the Fleet. The old distribution of our ships of war
had become obsolete, and a new one was imperatively demanded to meet modern conditions, not only as regards steam, but also as regards our foreign policy. But though the change was needed, and it was necessary to abandon the old distribution, it did not follow that the new one would meet the national requirements. Nothing is easier than to alter without improving. Yet in so vital a matter as naval strategy an alteration which is not an improvement might have the most serious consequences. Fortunately the Board of Admiralty, guided no doubt in details by the First Naval Lord, Sir John Fisher, has worked out a system under which our naval power will be, we believe, distributed in the best possible way. In all forms of war concentration is of the essence of the contract which every commander hopes to make with fate. But on sea concentration is even more essential than on land. The Power that wins and holds the command of the sea is the Power that can produce five battleships for every three battleships of the enemy wherever that enemy's battle- ships may be. If three of the enemy's battleships, say in the North Sea, are only confronted by two of your own battleships, it does not matter how many splendid and invincible ships you may have at the moment in the Mediterranean or off the coast of America. The need for concentration in a small theatre of war was very visible on the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan. Some of the Russia-i ships were at Chemulpo, some at Vladivostok, and some at Port Arthur. Had they all been concentrated at Port Arthur, the history of the war might have been very different.
Up till now our naval dispositions have not been made with sufficient regard to this principle of concen- tration,—partly owing °to a tradition sound enough a hundred, or even twenty, years ago, and partly owing to the changes that have taken place in the distribution of sea-power among foreign countries. Now, however, that the Admiralty have decided to revolutionise our system, they have been guided by the principle of concentration. Further, they have kept before them the principle that it is the business of fleets, not to guard particular places, but to secure the command of the sea as a whole. Such command automatically makes secure all the sea-washed places which it is desired to render safe. For example, the only certain way in time of war of guarding the shores of Canada and the West Indies, and of India and Australia, is to secure the command of the sea by meeting and destroying any fleet capable of harassing those shores. Translated into the language of fact, the observance of these principles means that we must keep our ships con- centrated in European waters, for it would be with the European Powers that we should have to strive for the command of the sea if, unhappily, war should arise with any one of them, or with any combination among them. Theoretically, we admit, this dictum. leaves the American Fleet out of calculation ; but that Fleet is, we think, rightly left out. We do not mean to fight with America, nor she with us ; and if war should break out between the two branches of the race, it will be in the nature of a civil war, and against civil wars it is impossible to prepare. Again, even if these considerations did not hold (as undoubtedly they do), European waters would still be the proper place for our concentration, because no combination between the American Fleet and that of any foreign Power could take place without our receiving notice sufficient for the alteration of our dispositions.
The Board of Admiralty were, then, led by essential and invariable considerations to concentrate our naval force, and to concentrate it in European waters. The particular plan of concentration they have adopted is as follows. In the first place, we are to have a Channel Fleet which is to consist of twelve modern battleships and a sufficient number of attendant cruisers, and will take the place of the present badly named Home Fleet. The new Channel Fleet is to have its headquarters at home, and its station is to be our home waters,—i.e., the North Sea and the narrow seas. The next fleet is to be known as the Atlantic Fleet, and will take the place of the old Channel Fleet. It will consist of eight modern battleships and a proper complement of cruisers. Its base will be at Gibraltar, where all its repairs will be effected.
