THE FATE OF THE VOLUNTEERS.
IT is greatly to be hoped that the Government will not much longer allow the fate of the Volunteers to remain in suspense. When, about a fortnight ago, the Press was full of rumours that the Government plan for reorganising the Auxiliary Forces was to include a great reduction in the Militia and Volunteers, as well as the reduction already announced in the case of the Yeomanry, we hoped that we should at once hear of a peremptory denial on the part of the Government, and that the scheme would either be abandoned or else be proved never to have existed. The absence of any such authoritative denial, the open letter on the subject addressed by Sir Howard Vincent to the Prime Minister, and the article headed " The Menaced Volunteers " published in the Daily Express of Wednesday all point, however, to the fact that a reduction in the numbers of the Auxiliaries is still contemplated. It is true that the Daily Express states that the Prime Minister is going " to consult with his colleagues upon the question of the future of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers "—a somewhat curious formula, considering that all questions of im- portance come before the Cabinet—and that he has " agreed to hear their case against any reduction of the forces and against the decision not to grant the Auxiliaries a separate Department for administration." But though the announcement is made in a somewhat puzzling form, we trust that we are not unduly sanguine in hoping that it indicates that the Prime Minister is beginning to grow alive to public opinion in regard to this matter, and to realise how full of peril is the policy of reducing the Auxiliaries. The Volunteer movement has already received a heavy blow in the failure of the Govern- ment to keep the pledge made in 1900 by Mr. George Wyndham that the Auxiliary Forces should be placed under a separate Department. If this is to be followed by a policy of reduction, the movement which has done so much for the nation may be injured beyond repair. Fortunately, the final decision is in the hands of the country, and we believe that if once it can be made to realise the trend of the War Office policy in regard to the Volunteers, it will insist that this policy shall not be carried out. It will require that the Volunteers, instead of being reduced in numbers, and given a place in the War Office organisation which must in the end impair their true efficiency, shall receive treatment from the War Office authorities which will maintain, or even increase, their numbers, give them an organisation which will be ap- propriate to their needs, and make them efficient civilian soldiers rather than inefficient imitation Regulars. When the Auxiliaries, and especially the Volunteers, as we know them to-day, are attacked ; when we are told that they are not efficient, that they are not worth the money spent on them, and that the only way to make them of any use to the State will be to reduce their quantity and in- crease their quality, we would ask our readers to remember what the Volunteers did for us in the crisis of the South African War. The figures are well set out in Sir Howard Vincent's open letter to Mr. Balfour. - " The Militia gave to the Regular Army 14,000 men of the Militia Reserve, besides 1,981 young officers and 40,000 recruits ; and to the Field or Oversee Force 1,691 officers and 43,875 rank and file— a total Militia contribution of 3,572 officers and 97,875 non-commissioned officers and men. The condemned Yeomanry furnished 224 officers and 2,789 men to the Imperial Yeomanry for South Africa, and from that nucleus obtained 1,393 officers and 34,127 men, of whom 6,902 came from the Volunteer Force. And the Volun- teers sent to South Africa 594 officers and 19,255 men, exclusive of the 6,902 who joined the Imperial Yeomanry, a total of 26,757." Considering these figures, can we feel that Sir Howard Vincent's comment is unreasonable ? It runs as follows : " After a contribution, therefore, to the Field Force of 5,659 officers and 141,257 non-commissioned officers and men by the Auxiliary Forces, without the slightest legal, or indeed moral, necessity (except in the case of the Militia Reserve), it seems strange that to-day the Auxiliary Forces should be compelled to appeal to Parliament to obtain fair recognition, not alone of their value, but of their needs from the military authorities." If at the crisis of the South African War the Auxiliary. Forces had proved of little or no value, and if they had been found incapable of supplying us with any addition to our army in the field, there would have been a very strong case for saying that our whole Auxiliary Force must be reorganised and developed on different lines. When, on the contrary, the results were on the whole satisfactory, surely the wise thing would have been to say :—" The Auxiliary Forces have proved of great help in a difficult crisis, and therefore they shall be retained and developed on the old lines. The only change shall be to give them more sym- pathetic and generous treatment than before." Instead, the treatment given to the Auxiliaries since the war has been less, not more, sympathetic. To begin with, the Auxiliaries have been deprived of that independent Depart.4 ment which they were promised, and in a modified measure enjoyed for a short time ; and next, the Force is threatened with a reduction in numbers which, whether intended or not, will be taken by the Volunteers, at any rate, as an intimation that their services are not appreciated, and that they are looked upon as an incubus rather than a help by the military authorities. As we said a fortnight ago, the War Office argument as applied to the Auxiliaries seems to run as follows :—" The Auxiliary Forces proved invaluable during the war. It is our duty to prepare for future wars. Therefore we will immensely reduce the Auxiliary Forces." It will be for the nation to decide whether they will allow this War Office idea, of logic to be applied to the Auxiliaries, or whether they will not insist on the more reasonable view that, the Auxiliaries having done such good service in the war, we ought to develop and improve them so that in the next time of need they will do even better.
How, it will be asked, can the Auxiliaries be improved ? We believe that by giving them an appropriate organisa- tion they can be made into a force which wilt constitute an immense increase in the military strength of the nation. It may be useful to sketch in outline how this might be done. In the first place, we would take the Militia Force far more seriously than they have been taken hitherto. We would pay them better, and so increase their numbers and improve their personnel. We would next, wherever possible, arrange that the recruit training should be carried out under conditions which would allow the men to live in their own houses, and only come into barracks to be drilled or to learn the use of the rifle. This would be perfectly easy in the case of town regi- ments, and could, we believe, be managed even in the case of many county battalions by making the company the unit. The month's training would, of course, as now, take place under canvas. The Militia should also have a true Reserve, the terms of enlistment being, say, four years with the colours and three with the Reserve. We need hardly add that the training of Militia officers should be improved, and the regiments be given regimental transport. In the case of the Volunteers, the object should be, not to spend more money and time on making them into what we have called imitation Regulars, but to give them an appropriate organisation. Compulsory camps should be abolished, but attendance at camp should be facilitated and encouraged. In a word, the conditions should be made as elastic as possible, and the general efficiency of the regiment should be looked to rather than a mechanical test of efficiency be set up as regards individuals. At the same time, everything should be done to develop good shooting. Regiments should be provided with regimental transport. This should be done, however, not by giving Government waggons and horses, but by the Colonels being encouraged to make arrangements locally for the use of waggons and horses after the excellent model provided by Colonel Sturmy Cave in his Volunteer battalion. In regard to the Yeomanry, we are glad to think that very little need for change exists. Care, however, should be taken here, also, not to make the regulations too exacting. In the case of civilian soldiers too strict rules drive out the busy men, who nevertheless are often the most valuable. The men who find it easiest to comply with strict regulations are the men who are least in demand elsewhere.
Plenty more, did space allow, could be said against the folly of cutting down the Auxiliary Forces, and striving to break them on the Procrustean bed of the Regular soldier's ideals. We must, however, on the present occasion be content with urging once more the three points which form the subject of this article. The first is that every effort must be made to induce the Government to keep Mr. Wyndham's pledge that the Auxiliaries should be placed under a separate Department. Next, there must be no reduction in the numbers of the Auxiliary Forces. Finally, the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers must be developed till they can supply us with a force of all arms which will do three things : (1) provide for home defence; (2) provide a reservoir from which, as in the case of the South African War, a large force can be drawn off for oversea fighting ; and (3) provide a school of arms for that part of the manhood of the nation which does not become either professional soldiers or sailors.
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