of the British Government in America and the reluctance of the American capitalist to invest in foreign securities. Mr. Brand's significant comments on the outcome, had not America come into the War, deserve attention. His articles on the question of reparation, on the need for thrift and hard work and on the folly of strikes, are admirable. If Labour leaders did not suppose themselves to be omniscient, we should recommend them to read the book attentively. Other people at any rate may profit by Mr. Brand's wise and temperate advice.
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