THE THREATENED SINGLE-HANDED ACTION BY FRANCE.
BONAR LAW'S speech on Monday at the dinner of the Associated Franco-British Societies was excellent because it fulfilled the double function of being very friendly and very frank. He said that a break between France and Great Britain was " unthinkable." That is, of course, perfectly true, if only because of our geographical positions. If Englishmen should ever be called upon again to defend themselves in arms against a grand attack they could not do it, as in their historic past, merely upon the seas. Our defensive frontiers extend far into the heart of Continental Europe ; they lie wherever a future enemy may establish his starting- points for aircraft. But that is not the only reason for friendship between ourselves and France if either of us is to enjoy any sense of security or any real degree of prosperity. Without the co-operation of France we cannot restore the economic foundations of Europe. Modern finance and trade are much too complicated and delicate for it to be possible for either France or Great Britain to succeed if we worked against each other. These facts may be temporarily obscured by misunder- standing or ignorance, but they are bound to assert themselves in the long run, and would emerge into the clear light of day in an emergency. We may safely say, therefore, that co-operation between France and Great Britain is an essential which is imposed upon us by the facts, and would always be so imposed even if there _ _ were not• very, friendly '-impulses and sentiments—whiCh there notoriously, are—on. the • part of • Engliihraen, in favour, of this ..co-operation.
Many "people have been -quite naturally alarmed lately by 'the' threat of . M. Poincare that- if. Great Britain does not support _Frame in demanding what France considers adequate reparations. from Germany, France will take action alone • and occupy the Ruhr district. M. Poineare and. his , friends have -explained that such action. would be quite in accordance with. the Treaty of Versailles, which .sanotians, so they 'say, individual voluntary. action by any one of the Allies. No doubt the Treaty of Ver- sailles, like all other. Treaties, leaves room for different interpretations of • several' of ' the clauses. Probably M. Poincare can indicate words which seem verbally to confirm the right to 'take single-handed action which he claims.- Al! we can say in answer is: that his interpreta- tion is in any case opposed to the whole -sense and. spirit of the Treaty—a. Treaty which: assumes, and, is indeed founded' upon, common .consent and collective action. M. Poineares threat, as we have said, has .been. a' .cause of ,alarm, but w.hen we reflect upon the immutable facts which we . described at the beginning of this article, we confesa , that we cannot seriously join in. the alarm. To be quite explicit,. we do not believe that France will match' alone. We do, not believe that she. will occupy the Ruhr, district: Mr. Boner. Law„ secure his consciousness of -the fact that France..and Great Britain, have not, merely chosen to be .friends but -must. be friends, very properly allowed himself • to criticize the projected French action quite freely. What is the use of being . friends if one. cannot - speak one's. thoughts'? Mt. Boner Law said :- " I was surprised, admit, to find it stated that according to the- Treaty of Versailles one of the Allies was entitled, to take such action as entering the Ruhr alone. If it is true, just think of what.follows., •one Ally is entitled to do some- thing alone, another.Ally.is.eutitled to _say, I will have nothing to .do with it.' I say for England 'and ,France such .a ,condition of ,things would play directly into the hands of our old-enemies and would be exaetly•what Germany •would want. A greater misfortune to France or England could not happen than a development such as that, and it must not happen."
Mr: Boner Law, of course, did not: do more than indicate the dangers, but the subject might be taken much further. We can imagine a thoughtful Frenchman saying to himself something of this sort : " What, should we gain by this single-handed action ? Is it certain that we should get our full share of the reparations we demand .? Suppose that by a 'display of force we reduced Germany to a, state of compliance • could we take our full share while the rest of the Allies got none .? Yet it is obvious that.if we gat our full .share and others got none, we should be getting it at the expense of the others. They could not be expected to consent. That, indeed, would be to make the Treaty look ridiculous! Great Britain has lent us much money, but.she has also borrowed much money from America, who is demanding payment. Could she look on without a word while one of her .chances of being able to pay America vanished into thin air— especially when the misfortune was being brought on her by one of her debtors ? But to suppose that Germany will really be forced into compliance is, after all, only a wild assumption. Suppose Germany played the game of passive resistance, as she probably would. Suppose she took no hostile action against us whatever, but just pro- fessed complete inability to pay and, as a matter of fact, did not pay. We should be in a poor position to win a game like that, because we should be acting on our sole authority and should have no support from our Allies.. Of course, we might .try to frighten Germany byextending the occupation and making her think that she was in danger of losing the whole country. We might occupy Berlin. We might occupy Hamburg. We might occupy Munich. But by the time our occupations grew to that scale we should be employing an army of perhaps 2,000,000 men. Even if we extracted all the payments that we hoped for from Germany they would not meet the new bill which we had. run up for :ourselves ! "
We have tried to describe the cautious thoughts which may be filling many French minds. The French people as a whole are extraordinarily sensible ; if they were not they could not manage their private affairs so well as they .de. We feel pretty -sure, therefore,. that -common- sense, 'realism, or 'even the far-famed *logic ..of . the French, when -it. is 'applied to -NC Phincares particular proposition, will prevail. We have just•read -with .exceptional'pleasure an' article on Franco-British relations by M. "Georges Soelle, Professor -of International Law at: Dijon, published in Le Pregris 'Civique. Professor Soelle 'argues with brilliant effect' that there can he no fruitful co-operation between France and Great Britain till.. it is thoroughly imderstood.that we are dealing with a world-wide problem and not merely with the- particular interests of either France or Great 'Britain. The interest- of France is security ; the- interest, of Britain:is foreign trade, without whioh, she periihes. Professor Scelle tells his countrymen that when they interpret what looks like perverseBritish indnlgence towards Germany as a kind' Of ' hostility: to France, they -display their misunderstanding of the whole nature 'of the problem. The truth will no 'doubt; reveal itself some day; and in the meantime the hots, will invisibly keep us safe from the -dreadful events which alarmists think are sure to be the-result-of French policy.
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