The third fleet will be the Mediterranean Fleet, and will consist of eight battleships and a proper complement of cruisers, and will be based on Malta. In addition to these three great fleets there will be four Cruiser Squadrons. The first and second of these squadrons, each consisting of six armoured cruisers—vessels which might almost be called swift or light battleships—will be affiliated to the Channel and Atlantic Fleets respectively. The third cruiser squadron will be affiliated to the Mediterranean Fleet. The fourth will be a Particular Service Squadron, with the Atlantic for its cruising ground, and with Devon- port for its home headquarters. This is the full tale of the fighting fleets to be kept at sea in European and Atlantic waters. The South Atlantic Squadron will disappear, and the present North American Squadron will become the fourth cruiser squadron. Outside European waters, the present China, Australia, and East Indies stations will be retained. Any battleships that are deemed necessary will be allotted, as at present, to the China station, while the cruisers of the three other stations just named will be at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the China station. These three cruiser squadrons will thus form an Eastern group, just as the three cruiser squadrons in the Atlantic and home waters will form a Western group. A fighting squadron will be retained at the Cape of Good Hope, and will form a connecting link between either the Eastern group and the Mediterranean cruisers, or the Eastern group and the Western group. Such is the disposition of all the ships at sea. In addition, however, there will be a Reserve of efficient fighting ships kept in commission at home instantly available for relief or reinforcement. Each ship thus kept in reserve will have its nucleus crew, Captain, second-in-com- mand, and other essential officers and men. This per- manent staff, as it were, will be capable of taking their ship to sea periodically for gunnery practice and machinery trials, and when mobilisation is ordered she will receive her full complement of men. Ships in this Reserve in commission will not, however, be unrelated units, but will be already formed into squadrons under flag officers who will command them in time of war. In addition, two modern battleships and two modern cruisers will be kept in the chief naval stations at home as emergency ships which can be got ready at a few hours' notice for reinforcing purposes without a general mobilisation. Incidentally it may be remarked that not only will use- less weak squadrons be abandoned in order to produce concentration, but weak units will also be got rid of in order to produce what we may term moral and financial concentration. At present we have a considerable number of ships afloat which are not worth the money we spend on them. A weak ship costs almost as much to keep in commission as a really effective ship, and uses up a large number of highly trained officers and men. It is clearly better to get rid of such ships altogether, and to use the money now wasted in keeping them in commission to man effective vessels.
Before we leave the subject of the Admiralty dis- positions, we must express a word of regret that the name "fleet," rather than that of "squadron," has been given to the Channel, Mediterranean, and Atlantic commands. We realise, of course, the convenience of doing so ; but had these commands been called "squadrons," they would have marked that oneness and indivisibility of sea-power which should never be absent from our minds. The plan of speaking of "the Fleet," and meaning the whole of the warships of Britain, would have helped men to realise the need for naval concentration,—one Fleet and one Empire. We want the British people to realise that they have only one Fleet, and that the Atlantic or Medi- terranean Squadron when it acts is only acting as part of a whole, and may be called upon to act in the North Sea or the Baltic quite as appropriately as the Channel Fleet. They are all mere parts and divisions of the Fleet, not separate entities. This is, of course, the underlying thought of the Admiralty, and we presume they have chosen the word " fleet " rather than " squadron " because We cannot leave the subject of the Fleet without a word as to the deputation which waited upon Mr. Balfour on Saturday last in order to impress on him and the country the need for obtaining assistance from the self-govern- ing Colonies in the matter of Imperial naval defence. Though our readers know well the views of the Spectator upon this point, we cannot help putting on record once again our strong disapproval of all attempts to harry the Colonies into making contributions to the Imperial Navy. We fully realise that the Colonies would be in a perilous position unless the Mother-country kept the command of the sea, and so ensured their safety as well as her own. But we also realise that it is the duty of the parent to provide for the safety of the children till those children are old enough and strong enough to assist in the work. At present we hold that neither Canada, Australia, nor New Zealand is developed enough to share the burden of sea-power. They have their houses to build, their roads and railways to make, and innumerable other development works to carry out, and therefore if we now ask them for subsidies which will not cripple them in their work of building up strong States, they can only give us very small contributions, such as they give at present. In our view, the plan which is most likely to strengthen the Empire is not to worry the Colonies on the question of helping the Navy, but to leave it to them in their own good time to propose to do their share. They have never proved grudging or ungenerous, and we believe that if we leave them alone they will, as soon as they feel able to do so, offer of their own accord to pay a fair share towards naval defence. Already, as we pointed out last week, the Australians are begin- ning. to realise their duties in this respect. Mean- time, let us be content with the contributions they already pay ; and, further, let us do all we can, without asking for direct payment, to foster the growth of a naval Imperial spirit in the Colonies. If in the course of the next fifteen or twenty years we see a considerable Naval Reserve grow up in all the self-governing Colonies, a great deal will have been accomplished. Later, should the Colonies have increased sufficiently in wealth and population, we may fairly ask them, not only to bear their fair share of naval defence, but also to assist in the responsibility of directing the policy of the Empire. For the time being, we agree that no harm can be done by discussing these matters the next time the representatives of the Colonies are called together in council, provided always that no direct demand is made on them for a contribution, and that no attempt is made to shame them into giving a contribution, which, in our belief, they are not at present in a position to pay. The Imperial bond must never be made a matter of barter or calculation. Once erect self-interest as the basis of Empire, and the Empire is doomed..
THE POSITION OF LORD LANSDOWNE AND LORD SELBORNE.
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