Nothing could be more 'disastrous' to the conduct of military
operations than anything which encouraged the Germans to believe that by these raids they could excite such a clamour in this country that the Government could not resist the demand for the withdrawal of aeroplanes from the front. If the aeroplanes could be provided both for the front and for -our defence against–raids; that would. of course -be done. If not, the Army must. come first, and it was vitally important that the Germans should know it. They were just as alive to the importance of supremacy in the air as we were, and had put forth prodigious efforts in the last twelve months, but the Government's information was that the German capacity of production was not adequate to compete with the provision we had made. Hitherto the increase had only been gradual, but our pro- duction was now going up by leaps and bounds. In the ensuing debate there was some criticism- from Mr. Joynson-Hieks, Sir H. Dalziel, and others, while Lord • Hugh. Cecil maintained that the air problem was a wholly military problem, and that the judgment of the military experts ought to prevail.
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