THE STATE OF EGYPT.
SIR ELDON GORST, in his annual Report on the con- dition of Egypt, writes with a frankness which does him no small credit. Speaking generally, or, rather, politi- cally, the Report is a confession of failure : failure, however, not as regards the prosperity of Egypt or the welfare of her people, nor, again, personal failure on the part of Sir Eldon Gorst, but failure as regards the attempt of the present Government to carry out so-called Liberal principles in the administration of Egypt. The Liberal Party as a whole, like the Liberal Government, have, of course, no in- tention of abandoning our work in Egypt or of handing Egypt back to Turkey. Bemused, however, by the talk of Socialistic winter visitors to Egypt about "the iron despotism of Lord Cromer" and "the cruelty and wickedness of stamp- ing out every budding germ of democratic sentiment in the breasts of the Egyptian fellaheen," the Liberal Party deter- mined to make a beginning in giving the people some of the blessings of self-government and of representative institu- tions. Word was passed to the British rulers of Egypt that they were to make haste to train the people of the Nile Valley in the duties of self-governing citizens. Not only was British control to be kept as far as possible in the back- ground, but more initiative was to be given to the Legislative Council and the General Assembly. Sir Eldon Gorst, as was his duty as a Foreign Office official, loyally carried out the principles of his chiefs—action for which no blame can attach to him. The result has been, as we felt cer- tain it would be, and indeed pointed out that it must be, com- plete failure. When we say this we assume that the true goal of British rule in Egypt is not to further any par- ticular set of principles, whether they be suited or unsuited to an Oriental country, but to govern Egypt in the interests of the governed—that is, to give the Egyptian people the government which will afford them the maximum of security and personal liberty, which will decrease that extreme poverty which is the mark of all Oriental countries, and will secure their material progress and development. Further, and as a secondary object, we ought, as far as possible, to employ native instruments in the work of government, or, to use a convenient formula, " British brains should work through Egyptian hands." The final word must always be with the British authorities, and our supervision must be close and effective. The actual administration should, however, as far as possible, be carried out by natives. The failure of the attempt to combine this ideal with the spread of representative institutions and Liberal prin- ciples is so well described in Sir Eldon Gorst's own words that we cannot do better than quote them. It is interest- ing to note that once more the paradoxical nature of all things Oriental is emphasised. But Egypt is the most paradoxical part of the paradoxical East. In trying to develop native representative institutions in Egypt we find that we were directly striking at the native Ministry, and effectually undermining the practical policy of "Egypt for the Egyptians.' As Sir Eldon Gorst points out, if we are to carry on the policy of co-operating with native Ministers—that is, of using native instruments—we cannot encourage representative institutions :— "The conclusion to be drawn is that the policy of ruling this country in co-operation with native Ministers is, at the present time, incompatible with that of encouraging the development of so-called representative institutions. Even from the single stand. point of paying attention to the wishes of the ruled, there can be no doubt as to which of these two courses should be preferred. The Ministers are chosen from amongst the most capable Egyptians, and are better acquainted with the real desires and opinions of their countrymen than the members of a council who, in reality, represent nothing but the class of wealthy bays and pashas, and are, moreover, unable to resist any spurious agitation which may be manufactured by a few interested parties. Institu- tions really representative of the people are obviously impossible in a country in which, out of a population of over 11,000,000, only 600,000 can read and write."
The passage in which Sir Eldon Gorst dwells upon the reasons of the failure is so striking that we must indulge in a further quotation :— " In my view the principal and sufficient reason has been that from first to last the adoption of this policy has been attributed both by the Egyptians and by the local European Colonies to weakness, to an attempt to pacify the nationalist agitation by ill- timed concessions, and to an intentional diminution of British authority. It is not my purpose here to dwell upon the manifest absurdity of this legend, which has been industriously circulated by many whose motives are not above suspicion But there is no doubt that the motives of our action in endeavouring to meet the reasonable desires of the Egyptians, coupled with our tradi- tional policy of keeping British control as far as possible in the background, were misinterpreted, and led to the erroneous impres, sion that the aspirations of those who are in favour of the imme- diate establishment of full representative government would be furthered by an agitation directed against the British occupation. This being the chief cause why our recent policy has not produced the results which might otherwise have reasonably been anticipated from it, the course for the immediate future is fairly simple and obvious. We have to make the Egyptians understand that his Majesty's Government do not intend to allow themselves to be hustled into going farther or faster in the direction of self-govern- ment than they consider to be in the interests of the Egyptian people as a whole. Until this elementary lesson has been thoroughly learnt, no proposals for further developing the Legis- lative Council can be usefully entertained. The experience of the last few years shows that the axiom that British policy will not be moved from the right course by agitation or violence, either from the one side or the other, is not easily grasped. In the past, mere words and declarations have not proved sufficient for the purpose. Within the feeble measure of my means I have done my beat, in my recent annual Reports, to impress upon the members of the Legislative Council the fact that no extension of the func- tions of the Council is possible until it is clear that such a course can be adopted without danger to the well-being of the com- munity. This counsel has so far fallen on unheeding ears."
Sir Eldon Gorst, as an official, has very properly refrained from " rubbing in " the unwisdom of the action taken by the Home Government. That is perfectly right for him. We, however, who are in a position of less responsibility ana greater freedom, may give a specific example. The Egyptian Government prepared, in conjunction with the Suez Canal Company, an excellent scheme for the readjustment of the Canal Company's concession. The scheme was very favour- able to the Egyptian Government, and would have given them the immediate command of a large annual sum of money to be used in the development of Egypt. The Home Government approved, but, in obedience to their academie view of Liberal principles, they insisted that the scheme should be submitted to the Legislative Council. The result was what might have been expected from a body which has neither knowledge nor sense of responsibility, and which certainly has not a truly representative character. Partly coerced by the bogus Nationalist agitation outside, partly act- ing from a desire to show their power, partly out of dislike of the British who prevent the upper-class Egyptians from exploiting their natural prey, the lower-class Egyptians, and partly also from pure inability to understand the com- plicated financial arrangements, the Legislative Council threw away the result of very careful negotiation between the representatives of the Company and the financial experts of the Egyptian Government. They rejected the scheme with contumely, and encouraged the Nationalist out- cry that Egypt must be saved from ruin by British tyrants.
