TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE DEBATES ON EGYPT.
THE debates of Tuesday, upon the Egyptian policy of the Government—which were the serious debates, for they were the debates of leaders—were on both sides unsatisfactory in the extreme. Nothing can be conceived more feeble than the attack led by Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote. Not only had they no alternative policy to propose, but they had no certainty in their minds sufficient to give them a foot- hold for argument, and were overthrown in the war of dialectics with the greatest ease. It may be true that an Opposition is not bound to furnish the nation with a plan of action, but it is, at least, bound to have conceived one, so far as not to be compelled to admit that the Government is quite right, and that itself is only scolding because circum- stances have been unhappy. The Tories were so compelled. Take, for example, as a crucial test, the destruction of General Hicks's Army. Sir Stafford Northcote wasted half his speech and immense ingenuity in an effort to prove that, as the British Government were supreme in Egypt, they ought to have given General Hicks advice, and to have compelled the Egyptian Administration to make him strong enough for his work. That seemed clear, and Sir Stafford proved beyond debate that Lord Granville had refused to give such advice or use such compul- sion, and the House thought for a moment there was some- thing in it ; but when expressly challenged to say whether he would have sent soldiers to assist General Hicks or to avenge his defeat, Sir Stafford sharply repudiated the suggestion. In other words, as Mr. Gladstone told him, he would have had the Government give advice to an ally, and even compel him to act upon it, and would then have had them refuse to accept the consequences of their own officious peremptoriness. He would have them insist on a particular line of conduct, but remain indifferent in the event of failure. That is not only an impossible policy, but it is not a policy at all ; it is only a demand that the Government shall always advise so as to insure success without doing anything to achieve it, a demand about as reasonable as a demand that the Government shall alwayspossess foreknowledge. Every sentence of Sir Stafford Northcote's speech is burdened with the same difficulty. The whole pith of his argument is that the Government vacillated about the Soudan, yet he admitted that they were right in compelling the abandonment of that territory, and only erred in not advising the Khedive how to do it ; though, again, they would have been right in not remedying any evils their advice might have produced I The logical outcome of the speech would have been a demand that the Mandi, whose lieutenants threaten the Egyptian garrisons, should be defeated at any cost. But Sir Stafford Northcote holds the Govern- ment quite right in rejecting that advice, and only wrong in,—in,—we defy mortal ingenuity to discover clearly what. The inquirer certainly will not find it in the savage speech of Lord Salisbury, who, holding, we presume, like his colleague in the Commons, that it was right to abandon the Soudan, made it his one distinct charge against the Government that they did abandon it, so, in his judgment, causing the defeat of General Baker and the massacre of Sincat. He abused every result of their policy, or rather every misfortune which impeded the Government's policy, but never ventured to question that their policy was right. It is clear, in fact, from the speeches that if the Tories had been in power they would have done pre- cisely what the Liberals did in the Soudan, and only have expected success instead of failure. because they were Tories, and not Liberals. Even if the country were far more irritated than it is, such speeches would not detach a vote from the Government side, or induce one man to hope that a change of Ministry would produce a bolder or more acceptable policy in Egypt.
