TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE PLAN FOR MMITABY AND NAVAL ACTION IN ULSTER.
THE Government, in our opinion, were very ill-advised not to make a clean breast of their plan for com- bined military and naval operations in Ulster directly it became known in part. If they had told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth at once, the country might have been surprised, but in all proba- bility would have acquitted them, on the ground that, if they felt it necessary to take military precautions, they were justified in taking them without delay. Even as it is, and in spite of their first confused reticence and lame explanations, it would be wiser for them not to persist in declaring that their only intention was to guard a few stores and stands of rifles—an explanation which obviously will not hold water—but to let the whole story come out. No doubt such a change of mind would make a bad impres- sion for a time, but surely it is worse to allow the story to come out piecemeal. The spectacle of the Government fighting inch by inch to maintain secrecy and losing the fight is not edifying, nor is it likely to gain them votes. Such unsuccessful attempts at concealment are sure to create suspicion of the worst kind, and to give people the impression that there must be something more which the Government are trying to hide. Secrecy is only a wise policy when it can be absolutely maintained. When half, or even a tenth, of a story has leaked out, it is necessary to abandon all hope of further concealment. Though no one may willingly betray facts, the veil cannot be kept drawn. Sooner or later it will be torn in shreds. Bacon pointed this out in his marvellously shrewd and far- seeing essay on " Simulation and Dissimulation," an essay which we recommend to the careful consideration of the Cabinet. He notes that men are " too cunning " to allow a man "to keep an indifferent carriage" between openness and dissimulation, and "to be secret without swaying the balance on either side." The world in general, he goes on, " will so beset a man with questions and draw him on and pick it out of him, that, without an absurd silence, he must show an inclination one way ; or if he do not, they will gather as much by his silence as by his speech. As for equivo- cations or emulous speeches, they cannot hold out long." Unqueitionably this is what is going to happen, or, rather, is in process of happening, in regard to the Government's plan for action in Ulster. A great deal has come out already, and the rest will be " picked out" or inferences will be drawn from refusals to answer questions. When things are in such a state as they are, and when so much has been told, even the Prime Minister's "emulous speeches" cannot bold out long. We have taken some trouble to piece together what the Government, or, rather, the Committee of the Cabinet which had the matter in hand, were aiming at in the orders which were issued, or prepared for issue, to the land and sea forces of the Crown, and especially in the instructions which were received by General Paget and transmitted by him in so strangely inflammatory and provocative a form to the officers at the Curragh. In stating the result of our investigations we desire to use no exaggeration, but to put the Government position quite fairly. The matter is much too serious for exaggeration. But even if that were not so, exaggeration is a quite futile and ridiculous policy for those who wish, as we, of course, admit we do, to " pick " the true story out of the Govern- ment. Any exaggeration of statement on the. Unionist side at once gives Ministers the opportunity to make strong specific denials which look like general denials. These, though truthful per 8e, give the public an impres- sion which is entirely misleading. As an example of what we mean, we may point to one of the speeches made by the Attorney-General. He found some heated and unguarded statement in a Unionist newspaper, which looked as if the writer were accusing the Government of an intention to shoot down and massacre the Ulstermen in cold blood. This, of course, was a positive godsend to so astute a lawyer as Sir John Simon. Accordingly, he took an early opportunity of standing up before a popular meeting, beating his breast, and assuring his audience and thewhole country, on his honour, that the Government never bad any intention of massacring Ulstermen. Of course they had not. No sane human being over supposed that they bad. Not only are the Government humane men to whom, we are sure, bloodshed would in itself be hateful, but they are also not absolute fools, and do not wish to ruin them- selves for ever. Therefore, when Sir John Simon pledged his honour that the Government did not want to bathe their hands in the blood of, the Ulstermen, he_was speaking the absolute truth. At the same time, he gave the ordinary reader the impression that the whole story in the Opposi- tion newspapers was utterly untrue and had no basis in fact, and was indeed the merest nightmare. Colonel Seely's recent speeches have been conceived in the same spirit. He, too, has seized upon exaggerated and unguarded statements in the Unionist Press which can be repudiated with perfect truth. He, too, by vehemently repudiating exaggerated accusations, has given the impression that the Government never wanted to do anything but pre- vent a few stands of rifles from being stolen by Ulster hooligans.
