THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS. T HE Government preparations are, as far as
they go, entirely satisfactory. They adequately meet, that is, the immediate demands of the situation, and provide in the best way for our military needs in South Africa. It was eminently wise to employ, and so encourage, the admirable spirit shown by the Yeomanry and Volun- teers, and we do not doubt that the gallant men whose patriotic zeal has been turned to practical use will show themselves worthy of the confidence reposed in them. Unless we are greatly mistaken, we shall be told when the war is over that the generals in the field found no better material than that provided by the home Volunteers and Yeomanry. What we miss in the Government prepara- tions is not provision for the situation of the moment, but for the larger issues involved in the war in South Africa. We hold that in addition to what they are now doing they should mobilise the reserve portions of the Fleet, and begin the organisation of a Territorial Army of trained men on something like the lines we have already suggested. But before we deal with these points in detail let us say at once, and as emphatically as we can, that we do not advocate the mobilisation of the Fleet and the formation of a Territorial Army because we are in the least afraid of an invasion. We have no such dread. But in our opinion the rejection of any such dread is quite compatible with a desire to see this country put into such a posture of defence that it shall not be possible for even the wildest Chauvinist dreamer on the Continent to con- template the notion of invasion without feeling the thing to be utterly impossible and absurd. As we have said elsewhere, we want to give foreign Governments very sound grounds for telling their Jingoes that it is madness to think of attacking England. At present they would possibly be able to do so without any further preparations on our part. But suppose another sensational reverse on a big scale, and the need for the despatch of still further troops to South Africa. In that case we do not doubt that both in France and Russia there would be considerable pressure exerted on both Governments. They would be implored to seize the opportunity to give. the coup de griice to Carthage, while the German Government would be urged by its Colonial party to stand aside and pick up the pieces later. Now we must leave no temptation open for schemes of this sort, we will not say to be accepted, but even to be seriously con- sidered. And they will not be seriously considered if we have a Fleet held in readiness for immediate action, of the kind which would be in readiness if the whole Navy were mobilised. The Governments would then be able to tell their peoples, and to tell them truly If we try to attack Britain now she will take our fleets in detail and destroy in a day what we have taken so long to bring to perfec- tion. She has enough ships to beat us singly and collectively, and the fact that her shores are bristling with soldiers enables her to use her Fleet wherever she likes, and relieves her from having to keep even the Reserve Squadron near her own shores.' Can any one doubt the immense advantage of creating a state of things which will enable the serious statesmen of the Continent, who, remember, do not themselves want war, to speak like this ? Surely it is worth while to spend another three or four millions—though probably the extra cost of our proposal would not be anything like that—in order to obtain, not merely security, but the absence, even under the most un- favourable circumstances, of any rumour of insecurity. We want., in fact, to negotiate a big temporary insurance, which even if a little overdone on a narrow view of the case, will put us outside the risk of panic, and will enable us to carry on, not only the war in South Africa, but our ordinary business here, in the utmost confidence. This is the main reason for the mobilisation of the Navy and the formation of a Territorial Army for home defence, —an Army which will not only enable the Fleet to be entirely free in its actions, but which will also, if need be, allow the rest of our regular Army to be sent out of the Kingdom should difficulties arise, not merely in South Africa, but in India or Egypt. But in addition to this reason there is another of considerable weight. It has often been pointed out that the readiness of the reserve sections of the Navy for active service has never been tested, and that it cannot be said for certain that the machinery is as complete as it ought to be. But when proposals for a thorough mobilisation have been made, it has always been urged that sudden mobilisation in peace time might be regarded as an unfriendly act by the Powers, and would create a sense of panic, or at any rate of uncertainty, on the Continent which we should not be justified in creating. That there has hitherto been a, great deal of force in that argument we readily agree. Sea-power is by its nature so swift and terrible that it would have been contrary to international good feeling to mobilise the Navy on a. great scale in quiet times. Bet now we have an admirable opportunity for trying the great experiment of mobilisation without running the risk of hurting the feelings of other nations. No Power could now seriously contend that our preparations were of an unnecessary kind. When we have got an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men either separated from us by some six thousand miles of water or else actually on the sea, it is the merest common-sense to increase the active Fleet on a great scale. To provide for the protection of such lines of communications adequately, while providing also for the necessarily increased needs of our scattered Empire, is a perfectly legitimate act of prudence. In a word, no nation could at this moment feel fairly aggrieved at our mobilising our Fleet. By all the rules of the international game, we have a right to do so, and, as we have said, the best and most serious-minded statesmen on the Continent would at heart regard such a step with favour, for they would find in it the best answer to the excursions and alarms of their own Jingoes.
What we have said as to the organisation, or, rather, the preparation for the organisation, of a Territorial Army of trained men rests, of course, in the main on the arguments first used in regard to the Fleet. But it also can be supported as a great experiment for which the opportunity has now been given. We have always held that the great mistake in our Army system is the losing touch with the trained men who every year pase out of the Army Reserve, the Militia Army Reserve, and the Militia, and we have repeatedly urged that these trained men, when willing, should be organised as a Terri- torial Army for home defence. Many men pass entirely away from all connection with the regular Army or Militia at thirty-five and under, yet they would for home service be capable of fighting up till fifty-five or sixty. At this moment Lord Wemyss is organising a Volunteer Reserve out of the men who have passed through the Volunteers. We want the Government to organise a Territorial Army out of the men who have passed through the regular Army Reserve and the Militia. Of course such men must be paid and paid properly, for though we do not. doubt their patriotism they are poor men who cannot be expected to give their services for nothing. The initial plan we suggest for organising these trained men wound at present be something on these lines. At every regi- mental depot the Government should, in the first place, open a register where trained men (i.e., men who had been through their full service in the Army or Militia) should be invited to inscribe their names as willing to be embodied in special territorial regiments to be raised in case of further need. The men who thus inscribed their names should at once be given a retaining fee, and should then be told that they would not be wanted at present to leave their employment, but would be expected to put in an appear- ance once a week at a convenient hour for practice with the rifle—this could be done, of course, in the evenings or on Saturday afternoons as most suitable—and each week they would receive a money payment. Possibly it might not now be necessary to go beyond this point with the men, but retired officers and non-commissioned officere should at once be obtained, and equipment and cloth 04 should be got ready and stored at each depot. The incn should also be told what their terms of pay and service would be if actually called up, and these should be of a generous kind, including probably a bounty and a, pension. In this way we believe that a large force of men between thirty-five and fifty-five, who all knew their drill aed a', how to shoot, could be put into the field, and wou:.1 form one hundred and fifty as fine regiments as any in the world. It is true that they would not originally have an inherited regimental esprit de corps, but esprit de corps soon grows up among Englishmen, and ten days after embodi- ment the men would be almost as ready to die for the "good old regiment" as they are in the Grenadiers or the Mack Watch. Besides, the regiments would all be formed of men from the same locality, and that in itself gives esprit de corps. The details, however, are for the soldiers, and not for us. All we want to do now is to urge the Government to mobilise the Fleet at once, and at once to put in hand the organisation of that magnificent body of trained soldiers which is at present lost in the civilian population, but which only wants looking up and organising to form the basis for one of the most splendid military forces for home defence that the world has ever seen.
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