Sin,-Twolrecent articles in the Berlin Press deserve, I think, some
attention from your readers. The first is an attempt on the part of the Conservative Beichsbote to show that an increase in the German Fleet is not, or rather would not be, a menace. From the events in the Far East the lesson is drawn that a fleet destined only for protective purposes must nevertheless be able to take the sea, and must have absolute supremacy in its home waters. There has been, thinks the journal, too much insistence, both in Parliament and elsewhere, on the theory that Germany's naval require- ments are limited to a small fleet capable of protecting the coast in combination with the forts. A fleet tied down to a protected basis is exposed to serious dangers, because the enemy always knows- where to find it, and can demoralise its personnel by constant night attacks. The German Fleet must therefore be stronger than the Russian Far Eastern squadron, stronger than any naval force which France could send against her neighbour, and must not show too great a disparity with the English Channel Squadron (sic !) It is pointed out that the available naval force of England has a very wide area to cover, and that only about half its strength could be used for offensive purposes, and that therefore the German Fleet must be able to cope with half the English naval force. But the writer concludes with the remark that the building of a fleet able to show supremacy in its own waters is not equivalent to preparation for offensive measures. Such measures would be advanced by the existence of a more than equal German fleet in the waters of the prospective opponent, and Germany is little likely to reach that point. Protection alone is desired, but protection necessitates maritime supremacy in home waters. This is, I believe, the first reasoned suggestion that the German home fleet is not sufficient for defensive purposes, and it shows how carefully the lessons of the naval struggle in the Far East are being studied in Germany. But it is noteworthy that the writer does not suggest a two-Power standard. He regards either France or England as a possible opponent-not both together-and he clearly supposes that the initiative will hot-nay, cannot-come from Germany in case war should break out. The second article, to which I should like to refer is a long discussion in the Tageblatt of the Tibetan Expedition. The writer explains the vital necessity which compels England to prevent Russian encroachment on the glacis of India, and observes that there is no doubt that Russia, having taken Manchuria from the. Chinese "in Asiatic brotherliness," moved from the• North-East towards the coveted land of the Dalai Lama. But the noteworthy feature of the article comes ut the end. Endeavouring to decide what interest the Tibetan question has for Germany, the writer gives it as his opinion that from the German point of view it is most desirable that the English and Russian Powers should be as nearly as possible balanced. A Russian occupation of Tibet would not disturb that balance to any serious, extent; but when at some future date Tibet is opened up to competitive trade ' Germany would have little to gain from a Russian occupa- tion. Here, as in Manchuria, sooner or later Russia would close the door to German. trade. " Sooner or later the time will come when Russian enterprise and Russian industry will be sufficiently strengthened with the aid of a protective system that does not look back to drive our competition out of the field." In any case, the writer thinks that Germany Las no reason to take up a hostile attitude towards " perfide Albion" for the sake of Russia's fair eyes. That attitude would only confirm the English belief in German hostility ; and it is extremely doubtful whether, in gratitude for such Platonic friendship, Russia would lay aside her deep-rooted illwill against her old German teacher. It was observed at the beginning of the war that sooner or later German distrust of Russia would come to the surface, although it was for the time overlaid with the polish of official goodwill. It would appear that that time has come. It is worth noting that there is no longer any talk of Russia as the protagonist of West against East, but a clear acknowledgment that against Germany, as against the rest of the world, Russia will close the door when
and if she can.—I am, Sir, &c., C. T.
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