In addition to avoiding exaggerated statements, we ought to be most careful not to attribute subtle or elaborate motives to the Government. In the first place, they were probably living from band to mouth ; and next, as their action was the action of a Committee, the motives must have been mixed. In all probability, what the majority of the Cabinet Committee desired to do was to make a demonstration of the forces at their com- mand, and to make it on so big a scale that it would daunt the courage of the Ulstermen and force them to realize the seriousness and the futility of opposition to the Govern- ment policy. But the Committee of the Cabinet were also, of course, aware that a demonstration by land and sea, though organized on the impressive scale they con- templated, might fail to have any effect upon the Ulstermen. In that case, they no doubt argued, it was all the more necessary not to let the strategic position slip any further out of the control of the Government. Granted that the policy of coercion was to be adopted—and Mr. Churchill's speech at Bradford made it abundantly clear that it was to be adopted—the great thing was for the Government, as soon as possible, to get command of the military situation in Ulster, and be ready, if any direct action were taken by the Ulstermen, to hit back so quickly and so hard that there would be an end of all further resistance. But if that was to be the policy, was it not madness to have allowed 110,000 men to arm them- selves ? We agree, but presumably here the .position of the Cabinet Committee was : "It is no use crying over spilt milk. We cannot put one mistake right by making another. The 110,000 armed men are in existence, and as we have now determined not to yield to them we must make our position in Ulster so strong that it will be they, not we, who, when we begin the waiting game, have to say ' These people are too strong for us and we shall have to give in."
Here was the essential motive behind the Government's policy. They wanted to be ready for any emergency, and ready in such force that the Ulstermen, and not they, would be the under-dog if it came to a scrimmage. No doubt, also, they held that if they were going to make any movement they must make it on a big scale in order to avoid bloodshed—that is, they must not provoke or tempt the Ulstermen to attack them by any show of weak- ness. No inspector of police, if he is faced with a dangerous crowd, attempts to disperse it by the use of half a dozen constables. That would be to invite blood- shed. If he acts, he acts with such a force that there is a. reasonable prospect of the crowd being cowed anll rendered amenable to an order to disperse. Possibly there may have been one or even two Ministers in the Com- mittee who thought that it was too late to impress the Ulstermen by a great demonstration in force, but that even so it must be better to act at once and get the thing over than to wait and let the Ulstermen become still stronger before they were tackled. "It is always good policy to make the enemy's guns fire prematurely," was the maxim upon which they were acting. The truth of this, however, is never likely to be known, for neither. Cabinets nor Cabinet Committees keep written records. All we know, and it is quite enough, is that a plan of action was agreed upon by the Committee, and that the first-steps were taken for putting it-in action by land and_sea. Apparently it
was not thought necessary to make the Prime Minister aware of the plan in detail. To say this is not to attribute bad faith to the Committee. They were, we must assume, empowered by the Cabinet to take such steps as they thought advisable to make the Government's pcsition in Ulster safe, and not to tempt the Ulstermen to aggression by an exhibition of weakness. That being so, they, perhaps not unnaturally, considered that, if they kept to actions which were clearly not contrary to these principles, there was no need for having the details of their proposals endorsed by the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. Events, of course, have shown that they were wrong. The recall of the fleet by wireless, the acquiescence of the Government in the declaration of the officers that they would rather be dismissed than be sent to Ulster, the withdrawal of the troops which were actually moved—as, for example, a body of Engineers at Holywood—and, finally, Mr. Asquith's statement to the Times, all show not only that he was not aware of what the Cabinet Committee and the Departments concerned were doing, but that when he did become aware of their action he disapproved of it. Still, such disapproval may have been due chiefly to the fact that the plan was bungled and could not be put into operation. If it had been better carried out, and all had gone smoothly, it is quite likely that the Prime Minister might, like other statesmen before him whose bands have been forced, have accepted the successful coup.
We need not relate in detail what was the actual plan of the Government. It was set forth in the Morning Post of Tuesday, April 7th, and summarized by us in our issue of last Saturday. Probably the Morning Post account is a little too sensational in language, but we believe that substantially it represents the facts. It certainly repre- sents the impression produced on the officers at the Curragh by the statement made to them by the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. The Government have declared that their measures were purely precautionary. So no doubt in a sense they were. Indeed, it is hardly too much to say that military and strategic measures, whether by armies or individuals, are always precautionary. For example, what could look more aggressive than suddenly to rush up to a man, seize both his wrists, and hold them in spite of his struggles ? Yet such action may have been merely intended as a precaution, and in order to prevent him from thrusting his hand into his pocket, pulling out a revolver, and shooting you. We are perfectly willing to let the Government use the word " precautionary " if they like it. It is quite big enough to cover all the strategic operations which they planned for the coercion of Ulster.
