TOPICS OF THE DAY.
FRANCE AND ENGLAND. THE publication of the Madagascar despatches last Saturday is a very grave fact, for those despatches show that France violated an engagement deliberately made with us, and when she was specifically reminded of her pledges, gave no explanation of her conduct, but preserved a complete silence. When incidents of this kind happen between nations it is impossible to regard the situation but as one for grave anxiety. In certain quarters Lord Salisbury has been reproached for having thrown down another apple of discord. Even if France is very much in the wrong, wby should he, it has been urged, choose the moment when France is smarting in regard to Fashoda to bring up what is after all a minor matter ? Considering that the Madagascar incident has waited since last July, why could it not wait a little longer ? In our opinion those who argue thus, and blame Lord Salisbury for bringing our just cause of complaint in Madagascar to the front, are making a capital error,— granted, which of course must be granted, that they want to see our relations with France established on a really sound basis. We have, it seems to us, come to a point in our relations with France when it is necessary to arrive at a real and honest clearing up of all doubtful points. We cannot any longer afford to deal with each point as it arises, and in isolation from other points. Such a scheme of action does very well when, though two Powers have clashing interests, it is perfectly clear and perfectly well understood that both sides desire to keep on friendly terms. Under different circumstances the only safe plan is plainly and without reserve to raise all pending dis- putes together, and try to set one off against the other. For example, what would be the use of trying to settle the problem of the Upper Nile Valley when the day after that settlement it would be necessary to bring on the questions of Madagascar and of Newfoundland ? We know what is the result of such piecemeal negotiations by the example of West Africa. Last spring, after a great deal of heated negotiation, we obtained a settlement of the Niger contro- versy. But that settlement did not in the least improve our relations with France, for while she was making it a French expedition was on its way to enter territory which we had meet solemnly and specifically warned France could not be entered by her without an act being committed which we should regard as " unfriendly,"—i.e., as constituting, if maintained, a casus belli. We did not, that is, by settling the Niger question in the least improve the situation, but left the French Government as willing as ever to injure us in Africa. That being so, it is clearly better that we should now raise every doubtful problem, and find out once and for all whether France means to live at peace with us.
We shall not attempt here to suggest in detail how a general understanding might be arrived at. But it is clear that with goodwill on both sides there should be no insuperable difficulty in the matter of the Upper Nile, Madagascar, or Newfoundland,—the three chief points of contact between us and France. In the case of Madagascar we do not want to exaggerate the actual damage done to British interests. If we were given reasonable compensation we do not suppose that Lord Salisbury would refuse to agree to France applying to the island any fiscal policy she chose. But it must be clearly understood that we are not going to allow our clear and undoubted rights to be violated as France has violated them. If France wishes to apply in Madagascar the fiscal policy which she applies in Havre or Marseilles, she must enter upon negotiations with England for the purpose,—asking us to give up com- mercial rights which France voluntarily agreed to recog- nise and respect. France has no more claim to ignore our rights in Madagascar than we have to ignore those which she possesses in Newfoundland. The fact that France should have first recognised, and then ignored, our rights in Madagascar is, indeed, a sign of how unfriendly her acts have been. As our readers know, we are not to be reckoned among those who think that we ought to forbid foreign Powers to annex barbarous territory unless they agree to act in accordance with our fiscal views, and give us the same trade rights which we enjoyed under native rule. That appears to us to be much too wide and arbitrary a demand. We prefer to treat each case on its merits, and incline to the principle that we should interfere as little as possible with the fiscal affairs of our neighbours. The case of Madagascar, however, is not one where the principle of letting France do what she will with her own can be applied offhand. Had France in the year 1890, when she assumed the protectorate, chosen simply to conquer and annex, and so to take the fullest responsibility, we do not think that we ought to, and, further, we do not think that we should, have gone to war to prevent her doing so,—i.e., annexing, and doing what she would with her own. France, however, did not choose to burden herself with this responsibility, and to incur the difficulties which the passive hostility of our Government, and also of our traders, would no doubt have caused her. Accord- ingly, she only proclaimed a protectorate, and, in effect, took over and confirmed to us the trade rights we enjoyed with the natives. When France in 1895 decided to conquer and annex, she might again, had she liked to run the risks, have claimed to do what she would with her own. But she did not care to run the risks, and to see us proclaiming our neutrality, and so very greatly encouraging the natives. Accordingly, she again pur- chased our acquiescence by declaring that under the new regime our trade-rights would be respected. Now she repudiates her engagements, and treats our traders as if she had acquired the kind of free hand which she would have obtained had she boldly conquered Madagascar without making any engagements with any other Power. Here, then, we are not forcing our trade polioy—the best policy for all parties, we fully acknowledge—as the Cobden Club appears to desire, upon an annexing Power, but doing a very different thing,—i.e., holding France bound to engagements which she voluntarily entered into in her own interests. Clearly this is a case where France ought either to be held to her bond, or else made to give proper compensation if we allow her to repudiate her engagements. As we have said above, we cannot go into the details of a possible " all-round" agreement, but we trust that Lord Salisbury will try rather to bring in as many outstanding points as possible than to limit negotia- tions merely to the burning questions. For example, we should like to see the Egyptian and Tunisian questions— not forgetting Bizerte— introduced, and an understanding arrived at, if possible, as to the ultimate fate of Morocco.
These matters, however, must necessarily remain abso- lutely in Lord Salisbury's hands. Only one man un- fettered by external interference is likely to handle successfully a problem such as that which now confronts us. Fortunately, we have in Lord Salisbury a man fully equipped for the great task before him. Think for a moment of the unique position which he occupies. He is Prime Minister as well as Foreign Secretary, and also the most experienced and most respected diplo- matist in Europe,—no one even suspecting him or accusing him of being personally ambitious, arbitrary, or aggressive. He has next in an unusual degree the confidence of all his colleagues, and he has the support of the non-Jingo, as well as of the Jingo, elements in the Opposition, for no one regards him as a swashbuckler. Lastly, he has, and knows he has, physical force on his side. It would be idle to pretend that the French Fleet, good as it is, and gallant as are the men who man it, could stand up against our ships. The naval war must go in our favour, the French Navy being either destroyed or laid up. But on land we are not vulnerable to the attack of France. Therefore Lord Salisbury has the confidence which goes with the knowledge that, if it comes to war, it must be France that will suffer most. In the case of some men this knowledge would be dangerous. The ambitious man might be intoxicated by the thought of his power. The logical statesman might be tempted to hold too strongly that those who are in the weaker position will always give way to those in the stronger. Fortunately, Lord Salis- bury is neither ambitious nor a logic-monger, and will not allow the tremendous power he wields to demoralise him in the slightest degree. In truth, and England may be thankful for it, the man is worthy of his position. His is a wise and temperate nature, but not a weak one. He does not always care for the same things that his countrymen care for, and sometimes values at very little what they esteem of the deepest moment. Hence he has been called weak and timid. But if, and when, he believes a matter to be vital, and so worth fighting for, he will not yield a hair's-breadth. In the present situation he is eminently the man to be trusted. Depend upon it, his view of what is vital will be a sound one, and to that view he will adhere at all costs. We ask our countrymen, therefore, to trust Lord Salisbury, and to trust him in this matter implicitly and not half- heartedly. He will not fight France unless it is really neceseE .y to maintain our rights by war, and unless there is no other way out. If he does not fight France, that is, if he finds a peaceful solution we may be sure that he will have done so without injuring our essential interests or sacrificing the honour and self-respect of the nation.
Previous page
