GENERAL ROBERTS'S PROCLAMATION.
THE latest proclamation of General Roberts, although the Viceroy has not taken the trouble to forward it directly to England, marks another forward step in the relation of Great Britain to Afghanistan. The General announces to the Afghans the abdication of Yakoob Khan, and assumes, in con- sequence, the position of first authority throughout Afghani- stan. He does not annex or claim direct control, but calls on the Birders to continue to administer their districts, promises protection to the people who submit to the British Govern- ment, and summons the heads of clans and districts to con- sult with him about the permanent political administration of the country. They are, we may fairly presume, to elect an Ameer, or—what might be a better plan, though it has never yet been tried—a governing Council, charged with the general control of the entire kingdom. Under the circumstances, this step could hardly be avoided; and if Lord Lytton were sincere, and fully intended to let the Birders have their own way, we should commend this policy, as both dignified and generous. It would restore, if not to the Afghans, at least to the Afghan chiefs, their independence, and lead to the establishment, at all events of some form of central government,—essential, we imagine, if the dominion of the Douranees is not to be the scene of incessant civil war. The assent of the Birders would, no doubt, be purchased by the different competitors by individual bargains ; but power must be obtained somehow, and the richest competitor for the Ameera.t would probably govern as well as the most dreaded cut-throat. But unless the British retire, it is scarcely possible that the summons to elect should be sincere. The Indian Government wishes for a willieg, or—as it persists in calling him—a " friendly " vassal in Afghanistan, and no such Ameer will be acceptable to the Birders. They do not want a ruler who will take away, but a ruler who will secure, the inde- pendence of their country. They will brook, they say, no master, and though, of course, like all other human beings, they will submit to force, their willing co-operation in British designs is not to be expected. Either they will elect a man acceptable to Lord Lytton, and next day disobey him ; or, which is much more probable, they will elect one openly faithful to the British, and secretly pledged to themselves to exterminate the Kafir at the first convenient opportunity. The double qualification which Lord Lytton seeks in his candidate—power to rule the invaded people, and affec- tion for the invader—cannot be found, and will, we fear, from the outset prove fatal to the negotiation. Why, for instance, should Ayoub Khan, now independent in Herat, put an Ameer over his own head Or if he is elected, why should he approve of British control; yet without Ayoub's assent what is the Congress worth, when the first act of its nominee must be to ask British help to reconquer Herat? Herat cannot be separated from Afghanistan, if Afghanistan is to be held together,—which is, of course, the condition of the elective theory. If we wish for a strong ruler in Afghanistan, we must let him rule without us ; and if we seek only a vassal, we shall find him a most powerless and inconvenient intermediary. We anticipate that Lord Lytton's plan will fail, and maintain that the three alternatives are,—to retire alto- tether behind the Suleiman ; to retire on Cando.har alone ; or to administer the country as a possession directly de- pendent on England, and paid for out of English revenues. The first course is easy, and as we believe most wise, India within the Suleiman being a complete and defensible eon- • tinent. The second is a compromise with many disadvantages, but with the advantage of being comparatively cheap and prac- ticable; and the third is a grand scheme, which, though it would fearfully burden England, enabling Russia, as it would, to threaten her by land at any moment, and so compel her to double her garrison, would, no doubt, produce some com- pensating benefits to Asia and the world. But this notion of Orassal Afghanistan to be ruled by a Prince acceptable to Afghans, yet pliable as a reed in British hands, will not, we arc convinced, work six months. It will only result in an explosion, which will compel the Government either to retreat or to annex—the very alternatives which it is now rejecting. The officials, it is said, point to Hydrabad as a proof that such a scheme will work ; but the circumstances are very different. The great plateau which we call by the clumsy title of the " Nizam's Dominions" is an enclave, has always acknowledged the suzerainty of the rulers of India, and is not supposed by Englishmen to be per- petually threatened by a great European Power. There is danger in our position even there, as we shall find one day ; but the danger in Afghanistan would be infinitely greater, and may be measured by the fact that even between Dhakka and Cabot, on our most direct route, we only hold the ground our soldiers stand on. Any officer wandering outside that ground would be shot at sight. The policy of Great Britain would always lie at the mercy of a Nizam of Afghanistan,— which is not a position this country could tolerate for a year.
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