W E read in the Times of Tuesday an account of
a message of congratulation on the completion of the Anglo-French Convention sent by the Newfoundland Cabinet to the King. They convey to his Majesty, so runs the telegram, "the expression of respectful humble acknowledgment of great boon conferred on people of this Colony by Anglo-French Treaty, just approved by Senate, which they appreciate his Majesty the King was mainly instrumental in initiating." The Secretary for the Colonies, in replying, thanked Newfoundland in the King's name for her congratulations, but very properly said no word about his Majesty's share in the work. He tacitly assumed that the task was the Government's, and on their behalf "thanked Ministers for their kind expres- sions." While we think the Newfoundland teb.gram a very loyal and friendly act, we think also that the Government showed much discretion in ignoring part of it in their reply, for it contained the germs of a doctrine which is, to say the least of it, a very serious departure from our Con- stitutional usage. The place of the Monarchy to-day is very different from that which it occupied, say, in the early years of Queen Victoria. Then both its prestige and its influence had sunk very low ; but, partly through the remarkable political instinct and tact of the late Queen, and partly through events wholly unconnected with Con- stitutional development, it has now reached a position as strong, though in a very different sense, as under the Tudors or early Stuarts. The second half of the nine- teenth century saw a very general rehabilitation of Royalty in Europe, following upon the discrediting of the crude Republicanism of its first half. The knitting together of the governing men of Europe which has followed the in- crease of ease in travelling, and the closer connection of European interests abroad, has brought the Sovereign into importance as a weighty factor in foreign affairs. Above all, Imperialism and the rise of our Colonies into self-conscious national life have made the Crown a link of connection on which all are agreed. Colonial publicists who are impatient of the idea that the House of Commons should have a final authority in Imperial questions find satisfaction in exalting, and even exag- gerating, the Royal prerogative. All this is a natural, and to a certain extent logical, development. Britain is a Monarchy under a King, or if you like, an Empire under a Sovereign. Englishmen believe that in their present Constitution, with its mixture of Royalty and democratic government, they have found the final com- promise which can be justified in practice. On this view, the .Monarchy should be a vigorous and greatly respected institution, as integral a part of our system as the House of Commons ; and they welcome gladly any events which show that they have a King who is capable of exercising a wise and tactful influence on public affairs. Though they would not like a King who governed as of right, they distinctly like to see on the throne a wise and experienced man of the world deeply versed in public affairs, one who stands above and outside party, and who, though he cannot, and does not desire to, command his Ministers, can often, from the impartial standpoint of the Throne, give them much-needed advice, and can not unfrequently interpret public opinion more correctly than they can. But at the same time, there is a risk that the functions of the Monarchy may be exaggerated in a way than can only bring discredit upon the institution which it is intended to exalt ; and the Newfoundland. telegram furnishes a good occasion on which to point out this danger. It is an old-established doctrine of law that the King can do no wrong. He is assumed to be omniscient and infallible. If a Government blunders, his Ministers are held responsible, and not himself. He is supposed to have no bias to one party or the other, and all Cabinets are alike his Cabinets, all policies equally his policies. Clearly this is the only theory on which our party system can be combined with Monarchical institutions. Otherwise a Monarch becomes merely a temporary President, going out of office with his advisers. On one side the doctrine meets with universal acceptance. No one ever dreamed of blaming Queen Victoria for Mr. Gladstone's South African or Egyptian policy, and no one ever thinks of crediting the King with any share in the blunders of the present Govern- ment. No one, again, wishes to make him out either a Free- trader or a Protectionist. But it is sometimes forgotten that while the Sovereign must not be blamed for his Ministers' mistakes, neither should he be praised for their successes, except in the conventional way in which all the achieve- ments of a nation are ascribed to the action of its Monarch. The facts of the case have nothing to do with the question. There are many instances in the last two hundred years when the influence of the Throne has been used on behalf of a wrong cause. There are instances, too, such as occurred during the American Civil War, when the Sovereign has been an active agent on the side of sound policy. King Edward has undoubtedly shown in the past three years remarkable diplomatic ability, and no doubt our most conspicuous successes in foreign affairs have owed much to his assistance. But we do not like the way in which he is publicly credited with these successes, and given the praise which constitutionally should belong to his Ministers. For if the nation gets into the habit of giving the Monarch credit for a success, it is a short step to blaming him for a failure. That is to say, when Ministers blunder, and give the country good cause for turning them out, part of the odium will attach to the Monarch, who, if the wise fiction of our Constitution were strictly observed, should be considered wholly outside the arena of politics. We must never forget that if public acts can make a King popular, they can also make him unpopular. But we do not want to see the King unpopular in any circumstances. We can well believe that the King, who is essentially a wise and far-seeing man, realises this thoroughly, for we note that he has never given any encouragement to the public attempts to credit him with political successes at the expense of his Ministers. He has maintained the old Constitutional tradition to the full.
It seems, then, to us, as firm believers in Monarchical government, a matter of the highest importance.that the impersonal character of the Monarch should be maintained, —impersonal, that is to say, in relation to current, and probably controversial, politics. The Monarchy should be, like the Empire, a presupposition which cannot be ques- tioned. This is the more important now that the old divinity that hedged a King has gone for ever. The Monarchy nowadays is a creation, not of divine right, but of practical usefulness. It is presumed to be infallible and omniscient by a Constitutional fiction, since it is necessary to raise it above the level of ordinary politics. This con- vention, which owes its strength to its practical advantages, is. like all conventions, a delicate thing. A fiction is only of use when it is jealously and meticulously maintained. But if we once degrade the Monarchy by making it responsible, first for successes, and then ultimately for failures, we shall destroy any sanction it possesses. It stands on a pedestal above the stress of ordinary political life. If it is brought down from that pedestal into the dust of the arena in order to be the recipient of applause, the time will certainly come when it will also, as we have said, be the target for abuse. Another objection to the new departure is that it is certain to impair the very real usefulness which the King possesses. As things stand, he can exercise in home politics a power- ful indirect authority. In foreign affairs his personal influence, and the unique knowledge which belongs to his position, are factors of incalculable importance. But his work must be informal, unofficial, indirect,—as soon as it comes into the light of publicity, and is recognised and applauded, its value goes. At present the influence of the Throne is a kind of dernier ressort in foreign affairs. A wise Monarch may prevent war when his Ministers have failed, or he may effect an alliance when the efforts of his Ambassadors are vain. And the reason is that he comes into diplomacy with an authority belonging partly to his rank, but far more to his remote- ness from common politics. If his hand is to be recognised in every treaty, if, in effect, he becomes a superior Foreign Minister, much of this authority must be lost. The power of the Throne will become a stereotyped thing, working in ordinary official channels, and liable to bide the brunt of popular criticism as well as to receive the ovations of popular favour.
It is our loyalty to the Monarchy, and our desire to keep it intact in the power and prestige which the Constitution gives it, that lead us to deprecate the departure we have described. We are certain, as we have said above, that the King must be as averse as we can be from what is in substance a weakening of the Royal prerogative. But if it is necessary in the interests of the Monarchy to keep it aloof from politics, unapplauded, and therefore uncriticised, it is equally necessary in the interests of our political life. The King must be sheltered behind his Ministers, but no Minister should have a chance of being sheltered by his King, Cabinets and Ministers must stand or fall by their own deeds, responsible to the nation which gives them power, and if necessary, rewards. Otherwise all the fibre goes out of public life, and Consti- tutional government becomes a farce. English history is not without instances • of statesmen hiding behind the Throne, and the performance is neither edifying nor safe.
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