THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR.* IT is a

matter of common knowledge that when General Kuropatkin returned from his disastrous campaign in Man- aerie. be lost no time in compiling a history which was promptly suppressed by the Russian authorities. A few extracts appeared some time ago in McClure's Magazine, and were followed a little later by a German precis, It was not, however, until the appearance of the English translation of the fourth and part of the third volumes that it was possible to form any opinion as to the value of General Kuropatkiu'e contribution to the literature of the war. Even now the earlier part is missing, but it is understood that it is taken up with a detailed account of the Russian movements at the battles of Liao-yang, the Sha Ho, and Mukden. It can, therefore, hardly be doubted that the more interesting portions have been selected, and the work of both translator and editor leaves nothing to be desired.

It is as yet impossible to estimate the importance of the Russo-Japanese War, but it seems safe to say that it will be recognised as one of the really decisive events in the world's history.. A book written by one of the chief actors in such a drama cannot, therefore, be devoid of interest, but the General's treatment of his subject has gone very near to making it so. Apparently the author sot out to prove three things,—first, that for some years he was against Russia's expansion in the Far East ; secondly, that during the war he had to contend against almost insuperable difficulties; thirdly, that had the war gone on all might have been retrieved, because the Russian forces were only then beginning to realise their own strength.

The views of a Minister of War, a position which General Kuropatkin filled from 1898 to 1903, upon the foreign policy of his country must always be of interest, particularly when, as in this case, original documents are quoted ; but, after all, that is a sphere in which he must subordinate himself to his colleagues. It is therefore to the military portion of the book that the attention of the general reader is naturally drawn. At first sight it might appear that General Kuropatkin succeeds in establishing his contention that nothing short of rare military genius could have extricated Russia from a predicament into which she had been drawn by a reckless foreign policy. But the student who would really wish to inform himself on the military problems will do well to • The Russian Arm and the Javanese War: being Historical and Critical COnwnsais on the Afilitary roliay and Power of Enssia and on tau Campaign in the Far East. ]iy General Kuropatkin. Translated by Captain A. S. Lindsay, Edited by Major E. D. Swinton, D.S.O., B.E. With Maps and Illustrations. St vols. Landon: Jelin Murray. [f,8s. nut,]

compare General Kuropetkin's statements with the various

official accounts, English, Austrian, and German, which have been published. Unfortunately none of these three histories has as yet reached the battle of the Sha Ho Or

Mukden, and only the German covers the battle of Liao- yang. But even so, it is possible to form some idea of the

amount of reliance to be placed upon General Kuropatkin. Take, for instance, the well-known question of Zarnbaeff's retreat after the battle of Ta-shih•chiao. Kuropatkin says that after winning a tactical success Zarubaeff, "who was given general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force to Hai-cheng." From this passage it might be apprehended that General Zarubaeff had received " general instructions" to beat the Japanese at Ta-shih-chiao should he be able to do so, and that in the choice of method he was given a free hand. Such an attempt to cast blame upon a subordinate must always arouse suspicion, and it is more than probable that the true explanation of this retreat was Kuropatkin's own lack of decision :— " After many hesitations," says the German official history, "General Kuropatkin had finally decided to make a stand sit Ta-shih-ohiao, to gain time on the one band, and on the other to maintain as long as possible connexion with the important port of Ying-kow, at the same time, however, holding to the idea of offering a really obstinate resistance only at Hai-cheng."

Until the Commander-in-Chief's orders to his subordinate are published it will be impossible to say who was the responsible person ; but all the evidence which is at present available

seems to show that a large share of blame rests upon the former.

The whole book teems with similar attempts to show that defeat was brought about by causes over which General Kuropatkin bad little or no control :—

" Nowadays," he says in a letter to the Czar, "with the com- plicated machinery of modern armies, the personality of the commander is less important than it was. Without trusty, able, and energetic subordinates, without a spirit of initiation among all ranks . . . . . . the duty of a Commander-in-Chief is so difficult that it is far too much for a merely talented loader."

The bare statement is true enough; but were General Kurd- patkin's tools all so bad as he makes out, or was the workman somewhat less skilful than he would have us believe ? Even granting that all his complaints are justifiable, it should not be forgotten that no man of modern times has had so great a share in moulding the Russian Army as be who makes them, and the complaints of Kuropatkin the Commander-in-Chief are but an indictment of Kuropatkin the Minister of War; Among the many causes to which defeat is attributed was the system under which now units were constantly sent oat, while well-tried regiments were allowed to dwindle for want of drafts. The complaint is an old one, for the system has been found wanting as often as it has been subjected to the strain of war. But the system of the Russian Army had grown under the writer's own hand.

