CORRESPONDENCE.
BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE-CRUISERS.
[TO FHB EDITOR OF TOR " SPECTATOR:]
SIR,—Public interest in naval construction has been stimu- lated of late by the launching, within a fortnight, of two great armoured ships for the Royal Navy, and the simul- taneous announcement that the principal armament of each ship will consist of 13-5-inch guns instead of the 12-inch guns hitherto adopted in all British battleships and large armoured cruisers. Another point of interest has arisen because, for the first time in the history of the Royal Navy, a vessel officially classed as a "cruiser "—the 'Lion '—has been set afloat of which the dimensions and coat will con- siderably exceed those of the largest battleship afloat,—the 'Orion.' Unofficial writers have been moved to suggest a new classification and to describe the 'Lion' and her sisters as " battle-cruisers" ; that is to say, as vessels fit to lie in the line of battle, and also capable of performing the duties of cruisers,—a hybrid conception which runs counter to the teaching of naval history. Another view of possible employ- ment for swift armoured vessels of the 'Lion' type is that &scribed by Admiral Bacon and mentioned in the Spectator of July 9th. According to the conception of future naval warfare, each 'Lion' is to be associated with a number of swift unarmoured cruisers, scouts, and destroyers, each group forming a "battle-unit." This is a departure from the historical constitution of a war-fleet; it has not been publicly endorsed by Admiralty authority, but Admiral Bacon ought to be well informed as to the official view of the subject, as he recently held high office in that Department. It is, therefore, a matter of the gravest character when we are informed by him that so radical a departure from precedent is possible or probable. The doctrine universally accepted hitherto has provided that each battle-fleet shall be made up of "capital ships," whose combined, tactics in action shall be directed by a Commander-in-Chief. The idea of. breaking up a battle-fleet into groups, or pelotons, with a. view to increasing the effective use of their gun-armaments, as is well known, has been repeatedly considered and has been experimentally applied in peace manoeuvres. The French, who have shown remarkable originality in devising new formations for fleets, and have put these variations to the test in manoeuvres, have reverted to the line-of-battle as the best possible formation. Moreover, in most, if not all, of these peace manoeuvres groups have been made up of "capital" ships, each well armed and strongly armoured, not of com- binations of single armoured ships with smaller vessels. The historic use of cruisers is, as the "eyes of a fleet," to gain intelligence of the enemy and his movements, and to "screen" the movements of the fleets to which they are attached. Proof is still wanting of any real or substantial advantage which may attach to the abandonment of their historic place by cruisers. The subdivision of capital ships in order that each may be the nucleus of a " battle-unit " of the kind described above is a dangerous novelty. It is to he hoped that this policy will not be pushed further without thorough consideration and experiment. It is strongly opposed by many high authorities on naval strategy and tactics, who are convinced that such " battle- units " would produce confusion and loss of control, if not serious disaster, in actual warfare. Their objections ought not to be put aside, but investigated.
. The simultaneous construction of the Orion' and the 'Lion' classes obviously demonstrates a disinclination on the part of the Admiralty to " plunge " on the battle-unit idea. The 'Orion' represents the older conception, and is intended to form one of a fleet of capital ships ; at present she has many more sister vessels on the building-slips than the 'Lion.' This fact is comforting to those who distrust the policy represented by the 'Lion.' It is not known how many, if any, of the five new armoured vessels provided for in the Navy Estimates of the current year are intended to be armoured cruisers. In connexion with that new programme the reasonableness or otherwise of building more vessels like the 'Lion' is a most important question, which ought to be officially and conclusively answered before a decision is taken, because the construction of these vessels involves an enormous expenditure which might be better bestowed. Up to the present time, although the 'Lion' is afloat and the Princess Royal,' her sister ship, is far advanced in construction, it is noteworthy that their actual cost is unknown to either Parliament or the public. In all other maritime countries before new vessels are ordered estimates of the expenditure involved in their construction and armament are submitted to and approved by Parliament. In recent years the House of Commons has been refused similar information, and costly ships have been laid down• without any particulars of first cost having been given. The alleged reason given for this reticence is that, in the public interest, the cost ought to be kept secret. This reason really has no force in view of foreign action ; the estimated total cost of each vessel—including armament, ammunition, and reserves—ought to be given to Parliament before she is laid down, as is done in Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and the United States. Only approximations to cost of the 'Lion' and' Orion' are possible, but there can be no doubt that the outlay on the 'Lion' must go much beyond that hitherto incurred on any battleship added to the Royal Navy. Actual cost will depend on the state of. the steel and shipbuilding trades at the time when a ship is ordered. Savings of that
kind are practically independent of the type laid down, and will be realised whether it takes the form of a battleship or an armoured cruiser. One may therefore safely use figures for costs which have been given for completed ships in Parlia- mentary Papers, and on this basis make rough estimates of relative costs for new types on the assumption that they will be built under the same conditions. The actual cost of the