By this means a plan which was very much for the benefit of Egypt came to nothing. The Homo Government, which was, of course, well aware of the advantages of the scheme and had approved of it, were apparently content to say that if the Egyptian people did not like what was for their good they had a right to reject it. In our opinion this was an utterly false and sophistical way of looking at the matter. Just as well might a trustee allow a foolish cestui que trust to reject a scheme very greatly to his benefit. It was the business of the trustee—that is, of the British Government—not to do what the cestui que wanted, or some- one masquerading as the cestui que was supposed to want, but to do the best for the people of Egypt. The result was a great weakening for a time of British influence in Egypt, and a great blow to the Egyptian Ministry, who were thoroughly in favour of the scheme. What the Government should have done is obvious. They might,if they had liked, have submitted the scheme for the observations of the Legislative Council, but they should never have ex- posed a plan which they firmly believed to be for the benefit of Egypt (else they would not have produced it) to the veto of a fantastic body of which it can truly be said that it usurps the forms without the substance of repre- sentation, and indulges the licence, without the temper, of democracy.
Sir Eldon Gorst's answer to those who declare that the Copts are not being fairly treated is, in our opinion, quite satisfactory. It is our business in every part of the world which we control to protect minorities. In India, where the Mohammedans are in a minority, we are under a special obligation to see that they do not suffer at the hands of the Hindoos who out- number them so very greatly. We do not want to pamper them or make them the spoilt children of the British Raj, but we must see to it that they suffer nothing through our rule in India. In the same way as the Copts are in a minority in Egypt (a minority with much less power of self-preservation than the Mohammedans in India) we must see to it that they, too, have special protection and that their full rights are secured. We believe that the Copts do obtain from us this minority protection. It happens, however, that they are not as a race endowed with the qualities of command. Therefore they cannot always be advanced to high administrative positions. No ban, however, is placed upon them, and when, as in the case of Butros Pasha, they show exceptional ability, the highest posts in the country are open to them. Butros, the Copt, was first Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Prime Minister. He would have been the first to admit that he always received not only fair play but full protection from the British controllers of Egypt. To make Copts who are not fit for the position Mudirs of provinces would be absurd—provided, of course, that our object is to rule Egypt wisely and well and in the interest of the governed, and not to play a game with certain strict rules and forfeits—forfeits paid always, be it remembered, by the Egyptian peasant. Though Sir Eldon Gorst's Report is a confession of failure as regards the policy which the Liberal Government when they first came into power attempted to apply to Egypt, it is happily not in any sense a confession of administrative disaster. Though some harm has been done, that harm is in no sense irrevocable, and the prospects for our rule in Egypt for the future are not dim. Happily, Sir Edward Grey, though he appears to have shared the notion that Liberal principles might be profitably exported to Egypt, is possessed in practice of the sound Whig tradition of never pushing things too far. Though a most sincere—nay, extreme—Radical inprinciple, he is never rash in action. Accordingly he insisted on the attempt in Egypt being tentative and gradual. He would not plunge into the morass, but only put one foot in to try whether it was really true that the muttering of certain democratic and rhetorical spells over the bog would produce a hard crust upon which it would be safe to walk. When he found his foot went in as into melted butter, and that the crust would not bear a kitten, he, like a wise man, withdrew his foot, and, in doing so, has been backed up by his col- leagues. The experiment has been tried and has failed, and there is no further fear, while Sir Edward Grey is at the Foreign Office, of foolish experiments in the future. Egypt will henceforth be governed in the interests of the governed, and not on abstract principles.
Oriental peoples want justice and good government, free- dom from oppression, and low taxation just as much as do European nations. What they do not want, though some of them sometimes talk nonsense about it, is representative institutions and so-called self-government. Conceivably every Oriental would like to be a despot and rule his fellow man, but for the notion of sharing the sovereignty with several million other people he has no use. We personally think him wrong, dislike his ideals, and believe in sharing sovereignty on democratic principles ; but, then, we happen to be Westerners, not men of the Orient. It is a different ideal. The fact that ours is the higher one may be true, but that does not make it any more acceptable to the men of the East. Every Oriental is a fatalist, and fatalism is a powerful non-conductor of democratic fervour.
Perhaps it will be said that Lord Cromer never barred out the possibility of establishing representative institu- tions in Egypt as completely as we have done. We admit that Lord Cromer, in his great work on Egypt, is not dog- matic on the point, but, at any rate, he was always most emphatic against " rushing " reforms in Egypt, and in practice refused absolutely to worship at the shrine of political abstractions. We recall the striking words used by him in his farewell speech. It is thus the wisest of Imperial administrators deals with those who wanted to force the pace :- " The difference of opinion between my opponents, especially those in England, and myself is really not so much one of principle as one of degree. They wish to gallop. I consider that a steady jog trot is the pace best suited to advance the interests of this country. It is a pace which has done us good service in the past. I say it should be continued, never re- laxing into a walk or breaking into a gallop; and my strong con- viction is that if the pace be greatly mended a serious risk will be incurred that the horse will come down and break its knees."
How very near the horse came to breaking its knees a year ago was not known, and is not yet known, to the general public. Since, however, the danger is past and the Government have learnt their lesson, there is no harm in alluding to the perils from which we so narrowly escaped
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