We do not wish to exaggerate the importance of these
inci- dents. Had the French originally said that they meant to annex Madagascar, and that they then intended to apply to the island their own fiscal system irrespective of external consideraa tions, we should have had to determine whether we thought it worth while to fight about the matter, and probably should have acquiesced. We cannot, however, allow France first to obtain our consent to a protectorate, and then to annexation, on the understanding that certain things would not be done, and then to break her word without giving us any redress or even any sort of explanation. No nation can permit itself to be treated in such a way as that without being exposed to fresh injury. We have dealt at length with the whole subject elsewhere, and can only say here that we think Lord Salisbury was perfectly right to raise the question while we were debating other matters with France. It was too serious an incident to ignore, and must therefore be included in the coming negotiations with France,—negotiations which we devoutly trust will place our relations with that country on a firm and friendly basis, but which cannot leave them as they are.
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