On the other hand, while the failure of the Opposition in the debates seems to us complete, we cannot honestly say that we think her Majesty's Government successful. Some points, one or two of them of great importance, Mr. Gladstone certainly did make clear. He revealed the true policy of the Government in sending General Gordon to Khartoum, and proved that it was a wise and statesmanlike policy. The Government, having resolved to abandon the Soudan—which the Opposition admit to be inevitable—and to abandon it without sending an army there—which the Opposition openly approve—adopted the only means remaining to spare bloodshed. They despatched an officer, admitted by the Opposition to be the
fittest of mankind for the work, to the Soudan, in the hope• that by the exercise of his rare qualities and singular personal' ascendancy, he might persuade the Mandi and the Chiefs of the Soudan to allow the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons in peace. They thus staked success upon the life and ability of one man, but then they had no option, except to send the Army which even the Opposition would not send ; and one man's life, even though the man be General Gordon,. may be fairly risked for so adequate an object. All that could be done for General Gordon they did, and so anxious, so morbidly anxious, were they not to hamper him, that they even hesitated to relieve Tokar, which is clearly within the "littoral" we intend to keep, lest the Mandi, finding his best lieu- tenant, Osman Digna, attacked and defeated, should fancy all Gordon's assurances false, and in dread of treachery, dash upon the garrisons. That fear was dissipated by a telegram from. General Gordon, but it was a perfectly natural one, and we are by no means sure, considering the ingrained suspiciousness of Orientals, that it will not be realised. Moreover, Mr. Glad- stone answered another charge with perfect skill and suc- cess. The • Opposition charged the Government openly with vacillation in the Soudan, and implicitly with vacillation in Egypt, whereas the real defect and error of the Ministry has been a perfectly mulish obstinacy in adhering to an erroneous conception of the facts. From first to last they have held the same course, have insisted that Egyptian Pashas should show independence, should display ability, should feel love and reverence for self-government, or should in the extreme event be coerced and " shattered " and driven till they did. From first to last they have "respected the dignity of the Khedive," in order that Egyptians might love us, as Mr. Gladstone says all people love those best who most respect their freedom and nationality. Throughout they have acted on the theory that the only way to make British occupation beneficial was to in- terfere as little as possible, as reluctantly as possible, and as seldom as possible, and so to train the Egyptians to walk alone. As the theory is unsound from the beginning, Egyptians having been slaves for two thousand years, and asking good government, not self-government, and as the Pashas when fettered by English morality have not ability to govern, and as non-interference creates among the people only contempt, and not love—for what is the use of a Sultan who will not protect you, but hands you over to villainous subordinates ?—the Government have, of course, not been successful in Egypt ; but they have been consistent. They have always earnestly de- sired to leave Egypt ; they have always striven to induce the Egyptian Government to do its work well, and do it for itself ; and they have always refused, whenever the Khedive came to a decision in itself right, as, for example, the decision to relieve Sincat, to compel him to give that decision up. They have, as Mr. Gladstone says, always refrained " from stirring up sentiments as to foreign domination," and have, in fact, acted as they would have acted in Europe among a white and Christian population under the same circumstances. As that is not the way to act in the East when the object is to found a strong and contented State, but the exact converse of the way, they have so far failed, and from that failure all these troubles have arisen. Had the Government in Cairo been visibly English, it could have negotiated with the Mandi, or threatened the Mandi, or detached the Sheikhs from the Mandi with success. The men of the Desert have not forgotten the crash with which King Theodore toppled down, and while they are not prepared to defy the British, the British not being Pashas, they have absolutely no motive for such defiance. The single root of evil has been the decision to " respect the dignity of the Khedive," and refrain from avowing that where Englishmen are in "occupation," there they must govern ; but then that charge, the single one to which the Government is liable, is not brought by the Opposition, and cannot be brought by them. There is not a sentence in their leaders' speeches which indicates that if they were in power to- morrow they would establish an overt Protectorate in Egypt, or appoint a British Ministry in Cairo, or attempt in any way to govern directly any more than this Govern- ment does. All they would do, apparently, is to increase the British garrison, and so make the burden on Egyptian finances heavier ; and to give some more " advice," for which, when it failed, as British advice always does fail, except when it is only a smooth word for orders, they would hold them- selves irresponsible. In what way would their policy as painted by themselves benefit the Egyptians, or improve the condition of Great Britain, or protect the general interests of mankind ? They may rely on it that great Governments are not over-
thrown by such speeches as Lord Salisbury's, which is mere swearing, or as Sir Stafford Northcote's, which is mere cavilling, and that the only result of the debates will be to deepen the distrust with which the Conservative party is regarded. It has not many plausible pretensions to put forward just now, and if it cannot govern, what remains ?
Previous page