But granting everything that the author of this work tells us ; granting that the railway failed to come up to he expectations, although it did far more than any one outside Russia believed possible, what do we find ? What we are led to believe is that General Kuropatkin, fighting against almost superhuman difficulties, was forced back by superior numbers until, shortly before the declaration of peace, he at last got together and organised an army with which victory might have been won. The truth is far otherwise. As early as the end of the third week in. August, 1904, the much- maligned railway had enabled a hundred and seventy-nine battalions of infantry to be massed for the defence of Liao- yang in a position upon which much skill and labour had been expended. To drive this force from its trenches Marshal Oyama had under his command only eight divisions and some reserve troops, perhaps a hundred and twenty battalions in all. Even allowing that the Russian army began the battle with a shortage of fifteen thousand men, as stated, there is still a wide margin in its favour. Yet the mere threat of General Kuroki's crossing to the north bank of the Tai-tzu was sufficient to make General Kuropatkin withdraw his: unbeaten troops from in front of General Oku and the Second Army. Seldom indeed has any commander been offered a finer chance of retrieving his mistakes than that which presented itself to General Kuropatkin on the evening of August 81st, 1904. Yet his action is justified by the simple method of overstating the strength of his enemy. The numbers available to meet the Japanese turning move- ment were, we are told, only fifty thousand to fifty-five thousand rifles. " Kuroki's army, on the other hand, was calculated to number approximately sixty-five thousand to seventy thousand men." Fortunately Sir Ian Hamilton's published reports and the German official history enable us to check these figures, and from these it is clear that on the morning of September 1st General Kuroki bad on the north bank of the river not more than two divisions of regular infantry and some reserve battalions. " It will be for the future historian to decide," says General Kuropatkin, 4' whether the troops we put into the field before March, 1905, would have sufficed for victory." Unless we are greatly mistaken, the future historian will find ample evidence in this war to prove that to-day, as in the past, "in war what is wanted is not men but a man."

It would not be difficult to multiply instances showing that in many cases when blame is thrown upon subordinate officers, or even upon private soldiers, the Commander-in-Chief was himself the principal offender. But the task of hitting the man who is down can never be agreeable, and it would be pleasant to believe that General Kuropatkin was more sinned against than sinning. There are, however, other reputations to be considered, and of far greater importance than the fame of any individual is the good name of the Russian Army. It is, of course, the case, as the author impresses upon us, that even at the close of the war Russia had put forth only one- seventh of her fighting force, whereas Japan was almost at the end of her resources. But although in war numbers go for much, the spirit which inspires an army goes fot' more.

A. casual perusal of General Kuropatkin's memoirs would certainly produce the impression that the men under his command were lamentably deficient in the martial instinct ; but here again there is reason to believe that he is something loss than just. No doubt his statements are true, but they are not the whole truth ; and even when acknowledging that some of his regiments fought well, he seems to speak grudgingly. At the very beginning of the battle of Liao-yang, a battalion of the 23rd East Siberians held its ground against greatly superior numbers. until it had lost more than three-fifths of its strength. Indeed, every battle, and more particularly the defence of Port Arthur, proves amply that the Russian Army contains material to which any nation in the world might point with pride ; and it is impossible not to feel that it would have been more gracious for the Commander-in-Chief to lay stress upon the many glorious deeds which were performed rather than upon those which reflect less credit on the Russian nation. Even for those incidents blame does not come well from General Kuropatkin, and, to quote once more the excellent chapter of comments with which Mr. Karl von Donat's translation of the second volume of the German official history concludes, "events have taught us that even the Russian soldier became affected by the depressing effect of his constant retreats. How could he retain confidence in his leaders, and in the positions selected by them, if these were evacuated the moment the enemy showed signs of attacking them seriously P It was only too natural that, in the end, the soldier came to think he had a right to act in a similar way, and leave the battlefield the moment danger was drawing near. The want of preciseness in the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, which made every act conditional on something, could not do otherwise than paralyse all initiative of his subordinate leaders."

If, then, the German explanation of the shortcomings of which General Kuropatkin complains is correct, the remedy is obvious, and there can be no need to despair for the future. At the present moment Russia is suffering from a bitter sense of national humiliation ; but if she will only believe it, the history of the war contains much upon which she may reflect with legitimate pride. The hearts of her men are as stout as ever they were, and although her military organisa- tion proved defective, the difficulties were immensely greater than they would be nearer home. At the end of six thousand miles of railway Russia met an enemy whose training and equipment were as perfect as human ingenuity could make

them, and she may console herself for her defeat with the thought that she now possesses a large body of men whose experience, gained in the best possible school, may be used to provide that efficient leadership which in Manchuria was so conspicuously lacking.