Plain Speaki
ng at Geneva
THE most important day's work in the League Assembly was undoubtedly that of Thursday, September 11th, when M. Briand (in response to a clear warning by Mr. Henderson at a private meeting outside the League) abandoned one of his most risky proposals in connexion with the Federation of Europe, and when Mr. Henderson in the plainest of plain language expressed what we are sure is the thought of the vast majority of British people about disarmament.
Let us look first at M. Briand's scheme which has been transformed by his surrender. In his memorandum of last May he conceived of the Federation of Europe as being something outside and independent of the League. Of course he was careful to say that he in no way contem- plated rivalry with the League, much less hostility. He even considered that the Federation would help the League. And we could easily take him at his word, for M. Briand has been one of the League's firmest friends. Yet, however good M. Briand's intentions may have been, the probability remained that a Federation consisting of twenty-seven States bound together by certain common economic (and therefore political) interests, would conic into collision with the League at many points. The British view has always been that if the Federation was to be formed at all the League must be responsible from the beginning.
At the private meeting on Monday, September 8th, M. Briand, although already convinced that he could not wholly detach the Federation from the League, at least wanted to be authorized to inform the Assembly that there was agreement among the potential members of the Federation. Mr. Henderson, who knows how to be firm with unfailing suavity, would not meet M. Briand half- way. He saw that if M. Briand appeared before the Assembly with a general plan agreed to by the repre- sentatives of twenty-seven States, there would be a prejudging of the whole question. The Assembly would be influenced "from the word go '." • Nothing would satisfy Mr. Henderson, therefore, except that the Assembly should be asked absolutely without prejudice whether a Federation was in principle desirable. Mr. Henderson won ; and his victory explained the unusual note of hesitation and discomfort in M. Briand's speech on September 11th.
The proposal for a Federation will be examined by a Commission appointed by the League. If a Federation could by economic arrangements case the exchange of products throughout Europe so much the better. That would deserve everybody's blessing. But Mr. Henderson rightly held out no hope that Great Britain could become a closer member of a strictly organized Europe to the estrange- ment of the members of her own family. Nor could he admit that the Federation was really required, though in some ways it was a charming idea. The League already had all the necessary machinery for making nations physically secure and mutually helpful. Why invent new machinery ? Why not use what existed ?
When Mr. Henderson approached the subject of dis- armament he spoke with such earnestness that the whole Assembly was startled into strained attention. He said that though all men were searching for security, security would be impossible if the present competition in military preparations was allowed to go on. He declared that the British Government meant business about disarmament, but that every attempt at progress must fail unless "those on the other side " ceased to use disarmament as a mere phrase. The obligation to disarm set forth in Article 8 of the Treaty of Versailles had not yet been honoured. The pledge had often been mentioned. It had been renewed, but it had not been redeemed. "The peoples of the world," he exclaimed, "are growing impatient and doubtful of our good faith." He appealed to the Preparatory Commission to press on vigorously with its work in November so that the Disarmament Conference may be able to meet next year. "Those on the other side," we take it, are those countries which, like France, say that security must precede disarmament.
Incidentally Mr. Henderson expressed the hope that by amendments the Covenant would be brought into line with the Peace Pact, but he added that the British Government must make the important condition that a general Treaty for the reduction and limitation of arma- ments should be first carried through. We have frequently written on this subject, and shall not go into it again in detail now. The chief point is that it is not an urgent matter to make a Covenant which contemplates war in certain circumstances square with a Peace Pact which renounces war. Of course some people are so fussily-minded- tidily-minded, they would call it—as to want to tuck in every tiny thread which is seen protruding from the Covenant. We respect their purpose but cannot commend their wisdom. We mistrust a doctrine which in effect runs, "Seek peace and ensue it by getting people into the habit of thinking about war." The sanctions of the Covenant have never been used. It would be better to allow them gradually to lapse through disuse than to undertake some jigsaw puzzle of verbal reconciliation which might make the participants in the game lose their tempers.
Previous page
