T HE testimony of all observers on the spot goes to
show that political feeling in Russia is excited to a degree for which there is no precedent. The air is full of portents of change. Before the war began politicians in all countries used to speculate on the effect which defeat might have on the Russian mind. On the whole, perhaps, the impression which seemed to have most to say for itself was that reverses would evoke the passion of loyalty, and that the things which make for division would be postponed until after a final victory. Possibly if the reverses which Russia has sustained had been due solely to the fortune of war, this expectation might have been fulfilled. As it is, however, those reverses are largely due to faults which might have been guarded against,—faults which, if the Russian system had been what it professes to be, would have been guarded against. In theory, an autocracy has conspicuous advantages in carrying on war. It has unity of purpose, promptness of execution, and above all, un- tiring vigilance in preparation. In practice, the Russian autocracy has proved to have none of these things. There have been irreconcilable differences of opinion in the Government, extensive corruption in both Services, want of initiative and of training in the officers. The system which should show its best side in time of war has broken down at every point. It has failed to give that security against attack from withoutfor which a nation will sacrifice so much. These considerations are quite enough to account for the agitation which is now going on in Russia. The autocratic machine has proved incapable of doing its proper work ; consequently it behoves Russia to discover some alterna- tive machine to take its place.
Thus far we may assume that many, perhaps most, patriotic Russians have travelled. They see that change of some sort is inevitable if Russia is to have either security abroad or tranquillity at home. But beyond this point unanimity gives place to two contending theories as to the form which the indispensable change should take. According to one opinion, it should involve an entire Constitutional change. Instead of being governed from above, Russia must in future be governed from below. No modification of autocratic government, no system of checks, or delays, or self-imposed restraints, will be of any avail. Royalty may remain, because Republics have not proved superior to Monarchies in the way of good adminis- tration. But it must be Constitutional Royalty. The Czar must take his directions from his Ministers, and his Ministers must be appointed by the representatives of the people. The other opinion is that to propose changes of this sweeping kind would be to court disaster. It is un- likely that such demands would be conceded, and very doubtful how they would work out even if they were con- ceded. According to this view, the wise course is to reform from the top, not from the bottom ; to ask what the Czar is likely to give rather than to provoke an absolute refusal at starting ; to be content with setting limitations to his authority, and ensuring that at least he shall become acquainted with the wishes and feelings of his subjects, instead of acting, as now, in inevitable ignorance of them. Some kind of Parliament there must be, or else this last condition will not be secured. And some kind of election there must be if the Parliament is to be of use in giving the Czar the informa- tion which, as things are, he does not get. But the new system need not be modelled on any existing Parliament, unless, indeed, the type chosen be Germany. The great object should be to lead the Czar on, not to terrify him into a flat refusal to go another step.
No doubt the reasoning of this latter party halts in more places than one. The character of a Government depends on the ultimate seat of its authority. It is popular if the Executive is controlled by the people. It is autocratic if the Executive is controlled by the Sovereign. In the moderate scheme of reforms which is favoured by some Russians the Sovereign's will may be some time before it finds its way to the Executive ; but it will find its way there sooner or later. Parlia- ment can remonstrate, it can ask to be heard, it can use to the utmost such opportunities of making its wishes known as have been secured to it by the Sovereign's grant ; but in the end it will have to submit. It does not appoint the Executive ; con- sequently, in the last resort, the Executive will obey the Czar, from whom it derives its authority. Ministers responsible to a Representative Assembly are the one indispensable condition of Constitutional government. Anything short of this will be a mere makeshift. Yes, we should be inclined to reply, a makeshift, if you will; but is the situation ripe for anything else than a makeshift ? The very greatness of the change involved in the establishment of a Constitutional system framed on the most advanced Western models• is an index to the opposition its introduction is likely to encounter. Sud- denly, and merely as an incident of the war, the Czar is to be asked to divest himself of an authority which he him- self probably, and a great number of his subjects certainly, regard as specially divine. The only reason on which this demand is founded is that he has neither kept Russia out of war, nor organised victory now that she is at war. But these shortcomings—of which the Czar is possibly quite as sensible as his critics—will not seem to him to be necessarily associated with a particular system of govern- ment. He can point to Britain and the South African War as an example of the disasters that may happen under a Constitutional Government ; to Germany and the war of 1870 as an example of the victories that may be won by a Government Constitutional only in name. Yet on this very inadequate ground he is summoned to lay down his authority, to accept a position which in his heart he probably despises, and. to expose Russia to the unknown risks which such a step on his part would entail. For even the stoutest defender of a Constitutional system cannot deny that these risks exist. The most daring theorist, if he were seated on the Russian throne, might hesitate to bring down about his ears the vast fabric of Russian administration, and there is no reason to suppose that, in this sense, the Czar is a theorist at all. He is more likely to refuse to make the changes demanded of him, and take the chance of being able to suppress any consequent insurrection. Let us suppose, however, that the Czar's concessions have no other limit than the requests addressed to him. In that case a further consideration presents itself. Is Russia fit for complete Parliamentary government at this moment ? Can the prudent and far-sighted people on whose co-operation the success of a Russian revolution would largely depend give a confident answer to this question ? We should think this at least doubtful. For Parliamentary government has not of late years been a universal success. The scenes which the Hungarian Parliament has this week witnessed are not encouraging, nor are proceed- ings of much the same kind at all impossible in the Austrian Parliament. Nor can it be said that these dis- couraging incidents have their origin in the peculiar conditions of Austria-Hungary. For some of these con- ditions are reproduced in the Russian dominions, and reproduced on a yet greater scale. Parliamentary govern- ment has never been applied to such an Empire as the Russian,—so vast, so heterogeneous, so separated, as regards its component parts, by distance, by race, by language. The only parallel that suggests itself is the government of Great Britain and Ireland by the House of Commons, supposing that all the Colonies and Depen- dencies, including India, were represented in it in some rough proportion to their numbers. What are colonies or dependencies in the case of Britain are provinces in Russia, and so cannot be ignored in the construction of a, new representative system. It seems to us that if the Czar were now to offer his subjects a Constitution framed on the latest political theory, the wiser heads among them might well ask him to give them something more manage- able to start with. We are not at all sure that if the Russians had the choice between Parliamentary govern- ment of the most advanced type and such a Parliament as the German, they would not do well to choose the latter. For the German Parliament has at all events freedom of speech. It can tell the Government plainly what it thinks of their policy ; and though, if it refused to vote the necessary taxes, they would probably be raised in some other way, the Government, following the line of least resistance, are careful to give full information in regard to them. The Russian masses will have to be accustomed to a. larger measure of local self-government than has yet been accorded to them before they are likely to derive any benefit from a full-grown Constitutional experiment.
THE OPPOSITION IN HUNGARY.
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