Lion' will probably be less than this rough estimate would indicate, because she was ordered at a time when competition was keen, shipbuilding depressed, and prices ruled low. These temporary circumstances may fairly be ignored in making comparisons of the kind contemplated. One of the earliest armoured cruisers of the 'Invincible' class—each carrying eight 12-inch guns and possessing high speed—cost about one and three-quarter millions sterling, exclusive of guns, ammunition, and reserves. The vessels are 530 feet long, 17,250 tons in displacement, and their engines were intendefl to develop 41,000 horse-power. The 'Lion' is stated to be about 700 feet long, of 26,350 tons, with engines of 70,000 horse-power, and she is to carry eight 13-5-inch guns. On the basis of the Invincible' class, therefore, a reasonable estimate for the coat of a 'Lion' built in similar circumstances would be about two and a third millions sterling, exclusive of armament. The battleship 'Dreadnought' is 490 feet long, of about 18,000 tons, with engines of 23,000 horse-power, and cost (round figures) about £1,700,000 sterling, exclusive of guns, ammunition, and reserves. The battleship 'Orion' is said to be 54.5 feet long, of 22,500 tons, with engines of 27,000 horse-power. On the basis of the 'Dreadnought's' cost the 'Orion' would cost about £2,100,000. From these figures it appears that, rapid as has been the increase in cost and dimensions of British battleships since the 'Dreadnought' era began (1905), the rate of increase in dimensions and cost of armoured cruisers has been still greater. The plea for a reconsideration of our policy of naval construction put forward in the Spectator of July 16th is consequently not ill-timed or unnecessary.
Not long ago Admiral Bacon in an article published in a Service magazine maintained that much harm might be done—if it had not been already done—by critics of Admiralty policy who demanded publication of the reasons upon which that policy was based. The preferable course, according to the gallant officer, for outsiders and the public generally, was to trust the Admiralty; to rest on the assurance that, having the best information and talent at its disposal, the decisions of that Department might be accepted confidently whatever results they might involve. This is undoubtedly a comfort- able doctrine for officials and ex-officials ; it can hardly be accepted by outsiders in view of rapid changes which have taken place in Admiralty policy during the last five years. These changes cannot be admitted to be an outcome of experience or experiment; they are explicable only on the assumption of changes of opinion on the part of responsible authorities in regard to matters of vital importance. For example, in the disposition of the heavy glum in battle- ships and armoured cruisers change has followed upon change, without the possibility of experience with earlier arrangements, because the ships were not completed and their arrange- ments were not tried in practice before further change took place. In regard to the use of internal armour for defence against torpedoes and submarine mines there has been a similar lack of continuity of policy or practical experiment on rival methods, one or other of which must have been inferior, if not mistaken. Another reason for urging that the public should be better informed as to the principles underlying Admiralty policy is to be found in action taken by other maritime countries which formerly favoured the construction of armoured cruisers, but have now ceased to build vessels of the type. Italy, France, and the United States formerly devoted large expenditure to the construction of armoured cruisers ; they now concentrate expenditure on battleships. Germany alone has been following our lead of late; she has built far fewer armoured cruisers than our- selves, and has simultaneously and steadily constructed a con- siderable number of small protected cruisers. The Admiralty until quite recently made no similar additions of small cruisers to the Royal Navy, but "scrapped" many vessels that might have rendered valuable service in case of war. Japan is said to be now contemplating the constructionof other large armoured cruisers, or cruiser-battleships. If this
is true, it may possibly be a reply to our construction of two such vessels which are the gifts of Australia and New Zealand to the Imperial Navy, and are avowedly intended for service in the Pacific. In the war with Russia Japan perforce was compelled to use armoured cruisers in the line of battle, because she then possessed few battleships. Our armoured cruisers might be used similarly in case of need, but it might be preferable to build battleships instead ; and a remote possibility can hardly be regarded as a justification for the huge expenditure involved in the construction of each vessel of the 'Lion' type. The abnormal cost of such a vessel is largely due to the extraordinarily high speed contemplated ; in proportion to her size and cost she possesses small relative powers of offence and defence, while the great length involves greater exposure to under-water attacks. These considerations are important, and must be admitted to be so by every unprejudiced observer. Is it too much to ask that an official explanation should be given of the place and purpose intended for these gigantic and costly ships in our scheme of naval defence? Amateur tacticians have told us that these battle- ernisers are to overtake a flying enemy, and to compel his fleet to face an action with a pursuing battle-fleet; or that they are to drive in an enemy's cruisers and gain intelligence of his numbers and force. Past experience of war does not give support to these projects ; the writers who put them forward are irresponsible persons. Can any reason, based upon true public interest, be given why the British Parlia- ment and people should not be authoritatively informed as to the employment intended for the largest and most costly warships yet added to the Royal Navy P am, Sir, &c., C syn.
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