• We shall no doubt be asked why, if our account of what happened three weeks ago is correct, we make it a ground of complaint against the Government. We might very well counter this by saying that at present we are making no complaint against the Government. What wo want to do is to get at the true version of the facts—to " pick out " of them what happened. When we have ascertained the facts, but not till then, we shall draw our conclusions. We do not, however, wish to stand upon any dialectical punctilio of this kind. We want to get the facts because we believe that they will show not only that the Govern- ment have not dealt sincerely with the nation in the matter, but that they have practised an economy of truth which goes very near to a positive denial of the truth ; and, further, that, whatever their motives—and we are willing to give them the benefit of the doubt here—they were acting a most dangerous part, and one which if it had been persisted in would, to use General Paget's famous phrase, have " put everything into a blaze." The Government's plan was doubtless not intended to provoke the Ulstermen, but it certainly would have provoked them, and the Government ought to have known that it would.
What would have happened is what has happened at the beginning of every war for the last ten thousand years and more—the race for the strategic positions. When the Ulstermen saw the troops beginning to pour into Ulster, and heard that, if necessary, the Government were prepared to send twenty-five thousand men into that province, it would have been their turn to be seized with panic, and to be driven to action by the thought of " Now or never I" Nothing flies to people's heads so much as that consideration. •The cry, " Once let the Government get pos- session of subh-and-such places and positions and we shall be utterly at their mercy," would have run like wildfire through Ulster. We doubt whether even Sir Edward Carson's splendid prudence would have enabled him to prevent an attempt to anticipate the action of the Government. But if two sets of armed people are racing for a particular position, the rifles go off by themselves.
Somebody on one side or the other gets hold of a much- coveted bill commanding some important position, such as the outskirts of a city or a bridge over a river. Then the general that has not got it, but has force enough at his com- mand to take it, is certain to say to those above him : " If you don't immediately take ' Prospect Hill' you may as well throw up the sponge, for it is the key to the whole position. If we let the enemy keep it, we may as well retire altogether and throw down our arms. The game is up for us." Faced with such a dilemma, the authority to whom the appeal is made is almost certain to yield to "the soldier on the spot." Therefore we have every right to say that if the Government plan had been put into operation, as it would have been but for General Gough and the men who acted with him, there must have been immediate bloodshed in Ireland. The fact that in cold blood the Government issued strict injunctions to the generals on no account to fire the first shot, and told them to endure all things rather than be the cause of the first casualty, matters nothing. It is all very well to issue such commands, but they have very little effect when "contact is obtained" and when everyone's nerves are strung to the highest pitch. Then who fires first is a mere matter of chance.
The Government's blunders have given us the most striking proof of how much wiser and safer it is for politicians to be honest and sincere in their action than dissimulative. If at the very beginning the Government had said : "We do not want to attack the Ulstermen, but we are determined that we will not be put in such a position that they can dictate to us and we cannot give any reply to them, and therefore we are going to send enough troops to Ulster to enable us to speak with them on equal terms," the country as a whole would not have condemned them. Though not agreeing with the Govern- ment's policy, and though fearing bloodshed, they must have admitted that, assuming the Government's standpoint, Ministers took the only reasonable course. The Govern- ment, instead, made a plan for a great demonstration in force, began to carry it out, and then, when circumstances rendered it impossible, ran away from their plan and swore that they never meant anything except to take pre- cautions against the Government's stores being stolen by rebellious Ulstermen ! And this though it is notorious that the discipline in the Ulster Army is such that not a com- plaint has ever been raised by any person, public or private. as to their conduct ! The Government put themselves thoroughly in the wrong, not merely by their actions, but by their explanations. If they are wise they will now as far as possible retrieve the position by telling the truth. It is pretty certain, however, that they will lack the moral courage to do this. In that case they will, as we have said, have to suffer the humiliation of having it "picked out " of them. The only alternative to that would be a course of desperate and unashamed lying, but this course, we feel sure, they will not adopt. Their sole loophole of escape is that the Opposition should so exaggerate in their interrogatories that the Government will have an opportunity for denying wilful murder when they are being accused of arson. We trust, however, that the Opposition will give them no occasion for practising such subter- fuges, but will put the story in its lowest terms, and then request the Government to deny it if they honestly can. Such a denial will not be made, and we can then draw the necessary inferences.
Previous page
