examination this week. We note, however, that the Commis- sion
has, as usual, decided that the office of Commander-in- Chief has gradually been made too important, and that if the Secretary for War is to be really responsible for the Army, the powers of his rival must be divided. The Secretary, in fact, must have a professional staff, each of whom will control a department, and all of whom can form a kind of Council with whom he can advise. The key-note of reform, we have been convinced for years, lies there; but we are not a step nearer to securing it. The Crown dreads and dislikes any change, the Army is averse to the idea, and the statesmen, who ultimately rule, cannot get over an impression that the Secretary would job appointments for political reasons. Some precautions might be necessary to prevent that particular abuse, which once greatly injured the Navy; but while the dual administration lasts, there will be no organisation at once effective, alwaysi ready, and fairly cheap.
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